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0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS  
 
This report sets out findings of the evaluation of the National Open Disclosure 
Program. The report’s contents address the questions that govern this evaluation as 
defined in the original Call for Tenders: “what it is about this kind of intervention that 
works, for whom does it work, in what circumstances does it work, in what respects 
does it work and why does it work”. The Report brings together the research work 
done by the Evaluation Team, which includes staff from the University of Technology 
Sydney, The University of Melbourne, and The University of Queensland. Short 
biographical statements can be found in Appendix L. 
This Report presents analyses of data collected in Victoria, South Australia, 
Queensland and New South Wales. This data includes: 
1. 154 interviews with health care professionals and consumers. Of these 
interviews, 131 were conducted with health care professionals, 15 were 
conducted with patients and 8 with family members.  
2. 80 questionnaire surveys (health care professionals only).  
Details about numbers of interviewees and survey respondents per State and per site 
are included in the Appendices. 
0.1 Overview 
Data analysis reveals three main aspects of Open Disclosure:  
 
1. Open Disclosure is met with approval and relief on the part of health professionals 
and consumers:  
a. staff can now discuss matters that in the past were often seen as too 
difficult to discuss 
b. consumers express feeling pleased for being told what happened 
2. Open Disclosure is not a temporary fad: health care staff and consumers 
interviewed and surveyed see Open Disclosure as integral to fostering and 
maintaining good relationships in health care, and to enhancing health care 
services  
3. as emerging practice, Open Disclosure creates uncertainties about: 
a. which incidents ‘trigger’ (High or Low Level) Open Disclosure 
b. the impact of Open Disclosure on their and their organisation’s reputation 
c. the legal and insurance implications of Open Disclosure 
d. whether colleagues will support those carrying out Open Disclosure. 
0.2  Main Recommendations 
Staff and consumers highlight the importance of: 
1. Staff conveying their apologies in ways that are sincere  
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2. Patients and families becoming involved in the incident management and practice 
improvement processes that contextualise Open Disclosure by staff making it 
possible for consumers1 to contribute their views on, questions about and insights 
into health care service work that they or family members have been involved in, 
thus helping staff to broaden the scope of their enquiries and their learning  
3. Open Disclosure training being provided to health care staff across Australia to 
ensure that clinical staff do not remain exposed (as they are now) to the risk of 
their and/or their colleagues’ inadequate approaches to disclosing adverse events 
4. Junior staff being engaged in Open Disclosure training to  
a. equip them for disclosure of adverse events  
b. intensify their attentiveness to patients’ experiences, needs and feelings 
5. Policy makers considering undertaking a review of the legal processes and 
practices bearing on institutional apology, Qualified Privilege and no-fault liability 
6. Clinical professionals committing to a shared and cross-organisationally networked 
responsibility for health-service-produced (unexpected) outcomes 
7. Researchers being directed to produce Australian evidence to show whether Open 
Disclosure benefits local health care organisations and consumers.  
0.3 Main Findings: The Interview Data 
0.3.1 For health care staff, what works is when: 
 
1. Open Disclosure provides frontline clinicians with the opportunity to discuss 
unexpected outcomes in a way that is  
a. morally justifiable  
b. not constrained by professional and/or organisational status 
c. mindful of how health organisational complexity mitigates individual 
blame 
2. High Level Open Disclosure2 occurs when: 
a. the adverse event is a Sentinel Event,  
b. it attracts a SAC 1 (and on occasions a SAC2) rating, and  
c. it is experienced by the patient (and/or family member[s]) as significantly 
impacting on their physical and/or emotional well-being 
3.  Low Level Open Disclosure occurs of ‘intercepted’ mishaps (including if they do not 
‘reach the patient’) that:   
a. are judged to provide shared learning opportunities for the patient 
(family), the organisation and for staff,  
                                                     
1 In this report, the terms ‘consumer’ and ‘patients and family members’ are used inter-changeably. 
2 ‘High Level Open Disclosure’ is distinguished from ‘Low Level Open Disclosure’ as follows: High Level Open Disclosure 
occurs in cases of serious harm (attracting a Severity Assessment Rating of 1, possibly 2). In contrast to High Level Open 
Disclosure, Low Level Open Disclosure allows clinicians to conduct a more ‘local’ (to the unit or department) organisational 
response (Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2003: 37). 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 6
b. that are experienced by the patient (and/or family) as distressing 
c. peer judgment classifies as breaches of an accepted standard of skill, a 
formal rule or an established fact of knowledge 
d. whose decision to disclose is achieved dialogically – through negotiation 
with the relevant  stakeholders 
4. Open Disclosure – particularly High Level Disclosure – is planned, conducted 
and/or closely supported and monitored by staff who have been trained and have 
gained experience in carrying out Open Disclosure 
5. Open Disclosure – particularly High Level Disclosure – is coordinated and 
supported by staff with specialised administrative-managerial appointments (e.g. 
the Patient Safety Officer, the Quality Coordinator, the Patient Liaison Officer, the 
Manager of Patient Safety, or the Director of Clinical Governance)3 
6. Open Disclosure is participated in by senior clinical (particularly senior medical) 
staff  
7. Open Disclosure is conducted by staff who have excellent communication and 
listening skills 
8. Open Disclosure is conducted in circumstances where clinicians involved in the 
adverse event have pre-established a good relationship and understanding with 
the patient (and family) 
9. Open Disclosure is a sub-component of an established clinical governance system 
that encompasses:  
a. well-established multi-disciplinary team processes,  
b. flexibly systematised work practices4,  
c. vigorous incident investigation and practice improvement structures, and  
d. interpersonal attitudes and relationships that afford questioning and 
critique of a kind that is not constrained by hierarchical difference and 
professional experience 
10. Open Disclosure encompasses careful pre-planning, responsive disclosure, 
adequate follow-up and internal as well as independent counselling support 
11. Open Disclosure is structured to include consideration of paying for patients’ and/or 
family members’ out-of-pocket expenses 
 
0.3.1.1 For patients and family members, what works is when: 
 
1. Patient (and/or family members) are shown respect by being offered an immediate 
and sincere apology 
                                                     
3 While this works for frontline clinical staff, consumers’ views of the roles and effectiveness of such personnel depend on 
the extent to which the consumers expect and are enabled to meet with those most closely involved in the adverse event 
(see Section 2.5 below). 
4 ‘Flexible systematisation’ refers to clinical teams actively negotiating the contours of their work practices with each other 
on a regular, iterative basis (Timmermans & Berg, 2003). ‘Flexible systematisation’ involves (i) devising formal pathways 
that describe how the work is done and (ii) on-the-job examination and negotiation of how in situ work articulates with those 
pathways (Iedema & Degeling, 2001). 
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2. Open Disclosure is conducted as much as possible by those originally involved in 
the patients’ care, or contact is instigated at some point with those originally 
involved in the patients’ care 
3. Those in charge of carrying out Open Disclosure enable patients (and/or their 
families) to appoint a support person  
4. Those carrying out Open Disclosure engage consumers on three levels:  
a. negotiating with consumers the details and impact of the adverse event 
b. eliciting from consumers matters they want to see clarified and taken 
action on 
c. sharing with consumers carefully structured feedback as matters come 
to light rather than delaying feedback until the end of a closed-door 
investigation 
5. Open Disclosure counter-balances the fragmentation of health care occasioned by:  
a. relevant staff moving to other institutions;  
b. different staff expressing conflicting or accusatory perspectives on the 
causes of the unexpected outcome 
c. revelations of adverse events being made by staff at alternative 
institutions without such staff initiating appropriate, pre-emptive 
communication with the health care facility where the original care was 
provided 
d. different staff engaging consumer(s) in repeated questioning about the 
case (without the reasons for asking such questions or the conclusions 
drawn from the answers being made clear) 
e. lengthy investigations of adverse events producing a hiatus in the 
contact between the health facility and those harmed  
6. High Level Open Disclosure is deployed appropriately for all high-severity adverse 
events5 
7. Open Disclosure is enacted by staff who are proficient in ‘active (or reflective) 
listening’ (Egan, 2006), ensuring patients and family members gain the opportunity 
to express their grief, guilt, and/or anger 
8. Open Disclosure is carried out in a way that is sensitive to consumers’ culturally 
and linguistically diverse backgrounds 
9. Open Disclosure is planned, arranged, conducted and concluded as part of an 
ongoing dialogue with the patient and/or family 
10. Open Disclosure meetings are complemented with written notes for staff and 
patients (and/or families) containing  
a. a summary of what is verbally discussed during the meeting(s)  
b. an explanation concerning the medical-technical dimensions of the 
adverse event  
c. a statement that outlines the positions and responsibilities of staff 
involved in Open Disclosure  
                                                     
5 See footnote 2. 
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d. an overview of the organisational-administrative-managerial roles, 
structures and processes describing the service where the adverse 
event occurred  
11. A summary of these Open Disclosure notes (see point 10 above) are included in 
the clinical notes to inform clinical colleagues. 
 
0.3.1.2 In what circumstances and in what respects does Open Disclosure work? 
 
1.  Open Disclosure works well particularly in the case of low-level incidents where 
Open Disclosure is regarded as being continuous with existing disclosure 
practices, and where it is generally be enacted by those originally involved in the 
care6 
2.  Notification of adverse events occurs internally (by clinicians on the team involved 
in the adverse event) rather than externally (by staff at other institutions, by 
complaints bodies, by media outlets, etc) 
3.  High-severity cases lead to rapid and sensitive preparation on the part of the Open 
Disclosure team to ensure the Open Disclosure meeting is enacted in a way that 
acknowledges both patients’ and families’ expectations and staff’s reactions and 
needs 
4.  Support for staff and consumers may involve emotional debriefs and independent 
counselling; debriefing and counselling for staff and consumers may be required 
before and following an Open Disclosure event7 
5.  Open Disclosure works well when staff treat it as a dynamic and emergent 
process; that is, what triggers Open Disclosure, how Open Disclosure is 
conducted, how frequently patients and families need to be followed up are matters 
that are situationally determined 
6.  The practice of Open Disclosure is supported by staff involving patients and 
families more openly in discussions (pre- and post-admission) about the risks 
inherent in health care treatment, including: 
a. medical risk (scientific evidence of the percentage chance of success of 
a particular treatment) 
b. clinical risk (information about the types and training levels of the 
professionals involved in carrying out the treatment, including 
specification of medical and nursing personnel; information about risks 
of cross-infection and mis-medication) and  
c. service risk (referring to organisational resource constraints, capacity, 
under-staffing, etc) 
7.  The practice of Open Disclosure is supported by public education that alerts 
consumers to the shortcomings inherent in much public reporting about health care 
systems and services, including:  
a. the limited attention paid to health service complexity in favour of 
simplistic, alarmist and blame-oriented reports 
                                                     
6 We raise a caveat with respect to the notion that “we [clinicians]’ve always done it” in Section 2 below. 
7 Pre-Open Disclosure debriefing and counselling will focus on people’s experiences of the adverse event. Post-Open 
Disclosure debriefing and counselling are more likely to also focus on people’s experience of the disclosure itself. 
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b. the constant emphasis placed on the gee-whiz facets of medical care at 
the expense of sober assessments of what contemporary health 
services can be expected to provide. 
 
0.4 Main Findings: The Questionnaire Survey Data8  
 
1. Survey responses (80, response rate 74%) show that respondents are in agreement 
that Open Disclosure is of benefit:  
a. respondents strongly agree that Open Disclosure benefits health care staff and 
health care services 
b. respondents strongly agree that Open Disclosure benefits patients and families 
2. Survey respondents also agree that Open Disclosure: 
a. imposes an emotional burden 
b. imposes a resource burden  
c. has advantages that outweigh its emotional and resource costs  
3.  Survey respondents are uncertain about: 
a. whether Open Disclosure can be detrimental to professionals’ or organisations’ 
reputation 
b. whether colleagues will support them in their disclosure of adverse events 
c. when, how and with whom to enact Open Disclosure 
4.  Nursing and medical survey respondents differ on the following points:  
a. nursing staff responses suggest nurses may be more burdened than other health 
care professional staff by the emotional impact of Open Disclosure 
b. medical staff responses suggest that doctors may be more conscious (than other 
health care professional staff) of unexpected outcomes not always being 
appropriately communicated to consumers. 
 
                                                     
8 The questionnaire survey used for this project can be found in the Appendices to this Report. 
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This Final Report is the second of two reports written by the Evaluation Team for the 
National Open Disclosure Steering Committee, to satisfy the requirements of Tender 
N0001 issued by Queensland Health in 2006 and contracted to the National Open 
Disclosure Program Evaluation Team at the University of Technology Sydney. The 
Interim Report was submitted in June 2007. The present Final Report brings to a close 
the Team’s evaluation of the pilot implementation of the National Open Disclosure 
Program. 
  
This Final Report is organised in four main sections.  
Section 1. Introduction (the present section) 
Section 2. Analysis of the interview data 
Section 3. Analysis of survey data  
Section 4. Open Disclosure – Innovative Policy and Practice 
 
 
1.2 The Research Team 
This Final Report has been prepared by a team of cross-disciplinary researchers from 
three major Australian Universities: The University of Technology Sydney (UTS), The 
University of Melbourne and the University of Queensland. The team brings together 
expertise in, among others, communication studies, hospital and clinical ethnography, 
adult education, law, health policy and management, and clinical expertise including 
pharmacy, nursing, and allied health. The team boasts an impressive international 
reputation for initiating research at the interstices between health policy (reform), in situ 
hospital work, clinical communication and innovative social science. The present report 
represents the fruit of their collaborative effort: Within 12 months the team arranged 
Human Research Ethics Approval from 28 Ethics Committees across Australia, 
conducted in-depth interviews with more than 150 staff and consumers, and produced 
a report that is likely to become a global benchmark for frontline staff engaging in Open 
Disclosure.   
1.3 Human Research Ethics Committee Approval 
Approval was received from 28 Human Research Ethics (HRE) Committees for this 
project. There was a very high level of scrutiny of the science underpinning the project, 
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the project plan, and the researchers’ credentials. One HRE Committee rejected our 
application on grounds that no Open Disclosure was taking place in the relevant pilot 
site. Other HREC applications were delayed by some months; again others were 
delayed beyond the time frame of the current project, obviating data collection at those 
pilot sites (see Appendix D). Not many committees accepted the National Ethics 
Application Form (NEAF), and still fewer committees accepted approvals gained 
elsewhere using the NEAF as deserving their ratification (see Appendix D). 
1.4 The Methodology 
Data Collection: Staff interviewed were identified by the Open Disclosure project 
officers at the pilot sites (41 hospitals around Australia that had signed up for the Open 
Disclosure pilot project in 2006), and they were requested to allow the research team 
to make contact with them for the purpose of an interview. Health care staff 
interviewees were sent project information and consent forms. Upon completing and 
returning these they were sent a questionnaire survey and they were approached by 
phone for an interview appointment. Consumers were also identified by the relevant 
pilot facilities and initially contacted by the Patient Liaison Officer or equivalent, for 
permission for the research team to contact them. Some facilities declined to invite 
their patients (and/or family members) to be part of this research. The interviews were 
thus entirely voluntary for both the interviewees and the health facilities involved. This 
does mean however that we have been able to interview only an average of six to 
seven staff per hospital pilot site, and one consumer per hospital pilot site (see 
Appendix C for details). Some sites were much more forthcoming however than others 
in their support for this project, indicating experience and confidence with Open 
Disclosure. Other Open Disclosure pilot sites limited their involvement in the project, 
either because there were reservations about consumers being interviewed as well as 
staff, or because no Open Disclosure program was as yet known to have been 
initiated. Queensland stands out as the State where most of our data was gathered, 
from staff, consumers and central agencies. Interviewees have been very cooperative 
and enthusiastic. The consumers showed appreciation of the opportunity to talk to an 
external party about what happened to them while they (or family members) were 
treated in hospital, and about how the hospital conducted Open Disclosure.  
The total number interviews conducted is 154. Of these, 131 were conducted with 
health professionals9 and 15 were conducted with patients and 8 with family members. 
All interview sessions were audio-taped and transcribed, resulting in almost 2000 
                                                     
9 Of these 131 interviews with health care staff, 24 were conducted in New South Wales, 29 in South Australia, 33 in 
Victoria, and 68 in Queensland. Most of our consumer interviews were conducted in Queensland (15 out of a total of 23).  
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pages of data. The interview schedules and questionnaire survey are included in 
Appendices F-J at the back of this Report. 
Interview Data Analysis: The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth, ranging 
from 45 minutes to 2 hours in duration. Interviews were transcribed from the sound 
files by project team members. Most interview transcripts were coded by three (and in 
some instances four) team members independently10, supplemented by summary 
reports prepared by team member interviewers. The transcripts codings were 
tabulated and brought together for verification, comparison and further refinement, 
ensuring the data is processed in a way that is credible, reliable and retrievable. In line 
with the tender brief, analytical attention was given particularly to distilling interviewees’ 
practical suggestions and solutions that ensure Open Disclosure becomes part of 
everyday practice. 
The transcripts were analysed using semantic discourse analysis (Iedema, 2003). The 
importance of this approach is borne out by how this analytical method was able to 
capture not just the exquisite detail of health care professionals’ and consumers’ 
experiences, but also the emotional and interpersonal subtleties that were embedded 
in their responses. The significance of staff and consumers having been able to 
articulate (and of researchers having been able to analyse) these situational, emotional 
and interpersonal matters, is that now we have an in-depth map and State-of-the-Art 
outline of current Open Disclosure practices and perceptions in Australia, 
complemented with individual people’s stories (‘Vignettes’) enriching these 
descriptions with contextual and personal detail.  
Survey Data: In total, in excess of 80 survey questionnaires have been received. 
Because it was not possible to determine the sample size for the cohort of survey 
respondents (due to insufficient information about how many staff nationally are 
involved in carrying out Open Disclosure) we have had to limit our survey analysis to 
percentage comparisons across the cohort of respondents.  
Ethnography of Open Disclosure: The research team has had no opportunity to 
observe a ‘live’ Open Disclosure session. The circumstances and matters discussed at 
Open Disclosure sessions proved too sensitive for researchers to be allowed in to ‘live’ 
Open Disclosure sessions to carry out their observations. We were fortunate enough to 
attend several ‘real play’ Open Disclosure training sessions in both Queensland and 
New South Wales.  
 
                                                     
10 Interviews conducted between April and August 2007 were analysed by between three and four investigators. Interviews 
conducted between September and November 2007 were analysed by between one and two investigators due to time 
constraint (the Final Report was due 30 November 2007, with some interviews still being conducted late November as a 
result of delayed and highly complex project approval processes).  
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1.5 Structure of the Report 
This Report is presented as follows. In the first part of Section 2, we begin with an 
overview of the interview data and of the specific recommendations that interviewees 
conveyed on the basis of having been (or being) engaged in Open Disclosure. The 
data is arranged in the order in which frontline staff is likely to be confronted with news 
of an adverse event, a decision (or directive) to initiate Open Disclosure, the processes 
of pre-planning and scheduling the Open Disclosure meeting, conducting the Open 
Disclosure meeting, following the Open Disclosure meeting up with specialised support 
for staff and/or consumers, involvement in adverse event investigation, and 
disseminating findings from such investigation to relevant stakeholders.  
In the second part of Section 2, the Report moves on to consider patients’ and family 
members’ views of how staff conduct Open Disclosure. We present the data as 
follows: we follow the unfolding of Open Disclosure (like in the previous section 
detailing the staff interview analysis) as it would involve the consumer. We then itemise 
consumers’ accounts to take stock of the number of Open Disclosure events, the 
number of successful Open Disclosures, the types of problems and main concerns, 
and a range of further related issues. 
In Section 3, we present our analysis of the questionnaire survey. We collected 80 
surveys. The responses found in those surveys provide an important source of 
confirmation for the conclusions drawn from the interview data.  
In Section 4, we present our conclusion and some remaining questions. 
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2   ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS’,  PATIENTS’ AND 
 FAMILY MEMBERS’ INTERVIEW DATA 
2.1 Executive Overview 
 
At a most general level, interview responses reveal the following. 
1.  The interview data confirm the positive conclusions derived from our analysis of 
the questionnaire survey.  
2.  Interviews with health care staff revealed that: 
a. All of the 131 health care staff interviewed, without exception, expressed approval 
of the Open Disclosure initiative.  
b. Open Disclosure enhances relationships not just with consumers but also among 
health care staff.  
c.  Open Disclosure is challenging because (particularly in the case of severe adverse 
events) it requires  
i.  ongoing attention to how the various stakeholders see and experience 
responses and initiatives; 
ii.  dynamic adaptation of Open Disclosure strategy to stakeholders’ 
perceptions and experiences. 
3.  Interviews with consumers revealed that: 
d. Open Disclosure was in most cases experienced as an attempt on the part of 
clinicians and the organisation to show respect for the dignity of the patient. 
e. Open Disclosure is not necessarily enacted according to policy, respecting the 
appropriate level of organisational involvement and realising the appropriate level 
of formality of disclosure. 
f.  The less severe the adverse event, the more likely it is that the patient and/or 
family is given the opportunity to speak with the clinicians who were involved in the 
treatment and closest to the incident, and vice versa.  
g. Open Disclosure was only in isolated instances experienced as inappropriate. 
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2.2  Introduction 
This Section 2 of the report presents the analysis of the interview data.  
2.3  The Perceived Benefits of Open Disclosure 
 
Almost without exception, health care staff and consumer interviewees expressed approval 
of Open Disclosure as policy principle and in terms of how it is experienced in practice.  
All of the 131 health care staff interviewed, without exception, expressed approval of the 
Open Disclosure initiative. While it is clear that it places an extra burden on staff, Open 
Disclosure is a measure that enables staff to pay attention to how relationships with 
patients are maintained. The relationship with the patient goes to the heart of health care, 
and this may explain the relief expressed by interviewees at being asked to be open about 
unexpected outcomes.  
“Everybody that’s been involved with it have felt quite relieved.”  
[Support Personnel 51-91]11 
“I think in some ways they [staff] are relieved because … there is a plan: this is what we are 
going to do with this family.” 12 
[Director Clinical Department 88-19] 
Besides the moral importance of Open Disclosure requiring staff to do the right thing, Open 
Disclosure has gained interpersonal and personal importance for staff. That is, Open 
Disclosure is seen as important for enhancing patients’ healing as a result of their trust in 
the health care organisation, and it improves the health of working relationships among 
staff.  
“ I think …it  makes for a healthier organisation.”  
[Medical Manager 38-170] 
                                                     
11 This coding convention provides a generalised (de-identifying) organisational position description of the interviewee, a 
confidential State identifier code, and a transcript page number. The organisational positions are kept general for the 
purpose of de-identification and confidentiality: Medical Clinician, Nursing Clinician, Medical Manager and Nursing 
Manager (a Medical or Nursing professional who spends more than 20/25% of their time on managerial matters), Support 
Personnel (Patient Liaison Officer, Quality Coordinator, Patient Safety Officer, and related roles), and Senior 
Medical/Nursing Manager (staff with no or very limited clinical duties).  
12 Interview quotes have been edited to facilitate their reading. Editing involves omitting hesitations, repetitions, and any 
non-ideational content (e.g. ‘um’, ‘well’, ‘you know’). Words added in square brackets are our additions to clarify the 
meaning of what is said. Three dots are used to indicate that language deemed unnecessary is omitted from the quote. Full 
quotes are available upon request. However, Ethics Committee approval was granted on condition we preserve 
interviewees’ confidentiality, and it is therefore not possible to provide full transcripts as they may be identifying. 
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“We had a massive case of an absolutely horrendous situation involved and we went through an 
Open Disclosure process and that was the most amazingly kind of positive experience.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 32-84] 
 
For those who have had the opportunity to handle the emotional intensity of Open 









Open Disclosure creates trusting relationships 
 
“The clinician had made an error in judgment 
and had not picked up on something. Now he 
wasn’t the only one that didn’t pick up on it, 
there were other people involved, and there was 
a series of things that had taken place that 
would have allowed that to happen. And, it was 
an amazingly big group in this [meeting] room 
[to do Open Disclosure], I’ll never forget it, it 
must’ve been about fifteen people and a couple 
of relatives because the patient was 
unconscious at that time. And it was just the 
most powerful thing I’ve ever seen, this guy 
[clinician] sort of saying, ‘I really don’t know 
what happened. I really can’t explain what 
happened, but it shouldn’t have happened, and I 
have to take the responsibility for that. I was the 
one that had the responsibility for it’. You could 
see he was gutted and the family responded to 
that. This was a human and their loved one was 
in there not well and really nobody knew how 
things were going to progress. [But] then she 
[patient] did wake up and, and the relationship 
that was formed between the patient and her 
partner and the clinician was really quite 
phenomenal and they both learnt such a lot 
from that whole episode and over time the 
patient came back on board. But we were there 
every step of the way supporting [her], and 
when it was evident she was going to need 
ongoing rehabilitation, then we organised 
transport and all those little things.”  




Patients and family members have commented positively too on having had adverse events 
disclosed to them.  
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“They explained things to my other children and I. They explained the obvious. They didn’t tell 
lies, they told the truth. [They said] ‘Your son and your brother will never ever have you know a 
decent quality of life.’ But by the same token they also said that miracles can happen. And they 
have been, all of the doctors and most of the nurses they have been so wonderful, caring and 
compassionate. So, I found it helpful, we could ask questions, and the basic thing is they told us 
the truth, they did not tell any lies. I appreciated that. Me and my kids found it very helpful.”  
[Mother of patient; 5]13 
“They [clinicians] explained all these things. So, it was helpful I found. It’s cleared up a lot of 
things. It was very useful.”  
[Patient; 8] 
 
Patients and family members have also commented on their experiences of what they 
perceived to be inadequate disclosures. We analyse their comments in Section 2.5 below. 
2.4  Health Care Professionals’ Views On Open Disclosure 
 
The findings from the health care workers’ interviews are presented under five over-arching 
headings:  
 
- Before the Open Disclosure Meeting Takes Place (Section 2.4.1);  
- Conducting the Open Disclosure Meeting (Section 2.4.2); 
- Following up: What happens after the Open Disclosure meeting (Section 2.4.3); 
- Open Disclosure – Success Factors (Section 2.4.4); 
- Open Disclosure – Perceived Challenges (Section 2.4.5). 
 
2.4.1 Before The Open Disclosure Meeting Takes Place 
 
Before Open Disclosure takes place, different activities need to occur.  
1. Notice of the adverse event needs to reach those who are in charge of arranging Open 
Disclosure (Section 2.4.1.1).  
                                                     
13 These numbers indicate page numbers in the patient/family transcripts. 
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2. Staff need to decide whether Open Disclosure is needed, and whether High or Low Level 
Open Disclosure is warranted (Section 2.4.1.2).  
3. High Level Open Disclosure (but in some instances Low Level Open Disclosure too) 
requires careful pre-planning as part of which staff establish what the mood is of those 
harmed, what the attitude is of the clinicians involved in the incident, what the legal and 
insurance issues are, how to disclose the adverse event given this information, and where 
to conduct the session (Section 2.4.1.3).  
 
2.4.1.1  Notification of unexpected outcomes to those in charge of arranging Open 
Disclosure 
 
Initiating Open Disclosure is in the first instance contingent on notification of an unexpected 
outcome. Notification in itself will not guarantee Open Disclosure is necessary, but 
notification plays an important role in enabling those who are in charge of organising Open 
Disclosure to formulate a decision about whether and how to provide the patient (and/or 
family) with Open Disclosure. 
 
“Any facts like, has there been something come in from complaints? Has the [complaints body] 
got involved? You need to know these things otherwise you’re sitting there having the meeting 
and half way through, ‘Why didn’t someone tell me?’”  
[Support Personnel 30-190] 
 
Complicating the task of those in charge of organising Open Disclosure is that there is no 
predictable route by which unexpected outcomes are brought to their attention. 
Interviewees identified both self-initiated and other-initiated ways in which information about 
unexpected clinical outcomes reaches those in charge of arranging Open Disclosure. Self-
initiated notifications are those initiated by the health facility staff involved in the patient’s 
care; other-initiated notifications are those initiated by people not belonging to the facility 
where the adverse event occurred. 
 
Interviewees comment that self-initiated adverse event notifications include the following 
(table 2.1) (cf. Queensland Health, 2006a: 7).  
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Table 2.1: Self-initiated Adverse Event Notification - Types 
 Self-initiated adverse event notification types Relevant interview statements 
1 In-house incident reporting, analysis and management 
processes 
 
“[there are] instances where we’ve started an RCA 
[Root Cause Analysis] and recognise that there hadn’t 
been a disclosure”  
[Support Personnel 24-100] 
2 Analysis of medical notes “they realised [when] they went back over the notes … 
she wouldn’t have got an apology”  
[Support Personnel 29-9] 
3 Morbidity & Mortality reviews “we’ve also got Morbidity and Mortality reviews 
[through which incidents come to light]”  
[Medical Manager 27-22] 
4 Death audits “it might be through our death audits [that adverse 
events come to our attention]”  
[Senior Medical Manager 20-8] 
5 A report or phone call from the clinician(s) involved in 
the adverse event alerting senior staff 
“I think you actually get pro-active in reporting errors 
because they actually see it as being a way of 
protecting themselves”  
[Senior Medical Manager 20-37]  
“Sometimes it’s just staff members won’t put it on [the 
local incident reporting system] and they’ll go, ‘I just 
want to let you know this’, so it might be a phone call or 
an actual face-to-face [someone] wanting to let you 
know”  
[Senior Support Personnel 46-49] 
6 A phone call from the onsite clinical manager 
 
“I would expect to be notified at a suitable time by a 
phone call from one of the site managers who’d 
become aware of the incident”  
[Nursing Manager 38-31] 
7 Support personnel picks up news of an adverse event  “If the [Support Personnel colleague] picks something 
up they come straight to me and lets me know”  
[Senior Support Personnel 48-50] 
8 The health service’s own complaints department “Interviewer: Is that through the Complaints 
Department? Interviewee: May be complaints …” 
 [Senior Medical Manager 3-8] 
 
 
The Queensland Health Incident Management Implementation Standard lists additional 
health service internal sources of notification, including: iPharmacy and eICAT (Queensland 
Health, 2006a: 7). Equally of course adverse event notification can travel along multiple 
paths simultaneously: 
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“… our [Support Personnel Office] alerts us when there’s been a sentinel event or a high level 
adverse clinical incident, and at the same time we often get a parallel complaint coming in from 
the family or the patient themselves. So in this instance, it was not only the adverse incident 
reporting, but also through our [Support Personnel], because it arose from a complaint at the 
same time.”  
[Senior Support Personnel 35-65] 
 
Other-initiated adverse event notification is done by staff at other institutions and by 
members of the public themselves (table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Other-initiated Adverse Event Notification - Types 
 Other-initiated adverse event notification types Relevant interview statements 
1 The patient’s GP notifies the health service 
 
“… it [notification] came through the patient’s GP, 
through to the Deputy Director of Medical Services” 
[Support Personnel 26-172] 
2 The patient notifies the health service after ‘picking 
something up from other clinicians that something’s 
wrong’ 
“And quite often patients can pick up from other 
clinicians that something’s wrong” 
 [Senior Support Personnel 27-60] 
3 A health care complaints body contacts a health 
service and/or a staff member 
“HQCC are actually external, obviously externally to 
us, are personally contacting the clinician involved” 
[Support Personnel 40-141] 
4 Another patient conveys what they have seen to a 
family member or a staff member 
- “… the other ladies in the bed in the room told us 
[family members] exactly what happened.”  
[Family member 144] 
5 Publication of reports in the public media (newspaper, 
television report) 
“I actually got notification of one through the 
newspaper a week after it happened”  
[Senior Support Personnel 27-49] 
“…about six weeks later we read in the paper, and on 
the local television news, this lady’s mum talking to the 
media saying how this lady … died” 
[Medical Manager 43-161] 
 
 
The Queensland Health Incident Management Implementation Standard lists additional 
externally sourced notifications, including notification through medico-legal channels and 
the State Coroner’s office (Queensland Health, 2006a: 7). 
For different reasons, and acknowledging the source of adverse event notification is not 
easily controlled, self-initiated adverse event notification is preferable to other-initiated 
adverse event notification. Self-initiated adverse event notification: 
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a. Provides those in charge of arranging Open Disclosure with time and resources to 
plan disclosure.  
b. Means staff at the treating facility will be seen to have initiated the disclosure, 
rather than an outsider (whose notification may lead to suspicions and even claims 
of unwillingness to disclose).  
c. Improves the opportunity to choreograph the conduct and unfolding of the 
disclosure as well as shape its aftermath.  
In sum, if adverse events do not first come to the attention of those responsible for 
monitoring and improving the safety and quality of the care provided by the health service, 
this limits their opportunity to plan and take control of how the details and background of the 
adverse event are disclosed. This in turn is likely to diminish if not cancel out the impact of 
the health service’s ‘disclosure’, and places staff in the difficult position of having to manage 
potentially inaccurate and conflicting reports. 
 
To obviate other-initiated adverse event notification, interviewees recommend the following 
four ‘(minimal) specifications’14. The table below includes these minimal specifications for 
optimising Open Disclosure, the rationales provided by interviewees, and the relevant 
interview quotes (table 2.3). 
 
                                                     
14 The term ‘minimal specification’ is used to underscore that these are abstract principles – not step-by-step procedures - 
provided to give guidance in highly complex circumstances. In such complex circumstances, procedures do not provide 
sufficient or even appropriate guidance because how the practice unfolds in situ remains contingent on the dynamics of the 
here-and-now (Dekker, 2005). 
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Table 2.3: Adverse Event Notification –Specifications For Optimising Open Disclosure 
 Adverse event notification  
Specifications 
Rationale provided by 
interviewees 
Relevant interview quotes 
1 Ensure quicker turn-around 
of adverse event information 
through the health service’s 
incident reporting system. 
Comments were made about 
electronic incident reporting 
delaying management’s ability 
to hear about and act on 
adverse events. Adverse 
event reporting into web-
based systems needs to be 
complemented with systems 
that enable senior health 
service staff (with Open 
Disclosure responsibilities) to 
have access to and to analyse 
incident reports.  
 
“[with the web-based incident reporting 
system] It can take a considerable period 
of time before we know there is an 
incident, so I actually keep a separate 
folder [for] reporting”  
[Medical Manager 29-22] 
“Interviewer: ‘Do you have an electronic 
system in place where you can report 
incidents?’ Interviewee: We’ve got, well 
it’s more than that. It’s the phone call. … 
This has happened, directly to our DON 
or our DOMS who can then say, ‘Okay, 
this is how we’re going to handle this 
incident.’ So we now have our co-
ordinators. Our co-ordinators ask us 
every day on every round, ‘Have you had 
an incident here’, but we would hope that 
we would hear about it even before that.” 
[Support Personnel 59-99] 
2 Encourage staff to self-
report, ensuring their 
participation does not incur 
blame on the part of the 
health service. 
Comments were made about 
the need for a no-fault 
approach in Australia to 
acknowledge that many 
mistakes are unintentional, 
and to reassure staff that the 
point of error reporting is to 
learn, not blame. 
 
“if you actually self-report an error, unless 
it falls into a certain series of categories, 
you cannot be disciplined in relation to 
that error. That’s a really powerful 
statement by an organisation that says, 
‘Yes, we know people make mistakes, 
yes we acknowledge that ninety-nine 
percent of mistakes are innocent 
mistakes caused by a variety of factors 
that are generally outside the control of 
the individual and if you self-report, then 
you cannot be disciplined in any way, 
shape or form in relation to that error, and 
it’s embedding into that system the 
culture of ‘Yes, we’re highly skilled 
professionals, but yes, we do make 
mistakes and we actually need to learn 
and act on those mistakes, and not 
blame.”  
[Support Personnel 35-6] 
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Table 2.3: Adverse Event Notification –Specifications For Optimising Open Disclosure (cont’d) 
 
 Adverse event notification  
Specifications (cont’d) 
Rationale provided by 
interviewees 
Relevant interview quotes 
3 Familiarise staff with the 
types of adverse events that 
require Open Disclosure. 
It was suggested that 
publication of event types can 
inform staff in neighbouring 
organisations about the kinds 
of adverse events that attract 
Open Disclosure. 
“I think it’s important that they have the 
release of SAC, sentinel events and that 
sort of thing, as a number throughout 
[State name] but not apportioned to any 
particular facility.”  
[Support Personnel  33-184]  
 
4 Minimise the chance for 
conflicting accounts of 
adverse events to circulate 
around the health service by 
setting up ‘a single adverse 
event desk’. Such a ‘desk’ 
encompasses a pre-determined 
set of people who share access 
to a location where relevant 
information and documentation 
are securely stored. 
The problem of staff 
disclosing adverse event 
information before talking 
details through with 
colleagues can lead to 
different stories circulating. To 
ensure frontline staff know 
where to go for information 
about an adverse event, there 
needs to be a clearly 
identified place and person 
that can provide that 
information. 
 
“[things went wrong because] there was 
no single desk person who’d pick up the 
phone and hear the call for Open 
Disclosure”  
[Support Personnel  33-185] 
“… the story there was there was 
conflicting information … there was an 
acknowledgment there was an incident 
with the patient. That was done poorly 
from a clinical disclosure by a junior staff 
member with conflicting information. And 
that was actually then, in itself the 
incident in that that’s what really caused 
the anxiety for the patient.” 
[Support Personnel  33-191] 
 
Finally, self-initiated adverse-event notification is seen to be contingent (by interviewee 
Senior Medical Manager 24) on characteristics that are shared by excellent teams: trust, 
resilience, reflexivity, attentiveness to one’s own and others’ ways of working, willingness to 
share and learn from information, and a no-blame attitude towards those involved in 
adverse events. We expect the specifications offered in table 2.3. above to be equally 
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2.4.1.2 Determining whether and how to do Open Disclosure 
 
The decision about whether to initiate Open Disclosure is a complex one. Interviewees 
were clear that Sentinel Event List or Severity Assessment Coding ratings will not provide 
unambiguous answers to the question of whether to initiate (what level of) Open Disclosure. 
Interviewees emphasised that staff in charge of organising Open Disclosure should be 
flexible with regard to which adverse events incur Open Disclosure and what level of Open 
Disclosure is required (‘low’ or ‘high’).  
 
“Usually if it’s something that’s … incontrovertible on the shift, then the senior doctor will get 
involved … If it’s less obvious, you know what’s gone on, or there needs to be some 
investigation [i.e. it’s more serious], then it will be referred to the Director or the Clinical 
Director of the ED and we’ll do an investigation and then follow it up with the patient.” 
[Medical Manager 74-130/1] 
 
Interviewees see the need for Open Disclosure as depending on both the nature of the 
adverse event, and on the reaction to the unexpected outcome by the patient (and/or 
family). The Sentinel Event List and the Severity Assessment Coding provide staff with a 
first indication of whether (and what level) Open Disclosure is needed, after which more in-
depth analysis of the adverse event is needed.  
Analysis of the nature of the adverse event itself and of the mood of those harmed is crucial 
to determining one’s strategy. This analysis is important because on occasions adverse 
events may not qualify for Open Disclosure if assessed purely on their Sentinel Event 
status or Severity Assessment Coding rating. In these instances, it is not technical 
specifications, but personal needs and people’s perceptions that determine whether and 
how Open Disclosure is initiated.  
 
2.4.1.2.1 ‘Hits’: The adverse event that ‘reaches the patient’ 
 
Interviewees are aware that State policy documents require High Level Open Disclosure to 
occur for SAC 1 (and some SAC 2) rated adverse events (NSW Health, 2006, 2007; 
Queensland Health, 2006a). 
 
“If it’s going to be a SAC1 or SAC2 as per the [error reporting system] regulations, of course, 
they have to intervene.”  
[Nursing Clinician 2-64] 
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In general, High Level Disclosure is deemed necessary when it has one or more of the 
following characteristics:  
a. the adverse event is a Sentinel Event,  
b. it attracts a SAC 1 (and on occasions a SAC2) rating, and  
c. it is experienced by the patient (and/or family member[s]) as significantly impacting 
on their physical and/or emotional well-being.  
 
SAC 3 and SAC 4 rated adverse events may require ‘low level’ Open Disclosure, but this 
decision still depends on the perceived significance of the outcome for the patient (and/or 
family members). The following statements provide evidence of how complex 
circumstances can be due to contradictory indicators: 
 
“But there are some [adverse events] where we’ve done one Open Disclosure where, in fact, it 
didn’t meet the criteria as an incident. Now that seems really odd. But it became evident over 
the progression of time that perhaps we should have called it an incident. Perhaps there were 
elements that started to come from the family that we weren’t quite aware of and then we said in 
the first meeting, ‘Okay, we need to go back and do some analysis on this and see what we can 
improve and we’ll come back and see you again.’ So you sort of have to be guided by the 
family’s needs.”  
[Support Personnel 28-194] 
 
“The consequence of the outcome was small. The significance for the patients or relatives or 
something may have been higher than that. So we’ve done those and we’ve certainly done an 
Open Disclosure on a SAC3.” 
 [Support Personnel 28-190/1] 
 
For these interviewees, the high/low distinction does not do justice to the complexity 
of the decision making involved. Not surprisingly, those who have less extensive 
experience with Open Disclosure (than do Support Personnel who tend to have extensive 
experience in Open Disclosure) regard the question as to what triggers Open Disclosure as 
a vexing one.  
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“Perhaps we need more clarity about severity of things that need disclosing. There are clearly 
very minor things. I reckon Open Disclosure about minor things causes havoc without benefit 
that things must be disclosed. So, guidance about what do disclose and what not to disclose in a 
more corporate way might be helpful.”  
[Medical Clinician 54-8] 
“The question is about whether to tell someone something that will not cause any future harm 
and cause anxiety or do you not? … What I would like to see is clarification. Nationally, which 
cases are we talking about here?”  
[Nursing Clinician 55-4] 
 
What is reassuring is that interviewees with higher levels of Open Disclosure experience 
consider the task of determining whether there is a need for Open Disclosure to be a less 
vexing issue:  
 
“I suppose anything where the planned event hasn’t gone according to those plans [requires 
disclosure]. [In] Maternity we know that not everything goes to plan, so we’re used to talking to 
our clients fairly openly and honestly in regard to what happened or why they needed to go to 
theatre for a Caesarean or what happened to the baby … so I couldn’t tell you exactly what 
events [we disclose] because they’re different with each pregnancy unfortunately, but, basically 
if it doesn’t go to plan the way the woman hoped it would go, as in a normal vaginal birth, then 
we always sit down with all of our clients and discuss what happened and what we can do to 
change that next time.”  
[Allied Health Clinician 88-90] 
 
The next two quotes show that staff interviewed simplify matters for themselves by 
regarding disclosure appropriate for ‘complications’ as well as (what this interviewee refers 
to as) ‘stuff-ups’. 
 
“There is a difference between complication of treatment and stuff-ups of treatment. We have to 
be open about complications and stuff-ups.”  
[Senior Medical Clinician 66-16] 
“It does not have to be something really that arises from a mistake. And the ones I have been 
involved with especially have been complications that are considered even routine or 
considered part of what would be expected in the care of a complicated and unwell patient. 
Even just identifying that even if there is a complication can be considered an adverse outcome, 
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not just a surgeon made a big mistake. That in itself improves not only patient’s perceptions but 
also their outcome at the end of the day.”  
[Medical Manager 64-26] 
 
These encouraging statements need to be read with the following caveat in mind: 
disclosure of unexpected outcomes as yet means different things to different health care 
staff. As our patient and family interview data analysis shows, adverse events that should 
have been disclosed on the basis of formal Open Disclosure – that is, utilising formal 
notification and recording processes, involving appropriate clinical and support personnel, 
and structured on the basis of careful pre-planning, enactment and follow-up of Open 
Disclosure15 – were not always disclosed appropriately. In light of that, and without wanting 
to downplay the importance of clinicians’ showing themselves to be comfortable with 
disclosing adverse events, news of health care staff’s confidence in ‘doing Open Disclosure’ 
needs to be balanced against consumers’ claims about clinicians’ preference for informal, 
non-apologetic disclosure, even in the case of high severity adverse events (see Section 
2.5). 
 
2.4.1.2.2 ‘Near hits’: The adverse event ‘just misses the patient’ 
 
The question whether to initiate Open Disclosure for ‘near hits’ (usually referred to as ‘near 
misses’ in the patient safety literature (cf. Runciman, Merry, & Walton, 2007)) is a troubling 
one for many interviewees. Many responses we received to questions about when health 
care staff would deploy Open Disclosure are characterised by uncertainty and confusion, as 
discussed above.  
Attempts proposed to impose clarity on this complex domain of decision-making fall into 
three categories.  
 
Category 1. The decision whether to deploy Open Disclosure in the case of ‘near 
hits’ is subjected to medical reasoning only. By way of example, the interviewee 
cited below formulates the principle that underpins their decision making for them with 
relative ease. This ease however is achieved because the criteria governing the 
decision whether or not to deploy Open Disclosure are framed in purely medical terms. 
Such framing enables the decision-maker to omit considering the impact of the adverse 
event on the patient (and/or family): 
                                                     
15 State-based and organisation-based policy documentation has been created to accompany and refine the Australian 
Open Disclosure Standard. That documentation sets out exhaustively what formal Open Disclosure entails (e.g. NSW 
Health, 2007; Queensland Health, 2006b). 
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“if the harm has resulted in a temporary reduction in function or any effect that is felt by the 
patient then it is, we will determine it as a serious adverse event, so anything that we risk 
rate and classify as a serious adverse event is, becomes a High Level response. And 
anything that we just call a low, not a serious adverse event, it’s a moderate or a minor 
impact on the patient, like, you know, somebody has had a medication delayed by triage, but 
hasn’t really affected them, that’s a low level.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 60-106] 
 
This same interviewee regards disclosure to depend on whether the incident ‘reaches 
the patient’.  
 
“Our clinical practice is that any adverse event should be disclosed. Any incident where an 
error has reached the patient, and that’s the way we describe it, if an error has reached the 
patient it should be disclosed to the patient.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 60-106] 
 
On this principle, in cases where the adverse event does not reach the patient, no 
disclosure is made on grounds that you would not be able to specify the implications of 
the near hit/miss for the patient. 
 
“Near misses, the way we describe near misses is that there was a potential for an error to 
occur but it hasn’t reached the patient, so therefore we don’t [disclose], because it has not 
happened. You know, somebody stopped it from happening.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 60-106] 
 
The implications of this principle are that:  
 
1. organisational processes that have put the patient at risk without causing obvious 
harm are not discussed with the patient on the assumption there was and will be 
no harm;  
2. control over the decision to disclose may remain entirely within the purview of the 
health professional; 
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3. risk is created of other-initiated adverse events notification: someone other than 
the treating clinician may alert those (potentially) affected and issue a request for 
disclosure. 
 
Category 2. The decision whether to deploy Open Disclosure in the case of ‘near 
hits’ is subjected to organisational reasoning only. Here, disclosure of SAC 3-4 
rated adverse events is made to depend on whether the event was a divergence from 
planned action. If planned action failed to occur, the organisation should take steps to 
find out why it did not occur, communicate to the patient that it did not occur, and take 
steps to ensure that it will occur in future.  
However, not all processes in health care can be comprehensively mapped out due to 
their complexity (Lillrank & Liukko, 2004). On the one hand, many patient management 
plans are short-term requiring constant review (Cox, 1999). On the other hand, many 
clinical processes that could potentially be ‘path-wayed’ (because they are relatively 
predictable) are not pro-actively mapped out because clinicians lack organisational 
support and skills enabling them to do so (Degeling et al., 2001). Given clinicians’ high 
professional skill and knowledge levels, and particularly in emergency and other 
unplanned situations, it is not surprising that standards of care and service are 
expected that go well beyond pre-determined plans and procedures (Hollnagel, 2006). 
It may be problematic, then, to limit disclosure of ‘near hits’ to instances where care 
has been pro-actively planned. 
 
Category 3. The decision whether to deploy Open Disclosure in the case of ‘near 
hits’ is approached as a dialogic process. Given Open Disclosure is a dynamic and 
complex process that cannot be fully proceduralised, staff need to apply professional, 
organisational and ethical judgments when determining which events to disclose. At 
the minimum, and without dismissing arguments that there are cases where Open 
Disclosure may not be appropriate (see table 2.6), it is necessary to obviate non-
disclosure of events whose impact is (or would be) considerable in the eyes of the 
person (people) involved in the event. Were it to become a common cultural norm, 
standard disclosure of unexpected outcomes could benefit the organisation as a result 
of the dialogue that the event gives rise to.  
 
“So they [staff] not only benefited from it [Open Disclosure], they learned from it and 
they’re now teaching others.”  
[Support Personnel 73-37] 
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This does not mean that ‘near hits’ are per definition subjected to Open Disclosure. 
Importantly, this third category of decision-making involves delving more deeply into 
the nature and circumstances of the adverse event:  
 
“You don’t need to go and necessarily tell a patient, ‘Oh, we had a near miss with you’. You 
still need to couch it, and the organisation needs to treat them as important as other clinical 
incidents … often a near miss could be a representative pattern of a series of near misses 
where you may not know the whole pool of people who have potentially had that near miss. 
What are you going to do? Put out a recall on all patients between X and Y, dates, where 
you think they may or may not have had [the incident]? … I certainly meet with my Clinical 
CEO, we run over our clinical incidents, and if there is a trend or a near miss where you 
would ask the question, ‘Have other patients been potentially affected?’, you’ve also got to 
be able to isolate who those patients are that actually derive some benefit, otherwise it’s a 
fixing-the-near-miss-system failure”  
[Support Personnel 26-191] 
 
The stance advocated here is that ‘near hits’ need to be carefully discussed and 
closely thought through. Such discussion and analysis is dialogic, involving all relevant 
stakeholders, including patients (and/or families). Two principles apply:  
i. ‘unexpected outcome’ is a phrase that should incur two questions: unexpected for 
whom? and ‘outcome for whom’? The answers to these questions cannot always 
be determined by clinicians on their own, requiring negotiation with colleagues and 
consumers; 
ii. any unexpected outcome is worthy of attention and learning.  
 
Finally, the importance of discussing a ‘near hit’ with colleagues (“so the debate was 
should we tell this woman”) about whether to disclose or not is evident in the following 
vignette reproduced on the next page. 
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The ethics and pragmatics of  
disclosing a ‘near hit/miss’ 
 
 
“If I can give you an example of that, where I did an Open 
Disclosure in relation to a near miss and I, I was sure at 
the end of the process that it was the right thing to do. So 
maybe this illustrates the problem. … We had a woman 
who went under a general anaesthetic for a minor 
procedure and the anaesthetist gave her the wrong 
anaesthetic.  It was a muscle blocking agent, a 
paralysing agent. Now, there was a very small risk to the 
patient because she was there being monitored, the 
anaesthetist recognised the mistake straight away, and 
reversed the anaesthetic given, etcetera, etcetera. So it 
was controlled, no risk, the patient woke up and wouldn’t 
have known, well we didn’t think would have known 
anything about that near miss but it was potentially, 
conceivably a life-threatening mistake … so the debate 
was, should we tell this woman that we made this 
mistake, and we actually decided that we would.  I was in 
two minds about it. I rang her and I said (I did it by phone 
because I suppose it was considered to be not that 
serious to have to sit with her, but that’s another issue of 
judgment as to whether it was the appropriate way of 
doing it), …’I’m phoning from this hospital, and so on, 
and I understand that you recently had an anaesthetic’, 
and she said, ‘Yes, I did’ and I said, ‘How are you? Are 
you okay?’ and everything and anyway I said, ‘Look, I 
need to…I’ve rung you because I need to tell you that in 
fact we made a mistake when we delivered your 
anaesthetic.  There should be no adverse consequences 
for you, you won’t come to any harm, but you know, we 
have this approach that we’re always open about the 
errors that we make so that you trust the system. And 
she said, ‘Oh, I wondered about that because when I 
woke up I had muscle aches’ and one of the side effects 
of that drug of the paralysing agent is that it can give you 
sort of muscle spasm that can give you muscle ache. So 
she knew something was strange about that and she’d 
been wondering about it. So when I told her that she 
said, ‘Oh, I see now. I understand that.’ And she was 
very happy to be told and to have an explanation for that 
feeling. So you can see the value in that case.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 23-9] 
 
 
In sum, the decision whether to deploy Open Disclosure should encompass:  
1. the patient’s (and family’s) need and right to know,  
2. the clinician’s duty to apply professional-ethical judgment to their ways of working,  
3. the clinical team’s preparedness to discuss and analyse unexpected outcomes 
over and beyond the adverse event’s medical-technical dimensions, and  
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4. the organisation’s obligation to engage staff in life-long learning and practice 
improvement (under clinical governance).  
 
In the final analysis, these rights, expertises, attitudes and obligations are and remain 
dialogic: they cannot be subjected to fixed principles about whether to engage in Open 
Disclosure. Important to emphasise at this point is that disclosure does not mean 
‘discussing the unexpected outcome with the patient (and/or family)’, and that involvement 
of the patient (and/or family) in considering the unexpected outcome therefore does not pre-
empt or obviate Open Disclosure. The distinction between conventional approaches to 
sharing information with patients (and/or families) about adverse events (‘the clinician 
popped in to see the patient a few times’) and Open Disclosure is addressed in table 2.6 
below. 
 
The following minimal specifications may help determine whether to deploy Open 
Disclosure. 
 
Open Disclosure should be deployed under these circumstances:  
1.  Open Disclosure occurs in cases leading to unexpected outcomes that create     
  unintended harm (leaving aside wilful, malicious and negligent harm);  
2.  disclosure occurs of ‘intercepted’ mishaps (even if they do not ‘reach the patient’) that 
  are judged to provide learning opportunities for the patient (family), the organisation  
  and for staff, or that are experienced by the patient as nevertheless distressing; 
3.  disclosure occurs of events that peer judgment classifies as breaches of an accepted  
  standard of skill, a formal rule or an established fact of knowledge, and 
4.  decisions to disclose are achieved dialogically – through negotiation with the relevant  
  stakeholders. 
 
 
2.4.1.3 Pre-planning the Open Disclosure session 
 
Pre-planning the Open Disclosure session is seen as very important, particularly for High 
Level disclosures. Pre-planning is composed of a complex set of activities and objectives, a 
diverse group of people, and it generally happens rapidly. Pre-planning is seen to 
encompass at least the following overarching tasks: 1. Understand the adverse event; 2. 
Assemble the team; 3. Assess the patient/family dynamics; 4. Plan the disclosure 
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dialogue, and 5. Decide how to interface Open Disclosure with other dimensions of 
Incident Management (tables 2.4.1 to 2.4.5 below).  
Table 2.4.1: Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 1: Understanding the adverse event  
 Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 
Understanding the adverse event 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Establish the (nursing, medical, allied health 
and administrative-managerial) facts of the 
adverse event 
“Usually we’ll talk to the person [the clinician most closely 
involved in the adverse event] and make sure we’ve both got 
a common understanding of what the event entailed and 
make sure we’ve both looked at the history and the medical 
record and make sure that the Nurse Unit Manager has got a 
handle on all the nursing issues and I’m okay with all the 
medical issues [because] we’ve talked to the relevant 
people.” 
[Medical Manager 67-133] 
2 Decide whether the adverse event requires 
High Level Open Disclosure or Low Level 
Open Disclosure  
[see Section 2.4.1.2 above] 
3 Establish whether the adverse event needs to 
be reported to the Coroner or Crown Solicitor 
 
“… not every event is notified to the Crown Solicitor, but 
because of insurance requirements, the hospitals are 
obligated to notify the Crown Solicitor if they think 
something may occur out of it” 
 [Allied Health Clinician 91-98] 
4 Establish whether there are any legal, 
insurance and financial implications (such as 
ex-gratia payments) and related information 
that needs to be gathered beforehand  
 
“And I’ll know whether I’m offering um payments for taxis or 
compensation or whatever.” 
 [Medical Manager 42-94] 
“And we look at ‘will there be financial costs’. There’s a 
whole pro-forma that [State] has got and you actually go 
through all that. You look at legalities. You look at financial 
support. You look at what we might offer. Um, social work, 
counselling. There’s a whole gamut of things that we 
actually work through.” 
 [Senior Support Personnel 27-56]; 
“A number of times that they [the patient] will sit there and 
say, ‘Well, now we’re going to pursue litigation. Can you on 
the spot agree to pay us X amount of compensation?’ That 
always floors the clinicians. Because I’ve had a medico-
legal-management role I just say, ‘Well, you know, here I’ll 
pass on your, our details, our insurer’s details and you’re 
welcome to get in touch with them, and we’re quite happy to 
consider unmitigated claims.” 
[Support Personnel 2-104] 
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Table 2.4.2: Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 2: Assemble the team 
 Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities: 
Assemble the team 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Establish a reliable team of clinical and/or 
administrative-managerial staff that can be 
drawn on for urgent High Level Open 
Disclosure meetings 
“… what we try and do is, consistent with the policy, we have 
a team of three for the major disclosure processes.  So we 
ideally have the senior clinician involved in the case, a 
patient representative/client liaison officer, and a 
representative of the administration for the hospital or 
wherever the incident occurs.”  
[Senior Clinical Manager 1-2]  
2 Enquire into staff attitudes towards and 
feelings about the adverse event  
 
“I’ve got a clinical superintendent who I mobilise 
immediately for the medical officers [and] who reports back 
to me and lets me know how the staff member is travelling.” 
[Senior Medical Manager 24-48] 
3 Determine who of the clinical staff to invite to 
the Open Disclosure meeting and to what 
extent it is necessary to involve them in a 
separate pre-planning meeting  
“… you [might] get someone who’s inexperienced running a 
[Open Disclosure] session, and that person might slip up 
and therefore be exposed.”  
[Medical Manager 33-26] 
4 Decide whether the person most closely 
involved in the incident should be invited to 
come to the Open Disclosure meeting or not 
 
“… if you are in a situation where you’ve got to do an open 
disclosure and you’ve got a choice between two clinicians to 
do it, then you’re going to go for the person that you know 
has a better way of doing it.” 
 [Support Personnel 23-35] 
“We make an assessment: we bring the doctor in and say 
‘so tell us all about it’. And if they’re saying ‘That bastard of 
patient did this and that and the other thing’, they’re not 
getting back near them [the patient].”  
[Senior Medical Manager 47-88] 
5 Negotiate with staff who are attending the 
Open Disclosure meeting the disclosure 
strategy that is to be adopted; this needs to be 
done without fully scripting the meeting and 
thereby risking its authenticity 
 
“I mean the preparation with the clinician was minimal, like 
the registrar just walking to the meeting, I was just briefing 
him that I’ll do the introductions, you just say what 
happened, and then I’ll just explain the process, and wrap 
up the meeting. So that’s pretty much quite limited in 
preparation, because … you’ve got to be natural, you can’t 
be not natural. You want to be prepared, but yeah, [you] 
can’t be scripted.” 
[Support Personnel 48-137] 
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Table 2.4.2: Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 2: Assemble the team (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities: 
Assemble the team 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
6 Devise a strategy for junior staff who are 
involved in adverse events: This strategy should 
resolve whether junior staff should be protected 
from confronting victims of (particularly serious) 
harm and talked to separately, or whether they 
should be invited to observe or participate in the 
Open Disclosure process. This involves carefully 
selecting the Open Disclosure sessions so junior 
staff are likely to benefit from being present. 
 
“If there are apologies to make and I thought they [junior 
staff] were competent [to do that], and there are some that 
are competent, I would involve them in that process. But in 
general terms most of my difficult patients … come back to 
a special clinic where I have control of that situation.” 
 [Medical Manager 29-20]  
“The junior staff member, no. We wouldn’t involve them at 
all. What we would do, though, is that we would have the 
senior clinician or the director of that area be the person 
who’s going to talk to that [junior] clinician and advise them 
how we’re proceeding, so they’re not having an anxiety 
attack in the background.” 
 [Support Personnel 44-193] 
“If there are any juniors, they are there when they discuss 
the first meeting to say, ‘This has happened’, you know, 
‘Your dad or whoever’, ‘this has happened and we are doing 
an investigation. We will follow up and let you know’. And 
usually at that second meeting it is the Senior Consultant 
who has been involved in the care who would have that 
second meeting and the registrars usually follow them up 
and make sure they [the juniors] are involved and they know 
exactly what is the conversation.”  
[Medical Manager 70-112] 
 
Table 2.4.3: Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 3: Assess the dynamics of the patient/family 
 Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 
Assess the dynamics of the patient/family 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Find out details about the patient’s and 
family’s reactions to the unexpected outcome  
“We really just try and predict what sort of things might be 
their concern and see if we can understand the facts around 
what their concerns might be so that we can actually explain 
it well enough back again.” 
 [Senior Support Personnel 2-103] 
2 Determine who of the patient’s family should 
be invited to the meeting  
“… we encourage them to bring a cast of thousands if they 
wish.”  
[Support Personnel 28-195] 
3 Identify a family member as the single spokes 
and contact person; this is important to obviate 
different family members conducting unrelated 
conversations with staff 
“You need spokes people so you need to be able to talk to 
the patient and one person who fully understands and if you 
start getting outside that field you start running into 
difficulties.”  
[Medical Manager 29-28]   
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Table 2.4.4: Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 4: Plan the disclosure 
 Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities: 
Plan the disclosure 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Plan language to use and practise how to 
apologise given the specifics of the adverse 
event 
 
“We sit down and go through who’s going to do what and 
organise who’s going to say what.”  
[Support Personnel 34-5] 
“Yes, [we plan] who’s going to open the discussion, who’s 
going to say the apology … is there going to be any offer of 
support to the family, counselling or monetary support. [Pre-
planning] takes you through all the practice steps and it 
takes you right through that journey, [including] who’s going 
to talk about the investigation.”  
[Support Personnel 54-98] 
2 Prepare a strategy for and position on how to 
record the Open Disclosure meeting and 
whether to share that record with the patient 
(family) 
 
“… they will often come and ask, ‘Can we tape this?’ or 
sometimes they even do it surreptitiously. They’ll bring a 
tape recorder in. Some mobile phones can tape, you see, 
so they just put their mobile phone on the table and put it on 
and we don’t even know, so that’s another risk inherent in 
the system. But in this case they asked us to tape it and we 
agreed, rather than …giving them a tape we’d actually do a 
transcript of it.”  
[Senior Clinical Manager 4-9] 
3 Arrange a suitable space for the Open 
Disclosure meeting; such space may need to be 
an isolated one in case privacy is needed for the 
expression of emotions, one that has easy access 
and exit, one where there are no dangerous 
unattached (throw-able) objects, and one that has 
a low table with tissues and water (or tea) for 
everyone 
 
“First and foremost, make sure they’re comfortable. Actually 
happy with the room, you know, ‘Are you okay here?’ I 
always tell them where it will be, who’ll be there, you know, 
are they happy, because sometimes some people aren’t 
happy going up to the fourth floor of A Block. They prefer 
somewhere away from that area because it might be that, I 
don’t know, for whatever reason, so just to make sure that 
they’re happy with the place.” 
 [Support Personnel 29-182]; 
 “Nice low coffee table, water, tissues. Plenty of. They 
shouldn’t need to ask for any of those. They should be 
there. A good room is a social work room, a reasonable 
amount of space, comfortable chairs.” 
 [Support Personnel 46-202] 
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Table 2.4.5: Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 5: Deciding how to interface Open 
Disclosure with other dimensions of Incident Management  
 Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities: 
Deciding how to interface Open Disclosure 
with other dimensions of Incident Management 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Decide on how to interface Open Disclosure 
with Root Cause Analysis (1). Interfacing Open 
Disclosure and Root Cause Analysis can have 
advantages, in that staff can cross over between 
these two tasks and benefit from being familiar 
with both the clinical and the personal dimensions 
of the adverse event. Interfacing can also be 
problematic, however. RCA’s basic principle is to 
objectify clinical error through ‘hindsight bias’ 
(Dekker, 2005). Then, RCA seeks to formalise 
procedural constraints rather than nurture shared 
personal insights and error wisdom (Reason, 
2004) in that it proscribes those originally involved 
in the adverse event from acting as anything other 
than as interviewee. Most important within the 
context of the present report, in Australia RCA is 
largely conducted without involvement of 
consumers (Iedema, Jorm, et al, 2006). Evidence 
is emerging from the US where openness is found 
to mitigate consumers’ urge to complain and 
litigate (Wojcieszak, Banja, & Houk, 2006), 
leading to novel partnering with insurance 
companies (Berlinger, 2005; COPIC, 2004). UK-
based consumer involvement research provides 
models for ‘collaboration’ with consumers’ in 
incident management and practice improvement 




2 Decide on how to interface Open Disclosure 
with Root Cause Analysis (2). Interfacing Open 
Disclosure and Root Cause Analysis is seen to be 
particularly problematic in South Australia. In that 
State, Root Cause Analysis information falls under 
Qualified Privilege, obviating disclosure after the 
Root Cause Analysis process has started16. 
 
“In this state [SA] and probably others if you have SAC1 or 
sentinel event they say in this state we have to do an RCA. 
And in this state, there also has to be, we want you to use 
64D or qualified privilege. So, we said sorry but this does 
not actually fit with Open Disclosure” 
 [Support Personnel 93-81] 
                                                     
16 Jurisdictions other than South Australia also protect information generated as part of RCA.  For example, the NSW 
Health Administration Act 1982 s20Q is substantially the same as the sections applying to quality committees, the only 
difference being the insertion of the term ‘RCA team’ instead of ‘quality committee’ in the South Australian legislation.  It is 
also important to note that the South Australian health legislation is currently being reformed. Legislation currently before 
parliament in South Australia - The Health Care Bill 2007 - has a new Section s66 which protects information from quality 
activities (this is not very different from the former s64D) and a new Section s73 which protects information arising from 
RCA's. Noteworthy is that the South Australian Bill states that "Most people were happy" with protection of information that 
is produced as part of quality improvement activities. 
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Table 2.4.5: Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities 5: Deciding how to interface Open 
Disclosure with other dimensions of Incident Management  
 
 Open Disclosure Pre-Planning Activities: 
Deciding how to interface Open Disclosure 
with other dimensions of Incident Management 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
3 Deciding to what extent to involve consumers 
in these processes. This study recommends 
erring on the side of consumer involvement in 
investigation and improvement processes (see 
Section 2.5).17 
“… in those instances where we’ve started an RCA and 
recognise that there hadn’t been a disclosure and there’s 
pressure on to do the disclosure because the Area’s policy is 
very much that we try and gather information from families or 
give them an opportunity to pose any questions for the RCA 
team to consider, we put a bit of pressure on our teams to 
actually make contact with the family via the nominated 
person”  
[Support Personnel 11-100] 
 
Two points about pre-planning pro-formas: 
1. Does using pre-planning pro-formas diminish the Open Disclosure meeting’s 
authenticity? For several interviewees, scripting strategies and language for the 
Open Disclosure meeting using pro-formas can become an activity that detracts 
from the authenticity of the Open Disclosure meeting.  
 
“I think … not that you’re in there with a script that you’re disclosing. I think that this 
uh notion of um um, um being in your communication just open and honest and I think 
that’s the thing that makes it work, I think families genuinely react to … if you go in 
there with an agenda about how you’re going to do this.” [Dir Clin Gov Gr120] 
 
Pro-formas are recognised as being useful for those with limited experience, but they 
are seen to be less useful by those who have Open Disclosure experience.  
 
“It structures that meeting using that form. But given it’s pro-forma the way it’s written 
now, it invites you to have to write something”  
[Support Personnel 47-196] 
 
                                                     
17 This particular recommendation raises a question about Root Cause Analysis (RCA) as it has been defined in Australia 
(New South Wales Health Department, 2004) as well as querying the way Open Disclosure currently links in with RCA and 
other forms of incident investigation such as HEAPS (NSW Health, 2007; Queensland Health, 2006b). See Section 4 
below. 
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For one interviewee, the pro-forma proves useful to script the initial contact call aimed 
at inviting the patient (or family) to the Open Disclosure meeting, to make sure all 
important points are made.  
 
“We actually had a party-line script that we all worked to for the initial telephone 
conversation, um, now that was to ensure we said just enough, … our aim of the 
telephone call was just to get them to come into hospital … So, yeah, we effectively did 
work to a script for that one.” [Dir Ment Gr56] 
 
Thus, pro-formas aid pre-planning because they help staff prepare the language to use 
for the meeting, but interviewees emphasise the importance of staff acting naturally.  
 
 “What we’ve actually done here is, instead of trying to say it up top, is to let it happen 
naturally”  
[Senior Support Personnel 45-55] 
2. Does the information recorded on pre-planning pro-formas pose a Freedom of 
Information or a Discovery risk? For some interviewees, the information that is 
written on pro-formas, including provisional details about the adverse event, 
tentative understandings of the patient’s and family members’ state of mind, and 
related kinds of ‘soft information’18, potentially pose a Freedom of Information or 
Discovery risk. They are conscious that the generative intent of the pro-forma (‘jot 
down provisional understandings and possible scenarios and utterances’) incurs a 
legal risk due to such ‘soft information’ being subpoenable. 
 
“It structures that meeting using that form. But you’ve got to be careful what you write 
in case it is FOI-able. So you would never include some things in a meeting.” 
[Support Personnel 28-196] 
 
 
The following quote highlights the uncertainty this same interviewee has about the 
legal status of the pre-planning pro-forma: 
 
                                                     
18 ‘Soft information’ is information that remains subject to change. In contrast, ‘hard information’ is information that has 
stabilised and is therefore considered appropriate for publication. 
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“I would see that [pro-forma] document as a working document. It’s not the document I 
would say should be the FOI-able component of Open Disclosure. [But] I don’t think 
it’s protected. I think it probably does have some concerns because we don’t know 
where that document sits in FOI land or its disclosurable-type status. Some places don’t 
use it or write on it [for that reason].” [Support Personnel 28-196] 
 
There will inevitably be 'soft information’ that turns out to be based on wrong 
assumptions, incomplete or inappropriate, and that therefore will be changed. For that 
reason, soft information may be useful only for tracing the development of clinicians’ 
thinking about the adverse event and how that bears on the disclosure (see Section 4 




Pre-plan the Open Disclosure meeting in the knowledge that: 
1. staff will not be able to predict entirely how the Open Disclosure meeting will 
unfold, and  
2. staff need to remain flexible with regard to how the Open Disclosure meeting 





2.4.1.4 Scheduling the Open Disclosure meeting 
 
Scheduling the Open Disclosure meeting is not quite like making a formal appointment. 
Since staff need to be sensitive to how the adverse event unfolds, and to how the victims of 
harm are responding to the adverse event, scheduling involves more than arranging a 
meeting time and date. As the vignette below shows, scheduling the Open Disclosure 
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Scheduling the Open Disclosure meeting 
 
“… it [the incident] happened on a Sunday evening, 
knew about it on Monday, the Tuesday I was working 
to find out what was going on, and I was speaking to 
the clinician. So we thought, well we’ll … we’ll talk to 
the family on the Wednesday, um and we planned to 
approach, and let them set up the meeting, um but the 
boy fell … more critically ill, so we decided not to, it 
wasn’t appropriate timing. But then, that same day … 
we did the tracking of the [surgical] instrument, and the 
… the previous patient was Hep B positive …. So it … 
just kept on getting worse, more intense as to what we 
were going to disclose. Um, um, but thankfully, before 
… we went and approached the family, we had found 
out that the young boy was Hep B immune, because 
he’d had … he’d had … his immunisations for that, so 
that was good. Um, yeah, so we sat … with the family 
… . The registrar approached them that evening, no, it 
wasn’t, that was a Thursday … and said, ‘Can we meet 
with your family?’ … and went to the boy’s father … 
and set up a meeting.”  
[Support Personnel 30-135] 
 
Considered most important, scheduling the Open Disclosure is seen to involve appropriate 
timing. ‘Appropriate’ harbours four distinct expectations:  
 
Table 2.4: Scheduling Open Disclosure  
 
 Scheduling Open Disclosure  Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Schedule the Open Disclosure meeting in a 
timely manner. On the one hand, interviewees are 
clear about disclosure needing to take place in a 
timely manner. Here, what is considered important 
is dealing early and quickly with the problem. 
As noted above with regard to adverse event 
notification, the earlier an incident is registered the 
earlier it can be acted on, and the better able staff 
will be to manage the ways in which the adverse 
event is presented, discussed, and handled. 
 
“I think it’s early recognition [of] a problem where a mistake 
has been made, where it’s reported and the appropriate 
report [has been filed], and someone actions it, and we get 
in there quickly and try to deal with it. Early flagging it is 
important, early meeting with the family and the patient. 
Obviously the key principles are early acknowledgment of a 
mistake and an apology for it.”  
[Medical Manager 26-215] 
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Table 2.4: Scheduling Open Disclosure (cont’d) 
 
 Scheduling Open Disclosure  Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Do not rush to arrange the Open Disclosure 
meeting. Paradoxically, interviewees advise us also 
that it is important ‘not to rush into the situation’. 
They state that it is easier to recover people’s trust 
following deferred disclosure than to maintain trust 
following premature and unsuccessful disclosure.  
Taking time to assess the situation (patients’ and 
family members’ responses and views on Open 
Disclosure) will prevent the meeting being 
organised in a way that does not meet (or 
contravenes) the needs of the patient (family). 
While these two principles may appear to be 
contradictory, they nevertheless have one thing in 
common. They point to the need for staff to be 
sensitive to how consumers perceive and 
experience time since the occurrence of an incident. 
Timing the disclosure under these circumstances 
depends on being able to listen to how patients and 
family members are responding to the event, and to 
schedule the disclosure such that it reaps maximum 
interpersonal benefit for them.  
 
“… there’s a lot of emphasis … put on timely disclosures. I 
think in our experience that’s not always been necessary 
and, where people have rushed in we’ve had problems. 
Sometimes of course you need to sit people down and say 
‘look something bad has happened, we don’t know the 
details yet but we’ll keep you in the loop as we try and work 
through this’. That is I suppose a reasonable opening gambit 
for an Open Disclosure. But, equally, where we’ve missed 
the boat with early disclosure, we’ve often been able to 
recover it very successfully weeks or months down the track. 
And in some ways that’s been some of our more successful 
disclosures, because people have gone away and realised 
that there’s something wrong and they’re very grateful that 
it’s been identified and they’ve been contacted after the 
event.”  
[Medical Manager 29-92] 
“… when I spoke to [patient’s name] in regards to the 
meeting she was okay about the idea of it, but she said the 
more she thought about it the more she got a bit daunted 
that somebody fairly high up was going to come and speak 
to her. When I explained to her, ‘Look, we just want your 
word that, we’re not having a go, it’s not a big meeting’, but I 
think within the hospital system, having a woman with that 
title [senior hospital staff who was going to attend the Open 
Disclosure meeting] was just kind of like, ‘Whoah.’ But also 
she [the patient] was actually really to open to the idea of 
having a meeting. It just happened to be not the right time on 
that particular day.”  
[Allied Health Clinician 99-96] 
 
3 Arrive at the Open Disclosure meeting on time 
An important additional point is that once the 
meeting has been scheduled staff need to show up 
on time: 
 
“And you’ve got to turn up on time. Don’t turn up late, alright. 
There’s nothing worse. Where one went pear-shaped … he 
[clinician] turned up late”  
[Support Personnel 32-202] 
 
4 Respect consumers’ wish to change the time 
(place) of the Open Disclosure meeting. Making 
an Open Disclosure meeting appointment should 
not be regarded as exhausting staff’s responsibility 
to schedule a meeting with the patient/family 
members. If the patient/family members request a 
change of time, it is important that staff respect their 
wishes. 
“There was a lot of work done. … Not ‘Well, we’ll have a 
meeting next Tuesday at ten o’clock and catch you there and 
we’ll talk to you about it then’. You know you’re dealing with 
people’s feelings and they take a while to generate trust on 
that.”  
[Support Personnel 32-202-3] 
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Scheduling the Open Disclosure meeting #2 
“Something has occurred that shouldn’t have 
occurred. But it could’ve, it could’ve occurred 
because of one of three reasons. So, if you did 
an open disclosure at this point in time, you’re 
not quite sure, what you’re openly disclosing. 
And equally, it, it’s such a fragile stage at this 
point in time, that are you really adding value? 
Are you actually contributing anything at this 
point in time? Now it’s not saying, no we’re not 
going to do it, it’s saying okay, this is not the 
right time at this minute. You know, there’s too 
much happening right at this moment in time for 
family members to be able to take on anything 
more. And, so we’re doing some quick 
preliminary investigation to try and determine 
what indeed it is that needs to be disclosed to 
them, at this point in time. And so we haven’t 
done the initial disclosure within twenty four 
hours, because we’ve discussed it and felt, no, 
we’re not at that point where we can actually do 
something, it’s going to do more harm than 
good, right at this moment. So you certainly, 
you need to change it a little bit sometimes, but 
it shouldn’t be a decision made in isolation, it 
should be a consultative decision, so that 
people that need to be involved are involved in 
that decision making.”  
[Support Personnel 7-31] 
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Appropriate timing and scheduling require that staff:  
 
1. arrange the Open Disclosure meeting in such a way and at such a time that 
 patients’ and their family members’ needs and expectations are met;  
 2. balance the need not to delay the Open Disclosure meeting for too long with an 
 equally important need not to rush into the meeting and risk giving out 
 explanations that have been not been thoroughly checked and discussed with 
 colleagues.  
 
 




Once the Open Disclosure meeting has been prepared and scheduled, and the relevant 
people have been invited to the meeting, staff who have taken it upon themselves to lead 
the meeting confront the reality of negotiating the news of the adverse event formally with 
the patient and their family. Here, the pre-planning that staff have done is put to the test of 
the dynamics of patients’, family members’ and clinical colleagues’ responses and actions.  
Invariably, when asked about how they generally enact the Open Disclosure meeting, 
interviewees’ first response is to point to the unpredictable dynamics of human interaction in 
the context of unexpected outcomes and harm. Not surprisingly, one of the most frequently 
occurring phrases in their responses is ‘it depends’19. In our Interim Report, we referred to 
this unpredictability as embodying the emergent dimension of Open Disclosure: Open 
Disclosure has a minimal set of characteristics, but its practice is difficult to proceduralise in 
terms of a simple set of steps. Interviewees acknowledge Open Disclosure needs to be 
approached as a dynamic kind of decision-making and strategising20. Its unfolding depends 
                                                     
19 The frequency of use of the term ‘depend’ (as the root of ‘depends’, ‘depending’, dependent’ and ‘depended’) 
outnumbers that of ‘doctor’, with ‘depend’ occurring 248 times in the transcripts (total words: 414,046). 
20 Open Disclosure is typical of a “decision setting [which] does not allow the decision-maker enough time of information to 
generate perfect solutions with perfectly rational calculations. Decision making in action calls for judgments under 
uncertainty, ambiguity and time pressure. [hence] Decision and action are interleaved rather than temporally segregated. 
The decision maker is thus seen as in step with the continuously unfolding environment, simultaneously influenced by it 
and influencing it through his or her steps” (Dekker, 2005: 80). 
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on what transpires about the incident, how the adverse event is experienced by all involved, 
what is said about it, and how these things in turn are responded to.  
To capture this emergent dimension of Open Disclosure while at the same time not losing 
track of important general advice about how to run the meetings, we frame interviewees’ 
experience and advice in terms of ‘minimal specifications’ rather than in terms of a rigid 
protocol (Plsek, 2001). This is to encourage health care staff to recognise that the 
application of Open Disclosure rules is contingent on their comprehensive understanding of 
the adverse event itself, of people’s feelings and perceptions, and of the consequences of 
everyone’s actions and statements. For this understanding to be comprehensive, it must be 
anchored in ongoing attentiveness to others’ words, perceptions, feelings, and needs. 







 How the Open Disclosure meeting can disrupt 
plans 
 
“[it was an incident involving] an over-toxic drug given 
in overdose … and the um, [the clinician] who was a 
trained support person sat down with the family and 
went through the disclosure process. And I have 
absolutely no doubt that it had been done very, very 
competently. The family’s reaction however was really 
interesting. … the child was still in care and was going 
to be there for several months still to come, and the 
family went around and undermined the confidence of 
every other parent in the unit by telling them what had 
happened.  So, you know, there is this real balancing 
act about was that the right thing to do. I don’t know. 
Would we’d been better to have disclosed towards the 
end of the care. Don’t know. But, there’s a real down 
side which we then had to manage. I think in 
retrospect, it was the right thing to do to disclose 
early, but we needed to give more thought to the 
follow effects. And I think what we tend to do is focus 
on the disclosure as the event rather than part of the 
process. It can’t be taken in isolation.” [Med Mgr 
Blck85] 
 
That said, and when the pre-planning of the Open Disclosure meeting has been concluded, 
the enactment of Disclosure minimally involves the following components (table 2.4). 
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Table 2.5: Components Of Open Disclosure Meetings 
 Component of  
Open Disclosure 
Probe 
1 Saying sorry How, and how often, does the Open Disclosure team say sorry in an 
environment that is emotionally charged, legally risky, and personally 
and organisationally confronting? 
2 Doing ‘reflective listening’.  How can staff practise ‘reflective listening’ in circumstances that can be 
highly confronting? 
3 Maintaining the Open Disclosure team’s 
standard of excellent communication. 
How can the team keep those participating in Open Disclosure from 
jeopardising its intent by saying ‘the wrong thing’? 
4 Dealing with complex patient-family 
dynamics. 
How can the team limit the impact of complex the patient’s family 
dynamics? 
5 Determining the cultural appropriateness 
of the way staff do Open Disclosure. 
How can the team disclose adverse events when (their approach to) 
disclosure may not be perceived to be appropriate by the patient and 
their family? 
6 Distinguishing between conventional 
ways of dealing with unexpected 
outcomes and the practices required by 
Open Disclosure. 
How do staff differentiate between ‘the conventional way of disclosing 
complications’ and the new practice of Open Disclosure? 
7 Managing staff who were most closely 
involved in the adverse event. 
How can the team manage involvement of staff who were closely 
involved in the adverse event? 
8 Ensuring patients and family members 
have the right support people present 
without jeopardising confidentiality. 
Where do Open Disclosure teams draw the line with inviting outside 
support people to the disclosure meeting? 
9 Preventing Open Disclosure from going 
wrong. 
How can Open Disclosure teams prevent Open Disclosure from going 
wrong? 
10 Determining when disclosure of adverse 
events information is not appropriate.  
How can staff determine whether there are occasions when disclosure 
of adverse events information is not appropriate? 
 
In what follows we address and elaborate each of these components in turn. 
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Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Saying sorry. How, and how often, does the Open 
Disclosure team say sorry in an environment that is 
emotionally charged, legally risky, and personally and 
organisationally confronting? Interviewees regard the 
initial moment of making contact to alert the patient 
(family) to the need for Open Disclosure as the 
appropriate place to offer the first apology. The wording 
of the apology is a vexing issue however for many 
interviewees. 
Interviewees explain why apologising for adverse 
events remains a challenging matter: clinicians are 
restricted to offering partial apologies (‘I’m sorry this 
happened to you’) in situations where the full apology is 
often expected (‘I’m sorry we did the wrong thing’).  
“No, we say sorry then too. We acknowledge the error 
and apologise for what they’re experiencing.”  
[Senior Clinician Manager 9-4] 
“No, you cannot admit liability. You can apologise and 
say … we are sorry that this has happened to you, but 
we cannot turn around and say, yes we can offer you 
[an explanation] … and that is some of the anger, 
because they keep coming back through the course of 
the meetings and say ‘Why don’t you not just say that 
you stuffed up?’”  
[Nursing Clinician 55-5] 
 
 Interviewees with Open Disclosure experience are 
realistic about the potential consequences of refusing to 
accept responsibility for an adverse event. 
By the same token, interviewees acknowledge that it is 
not unusual for them to rely on their own judgement 
when it comes to negotiating liability in cases where 
fault is clear. They do so however in full cognizance of 
the insurance and personal implications of such 
admission. 
A number of interviewees comment on the unexpected 
benefit following their acceptance of responsibility due 
to its ‘cathartic’ effect: 
 
“I’d sooner someone who was shitty with me about 
failing to admit liability early than to admit prematurely 
and do more harm, basically. Providing I’m confident 
that I’ve done the right the thing, that I’m accountable for 
what I’ve done and that, in a sense, they get shitty with 
me but I don’t want them to lose their relationship with 
the organisation, so they can go to somebody else.”  
[Senior Clinical Manager 22-140] 
“Yes… we certainly do admit liability when we’ve done 
the wrong thing. We do it in a controlled way, though. 
We will check with our insurer first, because we want to 
be sure that we’re indemnified. We will all have a good 
think about whether we’re going to create a fresh wave 
of innocent victims, which is always possible if you use 
the wrong words and do it the wrong way.”   
[Senior Clinical Manager 22-140] 
 “And you know, ah it was one of the most dramatic 
experiences I ever had. As soon as I offered that 
[statement about taking responsibility for the adverse 
event] to them, it’s almost like there was a breath of 
fresh air coming into this room, and you really could see 
him physically change … His tone changed, his body 
language changed, and he was saying things like, ‘so 
where do we go from here? So that to me was a very 
eye-opening experience, very.”  
[Medical Manager 30-124 
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Given the rules embedded in the Open Disclosure Standard and the current legal 
climate in Australia, Open Disclosure does not sanction making full apologies. On the 
one hand, this is wise. The complexity of health services is now such that there are 
rarely if ever easy explanations for unexpected outcomes. Mandating the ‘partial [Open 
Disclosure] apology’ provides a way of preventing staff from rushing in and offering 
overly simplistic and potentially self-incriminating responses to patients’ and family 
members’ questions and accusations.   
On the other hand, in a situation where an experienced staff member judges a full 
apology to be justified and to everyone’s advantage, and where that staff members 
utters a ‘responsibility-accepting’ apology (‘We are sorry our service failed’), such a 
person would be in breach of policy, thereby risking their and their organisation’s 
insurance and indemnity cover.  
As Nancy Berlinger has argued, while legal considerations are an important component 
of how we do Open Disclosure, health care professionals (and policy makers) should 
not unduly privilege their own legal, financial and reputational concerns over 
consumers’ desire to have their dignity acknowledged. Consumers’ dignity is 
acknowledged in simple ways: by being sincere about one’s knowledge about what 
happened, and by accepting responsibility for anything that clearly is the responsibility 
of the health service (Berlinger, 2005). At this juncture, it becomes evident that while 
the apology may have legal ramifications for practitioners, it often principally has social 
and interpersonal meaning for those harmed. In that regard, the Australian Open 
Disclosure Standard has chosen to privilege the legal and self-protective dimensions of 
apologising over its social-interpersonal ones (Wojcieszak et al., 2006).  
For the moment, and with the complexity of clinical practices and the existing legal 
dimensions of apologising in mind, advising clinicians to use the partial apology may be 
preferable. However, legal reform might consider making the full apology an inherent 
component of Open Disclosure by rendering full apologies inadmissible in Court (as it 
has done in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory). Alternatively, 
Australia could consider reviewing its hesitation to move towards no-fault liability 
(Kirby, 2000) as this exists in New Zealand, Quebec and Sweden (Vines, 2007)21.  
Such reform becomes all the more pressing in view of interviewees’ accounts of 
dilemmas faced. In attempting to balance clinical experience, sensitivity to human 
feelings and needs, moral decency, strict procedure and legal norm, interviewees 
describe how they at times have no choice but to take risks of a kind that are 
                                                     
21 “Adoption of no-fault legislation would be the best possible outcome. At the moment clinicians in NSW and the ACT in 
Australia are already fully protected however and can give a full apology. It is a pity to hold them back because of a desire 
for uniformity in open disclosure across the whole country” (Professor Prue Vines, personal communication, 22 Nov 2007). 
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proscribed by the Open Disclosure Standard and by State policy. These interviewees’ 
honesty about the complexity of Open Disclosure lend force to the need for no-fault 
legislation, rather than calling for requiring stricter protection, more rules, tighter 
protocols, and more forceful sanctions favouring privilege or the ‘partial apology’. 
 
Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: 
Essential Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Doing ‘reflective listening’. How can staff 
practise ‘reflective listening’ in circumstances 
that may be highly confronting? Open 
Disclosure training emphasises the 
importance of listening to patients’ (and 
family members’) concerns (see table 2.10 
below for a definition). 
“The Standard thing is really just to listen to them [patients/family 
members], and allow them to develop their arguments and then to 
repeat it. I think that’s probably the critical issue. If they have 
problems, then you go through them all and you repeat them to 
them so you’re telling me these are the issues [to] get rid of the 
poison. … I’ve had some very, very difficult patients, and you find at 
the end of it they will say, ‘thank you.’” [Medical Manager 37-28] 
 Not everyone has the ability to enable 
patients and family members to ‘get rid of 
the [emotional] poison’. Crucial in these 
situations is that staff participating in Open 
Disclosure become attentive to their own 
conducts, assumptions and expectations, so 
that they know when ‘their buttons are being 
pushed’ and the moment has come when 
they need to suspend their habitual 
responses and reactions: 
 
“Oh, you’re opening all sorts of emotional cans of worms, and I 
think that if it’s not done carefully and sensitively by people who 
have a bit of an idea of what they’re doing, you can do quite a lot of 
damage emotionally to the clinicians involved and family members. 
You’re dealing with some pretty raw emotions and people are 
hungry and you can do a lot of damage if you don’t know what 
you’re doing. Certainly you get your buttons pushed, [and] you’re 
going to push them right back. It’s those sort of situations [into 
which] you certainly wouldn’t stick a junior untrained person who’s 
trying to defend their professional reputation and there’s an opening 
gambit.”  
[Medical Manager 28-170] 
 
The Open Disclosure training provided in some States is considered by many 
interviewees as an important resource for fostering the self-reflexivity needed for staff 
to suspend their habitual responses and reactions. Many interviewees comment on the 
need for more staff to be given the training – not merely to make them better at 
disclosing errors, but also to make them better and more attentive communicators in 
general. 
By the same token, once staff has mastered the art of ‘reflective listening’ they need to 
recognise that they have a degree of power over patients and family members. 
Reflective listening needs to be deployed wisely and ethically. It should be practised in 
acknowledgement that it is not applied to silence consumers’ concerns, but to enable 
them to begin to deal constructively with the future (Iedema, Jorm, Wakefield, & Ryan, 
submitted). 
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Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
3 Ensuring that the Open Disclosure team maintains 
excellent communication standards. How can the 
team keep those participating in Open Disclosure from 
saying ‘the wrong thing’? Those trained in Open 
Disclosure need to monitor not merely their own 
utterances and their effects on patients and family 
members, but they also need to monitor colleagues’ 
utterances – particularly those of colleagues who have 
had minimal or no training in Open Disclosure. Central 
to doing Open Disclosure, then, is fostering appreciation 
among colleagues of the challenging nature of 
appropriate Open Disclosure communication. 
Monitoring colleagues’ communication is a crucially 
important issue, because those whose communication 
skills are variable represent a liability in sensitive 




“It is all about having the right people and I think that 
there are some people whose manner and interpersonal 
skills perhaps would be counterproductive in that sort of 
process. These people might be involved in the event. 
… You can imagine someone [saying] ‘I go off and do 
Open Disclosure with this patient’. And you think ‘Oh, 
my god. Please don’t’ [or] ‘Can I come with you?’”  
[Medical Manager 86-51] 
 
As discussed above under the section on pre-planning, the decision to invite or not 
invite those involved in the adverse event to the Open Disclosure meeting(s) depends 
on the seniority of the clinician, and on their organisational and professional knowledge 
of the processes surrounding the adverse event. Their participation is ultimately 
conditional however on their ability to communicate appropriately (without blame) about 
their role and others’ roles in the adverse event, and on their ability to listen (non-
judgementally) to the patient and the family members. In light of that, it may happen 
that those in charge of Open Disclosure have to ‘dis-invite’ colleagues (i.e. ask them 
not to come to any more meetings) due to their lapsing into blame and judgementality.  
Clinicians’ communicative ability is now an increasingly important criterion for job 
selection. It is not just that those professionals who lack the appropriate communication 
skills constitute a liability in sensitive situations such as Open Disclosure, but it is now 
also increasingly clear that communicative ability plays a prime role in the prevention of 
errors in the first place (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004). 
Given the aim is to roll Open Disclosure out across the rest of the health system, 
communication training skills are therefore becoming increasingly important. While 
medical schools in Australia continue to teach communication in ways that underplay 
the need for reflexivity, attentiveness to patients’ needs and feelings, and ‘listening 
skills’ (Iedema, Degeling, Braithwaite, & Chan, 2004), it is undeniable that 
communication is now at the heart of clinical-professional expertise rather than being 
peripheral to it.  
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Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
4 Dealing with complex patient-family dynamics. How 
can the team limit the impact of complex the patient’s 
family dynamics? Interviewees commented that dealing 
with patients alone was often easier than dealing with 
family members, and that dealing with single family 
members is easier than dealing with any number of 
family members.  
In addition to the patient’s wife, husband, son or 
daughter, there may also be less closely related family 
members who may wish to share their interpretations 
and expectations. As a general rule, each additional 
person has the potential to exponentially complicate the 
disclosure dynamic. The less involved with the patients’ 
care family members are, the harder it is to convey and 
explain the complexity that comes into play in many 
care processes. This, in turn, exacerbates the ‘blame 
risk’: a family member at one or more removes from the 
day-to-day care of the patient may not appreciate how 
or why particular things happened (e.g. the need for 
appointing an agency/locum staff who may not be as 
familiar with patients’ care as salaried staff) and how 
this played a role in the adverse event.  
 
Staff involved in Open Disclosure need to be prepared 
to handle complex family dynamics and insist on 







“[with] The patient…you get everything right. But there’s 
a relative … out there who says … ‘that’s what I would 
expect’.”  
[Medical Manager 26-28] 
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Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
5 Determining the cultural appropriateness of how 
Open Disclosure is done. How can the team disclose 
adverse events when (their approach to) disclosure 
may not be perceived to be appropriate by the patient 
and their family? This concern that clinicians may not 
always be able to ‘get it right’ may derive from the 
emotional volatility of Open Disclosure meetings, but it 
may also emerge from Anglo-Australian assumptions 
about truth-telling being out of step with Culturally and 
Linguistically Diverse Groups’  or CALD practices 
(Tuckett, 2004, 2005), with how CALD patients and 
families enact their family dynamics, how they interpret 
and understand the purpose of Open Disclosure and 
‘the patient’s right to know’, and how well they 
understand the nuances of Open Disclosure talk. 
Dealing with people from diverse cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds requires additional resources on the part 
of those disclosing adverse events.  
These cultural challenges are not made easier by the 




In addition to the issue of CALD patients and families 
possibly needing interpreters, there is the matter of 
overseas trained (junior) doctors also not always being 
properly inducted to appreciate the purpose, practice 




This latter challenge touches on the extent and nature 
of Open Disclosure training for staff. The need for 
Open Disclosure in the case of adverse events 
introduces requirements with regard to how staff are 
educated professionally and how they are inducted 
into their organisation.  
 
“Ah, causing more harm to the patient [is a risk]…not 
saying the right words at the right time … as an Open 
Disclosure person you’re always trying… to say the right 
thing, and then you just hope that you do because 
sometimes it perhaps doesn’t come out the way it 
should have.”  
[Support Personnel 44-10] 
 “[we need] cultural awareness. [For example] a lot of 
indigenous people will give you eye contact and this 
older guy was really annoyed at the nurses because 
they wouldn’t give him eye contact  [but we]  don’t 
understand the various community groups and their 
nuances.”  
[Nursing Manager 34-115]   
“On one occasion I should have used an interpreter but 
was assured by the people I was talking to that they fully 
understood when clearly they didn’t. And sometimes it’s 
very hard to judge that. You know, some people sit there 
and they [say], ‘oh yes yes yes’, and then they speak to 
someone who’s got a command of English and it’s a 
whole new ball game.”  
[Support Personnel 12-28] 
“After that happened, I just made a point of [saying], if it 
was an older person who was non-English speaking I 
just made a point of getting someone there. And I would 
say ‘look, we don’t have to use this person, but this 
person is here just in case there’s any difficulties 
because it’s a very hard time for you and I don’t want 
you to have to worry about not being able to understand 
everything that we say’.”  
[Support Personnel 12-28] 
“… but of course sometimes it’s incredibly difficult to get 
an interpreter. Some of the dialects aren’t available. And 
then you get into family members who don’t interpret 
correctly. There’s no end of little barriers. [laughs]”  
[Support Personnel 12-28] 
“[name overseas-trained junior doctor] needed it to be 
explained to him what was going to happen because it’s 
probably not as common a thing in [his] sub-continent. 
And most junior clinicians aren’t aware of it in the [name 
State] system.”  
[Medical Manager 46-167] 
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Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
6 Distinguishing between conventional ways of 
dealing with unexpected outcomes and the 
practices required by Open Disclosure. How do staff 
differentiate between ‘the conventional way of 
disclosing complications’ and the new practice of Open 
Disclosure? No doubt, staff have moved a long way 
from the view that “[if] a patient doesn’t know about [it] 
they can’t get angry about it” [Nursing Manager 94-55]. 
By the same token, interviewees expressed concern 
about colleagues expressing undue confidence in their 
understanding of what Open Disclosure involves. 
A persistent theme in the interviews is that Open 
Disclosure is seen as making little difference to what 
clinicians would conventionally do when things go 
wrong. Interviewees say they are unsure whether 
colleagues’ references to ‘Open Disclosure’ mean that 
disclosure of adverse events is done in the way it is 
prescribed in the Open Disclosure Standard (Australian 
Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2003).  
In view of the prevalence of comments that emphasise 
‘this [Open Disclosure] is what I’ve always been doing’, 
it is important that training make explicit the differences 
between past practice and that required by Open 
Disclosure.  
 
“… that’s the feedback: ‘We already do that well’, ‘We 
deliver bad news all the time. We do that well’, and if 
you’re dealing with someone who already thinks they do 
things fine … I’m finding, they don’t see any need for 
improvement.”  






“I mean we’ve been doing informal Open Disclosure for 
years”  
[Medical Clinician 45-220] 
 
“I suppose that previously we wouldn’t necessarily have 
gone and had anyone else involved such as the 
[Support Personnel]. It would have been more informal 
within the Unit situation where we sit down and discuss 
with the patient and [address] their concerns, so I 
suppose it’s a lot more formalised now than it used to 
be.”  
[Medical Clinician 48-220] 
 
In contrast to how staff handled adverse events in the past they are now mandated to do the 
following (see table 2.6a) 
Table 2.6a: New expectations that Open Disclosure imposes on frontline clinicians 
 New expectations that Open Disclosure imposes on frontline clinicians 
a. Classify ‘complications’ and ‘known risks’ as adverse events potentially requiring Open Disclosure; 
b. Segregate High Level from Low Level adverse events; 
c. In the case of high level adverse events, involve specially trained staff in preparation for the 
disclosure; 
d. Make yourself available for pre-planning and conduct of Open Disclosure meeting(s); 
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Table 2.6a: New expectations that Open Disclosure imposes on frontline clinicians (cont’d) 
 New expectations that Open Disclosure imposes on frontline clinicians 
e. In case you were closely involved in the incident, consider and discuss with others the possibility 
of attending the Open Disclosure meeting(s) and the implications of doing so; 
f. Skill yourself in eliciting from patients (and family members) perceptions and feelings to establish 
whether the disclosure satisfies their needs and expectations; 
g. Show in what you do and say that disclosure communication is integral (not peripheral) to your 
clinical-professional role and skills; 
h. Acknowledge that Open Disclosure requires learning from the adverse events that is not purely 
technical and systems-based, but also team-based, interpersonal, and even personal, in so far as 
that each disclosure inevitably reshapes the patient-clinician relationship. 
 
Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
7 Managing staff who were most closely involved in 
the adverse event. How can the team best manage 
involvement of staff who were closely involved in the 
adverse event? As discussed under ‘Pre-planning’ 
(Section 2.4.1.3), those arranging the Open Disclosure 
meeting(s) need to think carefully about involving 
clinicians who were close to the adverse event when it 
occurred. Their decision requires gauging of those 
clinicians’ communicative skills and feelings about the 
adverse event, the threat of the family blaming the 
clinician, and the possibility that the patient and family 
might benefit from having the clinician there. 
The closer the clinician is to ‘the sharp end of the 
incident’, the more likely this person is to need support 
from and work closely with the Patient Safety 
Coordinator/Officer. At the same time, involving this 
clinician will require extremely careful preparatory work: 
how will the patient and family respond to this person 
being there? What information is available to throw light 
on their attitude towards the clinician in question? 
 
 
“I strongly believe that the people who are involved in 
the care should be involved in the disclosure, um, but 
there’s as many health practitioners who aren’t actually 
up to it.” [Medical Manager 26-85] 
 
“If … it’s sort of like … an obvious sharp end incident … 
where the clinician has directly caused the harm, 
definitely they need so much more support, than when 
it’s something that’s indirect. … So again, it all depends, 
some clinicians will need more support than … others. I 
think it comes down to the actual nature of the incident, 
the disclosure.”  
[Support Personnel 27-141] 
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Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
8 Deciding the implications of the need to ensure 
privacy and confidentiality of the Open Disclosure 
information. This task has two dimensions: Participants 
present in the meeting, and Recording of Open 
Disclosure information.  
First, where do Open Disclosure teams draw the line 
with inviting outside support people to the disclosure 
meeting? Interviewees are uncertain about the extent to 
which the disclosure meeting is a private and 
confidential meeting; to what extent its discussion can 
be recorded and shared with the patient and family, and 
whether it is acceptable to open the Open Disclosure 
meeting up to outsiders (friends, neighbours, 
colleagues, acquaintances who happen to be lawyers or 
doctors). While Open Disclosure resembles mediation 
and is in that sense comparable to ‘Alternative Dispute 
Resolution’ (cf. Berlinger, 2005), what constitutes 
confidentiality is ultimately and currently determined by 
those running the Open Disclosure meeting. Some 
interviewees err on the side of inclusiveness.  
Other interviewees regard the relative as the cut-off 
point beyond which no other people can be invited. 
Open Disclosure policy may not be able to fully 
determine whether only relatives can be invited to Open 
Disclosure meetings. Such invitation may need to 
depend on the nature of the relationships in question.  
Second, the privacy/confidentiality issue also affects 
decisions about whether and how the Open Disclosure 
meeting is recorded by the consumer. While taking 
notes is generally regarded as acceptable, tape-
recording draws a full spectrum of interview responses, 
ranging from outright ‘no’ to ‘yes of course’. Some 
interviewees regard tape-recording as a disturbance of 
the purpose of the meeting, while others consider the 
question of tape-recording the Open Disclosure meeting 
to require a carefully negotiated agreement, with copies 
to be distributed to all parties. 
 
“… for the patient not to have a support person and not 
wanting to have a support person, I would never, ever 
recommend that and I probably wouldn’t organise a 
meeting if the patient didn’t have a support person. If 
they had no family or friends I’d get someone from the 
community.”  
[Support Personnel 26-183] 
“And we do try to make sure that they have someone 
with them. We always try to make sure that they have 
got a partner or a friend or a family member, we will ring 
them, get them in.  
[Allied Health Clinician 98-7] 
 
“I think the onus on management is to invite the next of 
kin… and give them a semi-open offer to bring with them 
whoever they choose. Having said that, you’ve then got 
to be careful about issues such as privacy … I attended 
[an Open Disclosure meeting] recently, where there was 
no family member present but there were significant 
friends … who didn’t have closure following a death, and 
they wanted information that they had no right to had 
because they weren’t relatives.”  
[Medical Manager 9-58]  
 
“I would not normally [allow tape-recording]. Personally I 
would not participate in a recorded session … because I 
think … that it hinders the relationships that you should 
be forming, the dialogue between yourself and the 
patients, and if you make a recording, even a good 
recording, it can’t pick up all the nuances that go on. 
What I have been prepared to do in the past is take 
minutes of the meeting and provide a draft of the 
minutes to the family and the patient. So I’m not averse 
to recording it but I’m against, well I personally wouldn’t 
take part in one with either a tape recorder or a video 
machine.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 29-46] 
“I think you have to be especially wary of it [tape-
recording] and would absolutely insist that, say a 
recording made locally for us as well, [we’d make] 
copies of that tape or we’d take away a recording at the 
same time.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 29-23] 
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Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
 Some interviewees stated they have no problem with 
patients or family members tape-recording the meeting. 
This range of responses can be seen to suggest that 
some staff are more confident about their disclosure 
skills than others, more trusting of the motives of 
patients and family members, or less fearful of the 
consequences of transcripts ending up in the hands of 
lawyers. Legally, of course, a tape-recording does not 
exacerbate risk, as long as staff do not transgress the 
rules of the partial apology, of no-blame, and of non-
conjecture (about the causes of the adverse event). 
“there’s been a couple of occasions where people have 
wanted to tape and that’s fine, we’ve done that.  I have 
no problems with that.  We’ve allowed them any sort of 
record taking they want and we’ve tried to always 
ensure that we close off with the appropriate 
correspondence.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 46-91] 
“Yes, I often do [participate in meeting that are tape-
recorded]. It’s Open Disclosure. They [patients, families] 
can take whatever they want from the meeting. …We 
allow tape recording. When you’re speaking to the family 
you’re also speaking to everybody and you have to 
realise that so you just have to be cautious in the way 
you say things. When I say cautious I just mean that you 
have to be clear cut about how you say things so it can’t 
be misinterpreted in another way, in another venue.”  
[Medical Manager 35-155] 
9 Preventing Open Disclosure from going wrong. How 
can Open Disclosure teams prevent Open Disclosure 
from have adverse outcomes? In some instances 
interviewees talk about Open Disclosure meetings 
going awry. Staff’s greatest fear in this regard is ‘saying 
the wrong thing’.  
To prevent staff saying the wrong thing, it is considered 
important to pre-plan the meeting and rehearse what is 
going to be said. But even then things do not always go 
to plan:  
Also considered important is to arrange to have an 
expert in the relevant specialty area who is also familiar 
with Open Disclosure, such that technical questions 
from patients and family members can be dealt with. 
What needs to be prevented however is that more than 
two experts attend whose views diverge, potentially 
giving rise to contradictory answers to ‘curly questions’. 
 
“Ah, causing more harm to the patient [is a risk]. In an 
emotional [sense]… not saying the right words at the 
right time.” 
 [Support Personnel 26-10] 
“[I was unable to] see the bloody question coming … 
Too slow, I’m afraid. I put my hand up. Saw it, blindsided 
me, killed me. The exchange happened that quick that I 
was not on to it and, look, I don’t know if I should 
persecute myself because it was foreseen in that pre-
planning meeting and agreed, and when it still happened 
I was a bit annoyed.”  
[Support Personnel 27-200] 
“If you actually involve two [clinicians] from identically 
the same field, you may have some issues there 
because you don’t want any contradiction in between 
them going on when there’s a curly question.”  
[Support Personnel 27-194] 
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Open Disclosure going wrong 
 
‘Why did this happen?’ and [the mother] was sad [about the death of the 
foetus] but sort of felt well this was unexpected and unexplained and these 
things just happen and you just sort of get over it.  So I, of course, put my 
great big foot in my mouth as is my wont, and said ‘Well, because the baby 
was small’. And she said, ‘But didn’t that get picked up?’ [she wanted to see] 
antenatal records […] measuring her tummy, stuff like that, all the 
measurements looked alright […] and I said, ‘Well, you couldn’t predict it from 
that […]’. And she said, ‘But I had ultra sounds.’ And in fact she’d had 
ultrasounds for looking at her placenta […].if you plotted the growth of those, 
the baby was on a very small size, and depending on which chart you use it 
was either just below the normal or just on the bottom of the normal range of 
size, and I had some dispute with a radiologist about which chart should have 
been used and where you plot it, and so on. But anyway it obviously opened 
up this complete can of worms because what had happened was that the 
report of the thing said it had shown a normal rate of growth. Whereas in fact 
it hadn’t really grown, it had gone from the top end of the bottom half to the 
bottom end of the top half which meant it hadn’t grown very much at all in that 
time. And so having done something serious in interrupting her coping 
process, so it had gone back to ‘This has not been explained!’, [and] so then 
someone must be to blame for it’, and so on. And I mean I think it really 
stuffed it, and I think that she is just totally unhappy, and remains totally 
unhappy, has complained about the doctor she saw in the clinic to the 
medical board and so on, and this hospital’s response is to write a letter to 
say that basically it’s my fault for saying that […] that I’d made a mistake in 
plotting the ultrasound measurements and I should never had said anything to 
her. But the answer is that the baby was small and the scan did say it was 
small.  
[Medical Clinician 99-132] 
 
Table 2.6: Conducting Open Disclosure Meetings – Essential Components (cont’d) 
 Conducting Open Disclosure meetings: Essential 
Components 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
10 Determining when disclosure of adverse events 
information is not appropriate. How can staff determine 
whether there are occasions when disclosure of adverse 
events information is not appropriate? The complex decision as 
to whether near misses/hits need to be disclosed was 
discussed above. That discussion dealt with deciding whether 
the severity of the (potential) adverse event and the patient’s 
(family’s) right to know added up to an obligation to disclose. At 
the same time, we recognise that a limited number of factors 
can play a role in staff determining Open Disclosure needing to 







“… this is one case where we actually didn’t 
disclose…” [Support Personnel 78-97] 
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The table below (table 2.6b) lists instances where Open Disclosure might be deferred. 
Table 2.6b: Instances where Open Disclosure may be (indefinitely) deferred 
 Instances where Open Disclosure 
may be (indefinitely) deferred 
Supporting interview statements 
1 The patient has died and has no relatives. “Case 1 is where, in fact, there is and are no relatives, there is actually 
no-one to talk to so that’s quite easy, but we have to do Open 
Disclosure for that.”  
[Support Personnel 36-189]  
2 The patient has gone overseas, 
necessitating postponing Open Disclosure. 
“In fact there are five cases where they’re overseas.”  
[Support Personnel 36-189] 
3 The family refuses Open Disclosure. There 
may be emotional reasons for the family to 
(temporarily) defer or refuse Open 
Disclosure. 
“The next is where there was a birth, a difficult birth. The outcome of 
the effect of that birth where we felt there may have been an incident 
on the baby was, as yet, unknown and so that the family actually didn’t 
want to go there. They wanted to enjoy their baby.”  
[Support Personnel 36-189] 
4 Violence perpetrated or threatened by the 
patient or family. In some instances, staff 
have reason to believe that they are dealing 
with an ‘unreasonable complainant’ (NSW 
Ombudsman, 2007). Disclosure in the case 
of an unreasonable complainant might incur 
an undesirable response towards staff or 
towards a patient.  
Violence can interfere with staff adequately 
planning and conducting Open Disclosure. 
The interviewee below explains how they 
were prevented from carrying out a formal 
Open Disclosure due to ‘challenges for staff’: 
 
“And sometimes we take the babies away because the partner’s 
violent. So a lot of it’s, we’ve all been difficult in situations of telling lies 
to the women and they know that we’re telling lies, but do you take the 
baby away from the violent situation [or not]? It just really affects all of 
us.”  
[Nursing Clinician 94-64] 
“… it was a period of time in the ward, where we had three male 
severe head injury patients. And all three of them, were creating 
challenges for the staff over there and the staff themselves were 
failing, were starting to fail to cope because, every time they turned 
around, you know, either one of the patients were punching the staff, or 
the patients’ parents were accusing the staff of not caring for them 
properly, so you know, that stuff in the background was part of my 
decision-making around that..”  
[Nursing Manager 35-79] 
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Table 2.6: Instances where Open Disclosure may be (indefinitely) deferred (cont’d) 
 Instances where Open Disclosure may 
be (indefinitely) deferred 
Supporting interview statements 
5 It is not evident to staff that the patient (family) 
will benefit from the Open Disclosure of a 
‘near miss’. In situations where patients and 
families are already overly distressed, 
interviewees may see a need to make a 
separate judgment about whether Open 
Disclosure could unduly add to people’s 
distress. 
Interviewees know that there are cases where 
disclosure can do additional harm to people. 
 
“the issue of whether we’re doing more harm than good 
emotionally in raising issues has been raised, so I think it would 
depend on what the near miss was. … you still have to argue 
whether having an Open Disclosure process, that might make the 
health service feel good but whether it may actually do more harm 
than good.”  
[Medical Manager 66-43] 
“Oh the risks are harm. The disclosure process can create great 
harm to patients and families … even where there has been 
sensitive disclosure, that the absolute holding of this information 
by the patient, um, who may have … had some sort of error 
occurred during their care, um, may have to live with a sense of 
anxiety about that for many years, and I think that there is a 
sense that the disclosure process is a double-edged sword for 
many people. It can be healing and uh um, you know, healthy, 
and for some patients it will increase their vulnerability and … 
potentially do more harm than good.”  
[Senior Clinical Manager 20-111] 
 
In general, of course, most cases of harm render Open Disclosure obligatory: Open 
Disclosure cannot be avoided or deferred. A proportion of near miss/hit cases may 
qualify for deferred disclosure and of these a sub-set may qualify for non-disclosure. 
However, only exceptional circumstances (cf. the previous four scenarios just listed) 
warrant staff arguing to their senior management that Open Disclosure does not 
constitute the appropriate response to an adverse event. The Queensland Policy states 
in this regard, "In the event that a formal Open Disclosure is not progressed for a SAC 1 
event, the District Manager/ Clinical CE must document the reasons in a memo to the 
Area GM." (Queensland Health, 2006b: 11). In general, the option for non-disclosure 
should be negotiated with and approved by senior managerial staff. 
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Deciding not to disclose 
 
“… this is one case where we actually didn’t disclose … Now, the reason 
being was that it involved a teenager that was really struggling with his 
disease … who was actually quite seriously ill. To say that something went 
wrong in his particular care would have actually been a detriment to him, 
you know. The clinician had a very, very good case not to disclose to this 
particular person, because it would have meant that the work that they’d 
done beforehand would have been undone because of the frame of mind 
that he was in at the time. … It was quite a complex one, but to actually 
disclose what had went wrong initially, um, was really going to affect his 
chronic long term management. So that’s one where we chose that it was 
actually better not to. And I think there’s got to be room for that.”  
[Support Personnel 78-97] 
 
 
Finally, we need to ask the question, ‘How can staff be made aware of the risks 
inherent in not doing Open Disclosure?’ Not doing Open Disclosure – that is, not 
adhering to the overall process of contacting those harmed, pre-planning for the Open 
Disclosure meeting, organising a single-desk contact for the patient and family whom 
they can contact, and arranging for appropriate follow-up for both those harmed and for 
staff – carries increasing risks, given the rise in complaints and the public’s 




                                                     
22 Chris Wheeler, Deputy Ombudsman, personal communication, October 2007. 
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2.4.3 Following up: What happens after the (first) Open Disclosure meeting 
 
 
“[Open Disclosure] needs to be continuous, [it] is one of um, frequent and cumulative 
disclosure rather than just disclosing and then okay now we’ve done that.”  
[Senior Clinical Manager 12-108] 
 
Following on from the first Open Disclosure meeting, there are a number of strategies that 
interviewees consider crucial for ensuring that the hard work put into the first Open 
Disclosure meeting is consolidated. Interviewees propose strategies that seek to realise 
three things: 
 
1.  Ensuring the continued well-being of patients (and families),  
2.  Providing adequate support for clinical staff (colleagues), and  
3.  Creating and maintaining organisational memory. 
 
1. Ensuring the continued well-being of patients (and families) after the initial Open 
Disclosure meeting. Ensuring patients’ and families’ well-being is critical during the 
Open Disclosure meeting, but this task continues following on from this initial meeting. 
Interviewees offer the following strategies for creating continuity for patients and 
family members following the first Open Disclosure meeting (table 2.7 below). 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 63
Table 2.7: Strategies for ensuring the continued well-being of patients and families 
 Ensuring the continued well-being of patients and 
families 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Make sure that the patient and the family spokesperson 
can contact a designated staff member. Consumers may 
need to check on what was said during the first Open 
Disclosure meeting, or they may need further clarification. 
To facilitate this, interviewees recommend giving out the 
contact person’s telephone details at the end of the first 
meeting. Continuity of contact is important to reassure the 
patient (and family) that they are not being abandoned, and 
that the organisation is taking their (near) harm seriously. 
Continuity of contact also minimises the chance of additional 
information errors due to inadequate administration of the 
Open Disclosure process (e.g. sending its letter to the 
wrong person, or including inaccurate information).  
Continuity can be achieved through the Patient Safety 
Officer, the Patient Liaison Officer, or someone in a 
comparable role. 
These staff have the crucial role of tracking and storing the 
history of the Open Disclosure process with specific patients 
(and/or family members). As will become evident when we 
discuss the patient and family member interviews (Section 
2.5), this continuity and the support it gives are considered 
crucial by consumers. Interviewees also signal the 
importance of ‘a single desk’ where details of progress of an 
Open Disclosure case are held, and where patients and 
family members can be referred to. Alongside the strategy 
of the designated contact person, the single desk helps 




“So in terms of a team, my understanding is that 
they’ve changed each time. However, the Patient 
Safety Officer has been the constant in each of 
those.”  




“It’s either the CLO [Customer Liaison Officer] or 
the PSO [Peer Support Officer] that needs to be 
involved in every meeting, because … we’re the 
thread to keep it all together. … we’re the ones 
that are … you know, the memory.”  
[Support Personnel 34-140] 
 
“… my predecessor had moved on to another role 
so there was this bit of a gap without anyone 
actually being a single desk contact for it. So it fell 
off the rails a little bit.”  
[Support Personnel 34-185] 
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Table 2.7: Strategies for ensuring the continued well-being of patients and families (cont’d) 
 
 Ensuring the continued well-being of patients and 
families 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Send out a letter out to the patient (and family) within 48 
hours that summarises the Open Disclosure discussion 
and, if there was one, the plan that was agreed on.  
Staff benefit from having pre-developed pro-formas that they 
use for these follow-up letters. 
 
“… the letter is so important. At the end of it [the 
Open Disclosure meeting] you’ve got a plan. 
‘These are the things we’ve talked about and 
these are the things we’ve offered’. And if you’ve 
got a plan at the end of it and they want to go off 
on a sidetrack, you can refer back to the letter and 
say, ‘Well, this is what we talked about’.”  
[Medical Manager 45-28] 
“… the way I’ve been writing these[letters] is, 
‘Thank you for your meeting of X on such a date, 
here are the attendees. We met to discuss, or the 
following were key points of concern which were, 
or you raised or we discussed the following key 
points’, and list the points, number them or 
whatever, then address those in turn with what 
their concern was as we felt it was and then what 
our reply was and where appropriate an apology 
for the impact that that has had.”  
[Support Personnel 34-198] 
3 Offer the possibility of additional Open Disclosure 
meetings. Interviewees comment that the ‘right’ number of 
meetings is difficult to determine, and of course their 
number depends on the (perceived) severity and impact of 
the incident. In order to provide sufficient feedback and 
establish satisfactory engagement more than one meeting 
may be needed.  
 
“It [how many meetings to have] is difficult to say. I 
think it pretty much depends on the incident and 
on the patient as well. I would say on average 
probably two or three [meetings], probably. I think 
you need more than, certainly more than one to 
get the feedback and engage. Your … processes 
are actually gone [i.e. it is difficult to plan the 
number of meetings in advance].”  
[Medical Clinician 97-25] 
 
4 Be pro-active in organising additional Open Disclosure 
meetings. It may not be sufficient to offer patients and/or 
family members one’s business card and telephone number.  
Staff have maintained and persisted with making contact off 
their own accord, to the satisfaction of patients. 
[see Section 2.5] 
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Table 2.7: Strategies for ensuring the continued well-being of patients and families (cont’d) 
 
 Ensuring the continued well-being of patients and 
families 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
5 Ensure the follow-up meeting(s) are appropriately 
timed. While this issue is less vexing in the case of low level 
disclosures, the timing of High Level follow-up disclosure 
meetings tends to be dictated by the time it takes for the 
Root Cause Analysis investigation to be completed. This 
timeframe may not suit all participants, however, and 
intermediate meetings may need to be called to address 
burning issues.  
 
 
What is discussed at these ‘intermediate’ meetings however 
is not always a simple matter to resolve. In South Australia, 
Section 64D of the Civil Liability Act enshrines Root Cause 
Analysis information in Qualified Privilege. This means that 
no information from the investigation can be discussed 
outside of the investigation, and this renders offers of 
tentative explanations unfeasible.  
 
Discussing provisional Root Cause Analysis investigations’ 
progress is problematic in other States and Territories too. 
This is because the Root Cause Analysis investigation will 
not yet have produced firm conclusions, and discussing 
preliminary analyses goes against Root Cause Analysis 
procedure (Wald & Shojania, 2001).  
“… the second main meeting is usually after the 
Root Cause Analysis is complete … seventy days 
later. So it’s quite a long time after but if they’ve 
got problems, if they have urgent needs for 
information between the first meeting and second 
meeting, we’re happy to have a meeting so we 
may well bring them together and say, ‘Look, we 
haven’t yet got the full RCA, but this is what we 
know so far.’”  
[Senior Clinical Manager 10-4]  
“… we often have said in the past and the 
impression that the family is being left with is that 
there is going to be some big investigation and 
they get a report. And that causes problems. 
Because often then we get in the way of litigation 
and 64D as protected by the lawyers, so you do an 
investigation but you cannot tell the family. And 
that is worse. So we had circumstances where we 
had to do two [investigations]. One for the family 
and one for the lawyers and this is ridiculous.” 
[Medical Manager 93-18/9] 
“If people don’t disclose everything it becomes a 
very difficult process”  
[Nursing Manager 70-14] 
 
 
Additional note: Involving patients and/or family members in patient safety. Recent 
research promotes involving patients in patient safety (R. Davis, Jacklin, Sevdalis, & 
Vincent, 2007). A number of interviewees in the present study are positively inclined to 
involving patients and/or family members in addressing the adverse event. This may 
involve asking the patient and the family questions about the adverse event, and 
enabling them to ask questions about it. Such involvement is seen as potentially 
strengthening both the Root Cause Analysis investigation and as adding to the quality 
of the Open Disclosure process.  
However, pro-active involvement of patients and/or family members may not always or 
entirely resolve questions about what to discuss during meetings in between the initial 
disclosure and the Root Cause Analysis final report. If the patient (and/or family) have 
a desire to have specific questions addressed before the health facility can offer a 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 66
ratified explanation, the Open Disclosure staff may find themselves in the challenging 
situation of seeking input from consumers without being able (as yet) to provide much 
in return.  
Staff may be inclined to call on the patient’s (and family members’) patience and 
goodwill to overcome this dilemma: ‘Please tell us what you would want to know about 
the adverse event, and then you have to trust us to produce a reliable explanation in 
due course’. A more appropriate solution might be to adopt the principle of giving 
consumers a clearly circumscribed and recognised role in the health organisation’s 
adverse event management program (i.e. the totality of processes that includes 
Incident Reporting, Open Disclosure, Root Cause Analysis, and Clinical Practice 
Improvement). Such a role need not be fixed and constrained, and may depend on 
consumers’ levels of interest and knowledge. Research produced by the National 
Patient Safety Agency in the U.K. suggests that the spectrum of roles may range from 
‘listing questions for staff to respond to and act on’ (consumers ‘inform’ the health 
service), ‘attending focus groups to address specific issues’, to ‘attending meetings 
with clinicians’ (in which instance consumers ‘collaborate with’ the health service) 
(Mansell et al., 2005).  
Consumer involvement in patient safety processes may produce two distinct benefits:  
i.  It may be a more effective means of reconciling patients (and family members) 
with the pace, direction and framing of the investigation following disclosure, and  
ii. It may enrich the investigation’s scope and outcomes by allowing it to benefit 
from patients’ and family members’ experiences and insights. 
 
 
2. Ensuring appropriate follow-up for staff after the Open Disclosure meeting involves 
two kinds of strategies (see table 2.8). 
 
Table 2.8: Strategies for ensuring appropriate follow-up for staff  
 
 Ensuring appropriate follow-up for staff Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Involve staff in a factual debrief. A factual 
debrief involves asking questions like: how did the 
planning and running of the Open Disclosure 
session go? What could be improved? What was 
learned? 
 
“I think it’s extremely beneficial because you can talk about 
what went well, what went wrong, and you can talk about 
what you would do differently next time.”  
[Senior Support Personnel -34-57] 
 “I went and spoke to those medical consultants and said: 
‘Why did you do that?’”  
[Support Personnel 27-13] 
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Table 2.8: Strategies for ensuring appropriate follow-up for staff (cont’d) 
 
 Ensuring appropriate follow-up for staff Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Involve staff in an emotional debrief.  
 
Emotional debriefs can range from staff arranging 
to have informal ‘in-unit’ debriefs, to encouraging 
distressed staff to make contact with formal 
counselling services. Debriefs may be necessary 
not merely due to the occurrence of an incident, 
but also following an Open Disclosure session. 
 
 
In some cases, hospital-internal counselling is not 
appropriate and outside counselling needs to be 
arranged. Outside counselling staff will not face a 
conflict of interest in case organisational-
confidential information needs to be discussed 
(Berlinger, 2005). 
“[we have] an in-Unit sit down and talk about things 
particularly if people were upset … and there are formal 
support mechanisms that you can access through the 
hospital for counselling and that sort of stuff if you need it.”  
[Medical Clinician 43-224] 
“I also keep my people after the person’s left the room so 
that they can debrief, and they’ve got an opportunity to say, 
well, you know, I really would have liked to have said that, or 
I was really angry when that person said, so that they 
actually get it off their chest in that environment rather than 
go away still feeling as if they… ‘cause it actually can 
become quite a uh, combative environment.” 
[Senior Clinical Manager 15-48]  
“if we can’t debrief them[staff]  properly, we also pass them 
on to psychologists.  And we actually have a psychologist 
attached to our hospital who we will refer people to.  I also, 
in nursing, have a psychologist who is a support person and 
so whenever there are critical incidents she is available to 
them as a group as well as singly.” [Nursing Manager 65-55] 
 
 
3. Ensuring appropriate follow-up at an organisational level after the Open Disclosure 
meeting is seen to require the following activities (table 2.9). 
 
Table 2.9: Strategies for ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational level 
 Ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational 
level 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Staff in charge of Open Disclosure need to liaise with 
those engaged in Root Cause Analysis.  
Firstly, this may be necessary because information may be 
covered by Qualified Privilege, prohibiting its discussion 
(and dissemination) by staff who are not on the Root Cause 
Analysis team. As noted above, in South Australia Section 
64D of the Civil Liability Act prevents staff from talking about 
the details of adverse events considered under Root Cause 
Analysis investigations with staff not on the investigation 
team. At least one interviewee understands this to mean 
that if Root Cause Analysis has started, Open Disclosure 
needs to cease.  
 
“I think they [Open Disclosure and Root Cause 
Analysis] are [mutually exclusive] because in a Root 
Cause Analysis there is a protection, 64D … against 
any information that is discovered during the 
investigation … that means that nothing can be 
disclosed. Whereas I see Open Disclosure as being 
more a process where the information is actually not 
hidden, it gets disclosed to the patient and it is disclosed 
to everybody really.”  
[Medical Clinician 76-24] 
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Table 2.9: Strategies for ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational level (cont’d) 
 Ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational 
level 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
 Secondly, Open Disclosure and Root Cause Analysis team 
membership may overlap, particularly in smaller 
organisations.  
Staff may benefit from participation in both processes by 
being better placed to:  
i. integrate patients’ and family members’ 
questions into the Root Cause Analysis 
investigation;  
ii. update patients and family members about the 
progress of the investigation, and  
iii. inform them about details emerging from the 
investigation, provided these details have 
been signed off by the Root Cause Analysis 
team. 
Staff should be enabled to share with consumers carefully 
structured feedback as matters come to light rather than 
delaying feedback until the end of a closed-door 






“Sometimes they [teams] overlap [in membership] 
… because of the size of the organisation. And I 
have to admit if you can cope with the stress of 
these things [Open Disclosure] often it helps to be 
involved in the RCA.”  
[Support Personnel 66-88] 
2 Open Disclosure process needs to be systematically 
recorded, and records are kept in separate places. A 
comprehensive record is kept in the Patient safety Officer’s 
office. 
For one interviewee, this full record would not be included in 
the medical notes (“there would be nothing in the charts”). It 
seems important however for clinical colleagues to be made 
aware of the fact that Open Disclosure has taken place and 
what the facts of the adverse event turned out to be. 
 
“There would be document that Open Disclosure 
occurred, a note that Open Disclosure occurred … 
and that would be kept either in the Patient Liaison 
office or the Patient Safety office which are all filed 
and locked and secured and all that stuff.”  
[Support Personnel 27-8] 
“ … as far as the [medical] notes go, … there is a 
form that you put in that just says, ‘Open 
Disclosure was performed on such and such a 
date, clinician was so and so’, and then it’s signed 
… there’s not much detail that goes in there.”  
[Support Personnel 34-179] 
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Table 2.9: Strategies for ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational level (cont’d) 
 Ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational 
level 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
3 The conduct of Open Disclosure follow-up processes 
will benefit from a well-developed in-house adverse 
event register. Such register details the adverse event; 
(factually-determined) information about the adverse event, 
information about the patient and family (including the family 
spokesperson), letters sent out and information provided to 
the patient and family, plans that have been agreed on, and 
progress towards realising those plans.  
This interviewee provides the following reasons for keeping 
such a register: 
 
Given the need for a single-desk contact for the patient (see 
page 82), it is important that such a register be available to 
counter-balance the impact of staff turn-over. Staff may also 
wish to use such a register to aggregate Open Disclosure 
cases, and link this analysis to an evaluation of case type-
specific outcomes. 
 
“… there is central collation of that information. 
Anything that’s a serious adverse event, it is on a 
[register]. So that register’s maintained by the 
Quality Unit, and that is where you are able to 
track, you know, who is following up with the 
patient, who is the contact person, otherwise it 
becomes all over the place.”  
[Support Personnel 66-111] 
“So you need to be having that confidence that … 
we can track back and say that this case has been 
closed, or whatever. Or there is also the danger 
that you’re waiting and the coroner’s process takes 
two years and no-one has bothered to go back so 
if you don’t have that central register, when you 
get a coronial report you don’t know who was 
involved.” 
[Support Personnel 66-111] 
“ … so with our [register] we would also look at the 
timeliness of the Open Disclosure process, and 
how many cases were satisfactorily closed … we’ll 
have to decide on a target time for something that 
is seen as an adverse event  … so we need to 
decide on what are our KPI’s [are that] we want to 
monitor around that, not too many, so just 
manageable, one or two things that would give us 
an understanding of how well the process is 
happening so it doesn’t get lost.”  
[Support Personnel 66-114] 
4 It is seen to be of benefit to arrange monthly meetings 
among those involved in Open Disclosure.  
At these meetings, staff discuss two types of matters.  
First, the progress of individual Open Disclosure cases is 
monitored. 
 
Secondly, staff use the meeting to share common problems, 
useful resources, effective strategies, and emotional issues 
 
“the Clinical Review Committee which is the peak 
body committee, and at that committee there is a 
sort of a checklist we go through to say that, ‘This 
case needs a further follow up. Has it been closed 
satisfactorily for the patient, and has the patient 
raised issues around any further follow up, and 
who is the most appropriate person to follow that 
through?’.”  
[Support Personnel 66-112] 
“… it is a very … confidential, trusting forum and I 
really enjoy that.”  
[Nursing Manager 38-106] 
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Table 2.9: Strategies for ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational level (cont’d) 
 Ensuring appropriate follow-up at the organisational 
level 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
5 Community Advisory Committee involvement is 
recommended to signal progress of Open Disclosure 
roll-out in the organisation and publicise the level of its 
success to members of the community. 
 
“… we went to our Community Advisory 
Committee and gave them our report on what has 
happened so far, and where to from here. We also 
want to do consumer information things, and also 
developing some brochures so the Community 
Advisory Committee is involved.”  
[Support Personnel 66-115] 
 
Without appropriate follow-up, the effort put into the initial Open Disclosure meeting 
may be wasted.  Consumers may experience delays as abandonment, particularly 
when harm is serious. Indeed, as the consumer interviews show (see section 2.5 
below), consumers appreciate the efforts clinicians make to disclose adverse events, 
but the time it takes to formally investigate organisational adverse events is often seen 
as being out of sync with patients’ and families’ personal time, particularly following 
serious harm. It follows that strategies need to be devised to ensure consumers’ needs 
and expectations are not subordinated to organisational procedure and timing as a 
matter of course.  
 
2.4.4 Open Disclosure - Success factors 
 
Interviewees identified the following Open Disclosure success factors (table 2.10).  
 
Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors 
 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Staff are proficient in Active Listening or Reflective 
Listening.  ‘Active listening’ (Egan, 2006), already referred 
to as ‘reflective listening’ above, is considered crucial to 
managing the patient’s and family members’ anger, but also 
for managing one’s own emotions. Reflective listening turns 
on allowing patients and family members to vent their anger 
and other emotions, without unduly interfering.  
Reflective listening creates an interactive space for the 
patient and family members where they can express their 
feelings without being interrupted, questioned, or 
challenged.  
Reflective listening turns in large part on the clinician’s 
ability to place themselves in the patient’s (family member’s) 
shoes.  
“so that it is very much about the patient, and we 
are sorry that this has happened. You’re there for 
the patient, you’re not there for the clinician at that 
time.” 
[Support Personnel 30-147] 
 
“it’s a fact that you don’t just go and tell the patient, 
you have to sit there and just listen to the patient, 
and um and let them vent, let them tell you, um 
what they’re thinking. And that’s, that’s the hard bit 
in Open Disclosure, is to be sat listening.”  
[Support Personnel 30-145]  
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Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
 An important component of reflective listening, however, is 
‘relational ethics’. Relational ethics ensures that reflective 
listening does not just enable anger to be ‘vented’, thereby 
therapeutically silencing the affected consumer. Relational 
ethics emphasises the importance of dialogue as the basis 
for reconfiguring consumers’ emotions from anger and 
distress into feelings with which they can again engage with 
others and their own future (Shotter, 1989).  
“I’ve been on the other side as a family member 
wanting to know stuff.  When a member of my own 
family had an adverse outcome and died … I’m 
looking at it from two perspectives, as a clinician 
but also as a family person.”  

















“… the family are livid, they’re really, really angry. … so I 
said ok, well we need to … meet with them and talk 
through this. … it took quite a while for them to just, you 
know, get rid of their anger. … I didn’t try and interrupt 
them or stop them from talking. I didn’t try and deflect 
the blame because they were wanting to blame 
somebody, they were wanting to know the name of the 
nurse that was suppose to be looking after [the patient] 
… for 25 minutes, they ranted and shouted and were 
very scathing of, of the service. I guess at the end of that 
… they were just getting tired from being so angry, I … 
really just apologised and said, you’re right.”  
[Nursing Manager 27-77] 
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Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Staff display and enact sincerity. Sincerity23 is considered 
to be crucial to the success of Open Disclosure by health 
care staff interviewees. Sincerity becomes possible when 
staff do not impose pre-determined outcomes on their 
interactions with consumers. Sincerity means the outcomes 
of the Open Disclosure meeting are collectively negotiated.  
 
Being sincere may be in tension with constraints that bear 
on Open Disclosure, such as what those doing the 
disclosure can say, how they should and should not 
apologise, and how much information to give out. 
Nevertheless, it is possible for those charged with disclosing 
adverse events to achieve sincerity by showing they ‘share 
the pain’ that patients and family members are experiencing. 
 
Sincerity is seen as a crucial success factor because 
patients and family members are very good at detecting 
deception and insincere conduct. 
Sincerity requires staff to be genuine in their dialogue with 
consumers. One interviewee speaks about a successful 
disclosure meeting “wasn’t cosmetic, it was very organic” 
[Nursing Manager 28-105]. Another comments that 
disclosure means that “we can be open about it and not 
defensive” [Support Personnel 10-104]. It is important for 
staff to feel that they can engage in genuine dialogue with 
those harmed, involving themselves in the unfolding 
conversation (cf. ‘relational ethics’ above in this table).  
 
By the same token, being sincere should not be confused 
with ‘giving the patient and family what they want’. Instead, 
sincerity involves acknowledging others’ distress and needs 
without taking people’s emotions as a licence to blame 
others or blame oneself. It is important to advise staff not to 
confuse sincerity with guilt.  
It is this aspect of Open Disclosure that may be most difficult 
to explain to and absorb for staff. Staff need to let patients 
and family members emotionally unburden themselves and 
they need to respond to this emotionality in a sincere way, 
without allowing the intensity of the meeting to push them 
into self- or other-blame. 
“ …it’s still a very emotional, draining, stressful 
situation that … you actually go through, and, you 
really have got no idea when you walk into that 
meeting. All it’s left up to … is your good 
communication skills … but … most people are 
going through life-altering change, and they’re in 
crisis, and you don’t really know how the people 
are going to react … so that’s what sharing the 
pain is about.”  
[Support Personnel 30-142] 
 
“There has to be a sense of trust because often 
what you’re dealing with is recovering from a 
position of trust which has been lost.  So any 
commitments that you make you have to keep. 
People have very well-tuned bullshit sensors and 
you’ve got to be very careful about being 
absolutely direct and honest.  Which is why we’re 
careful about who we let do it because [if] people 
sense that you’re spinning a story rather than 
information their bullshit sensors go off and you’ve 
lost it.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 46-92] 
 
“… not ‘here comes someone with a cap in the 
hand to tell you they’re sorry for something they’ve 
done’. That’s victimising the person representing 
the organisation.”  
[Support Personnel 41-202] 
 
“… when you’re under the gun and if you’re a bit 
weak-willed then it’s easy to get out of gaol free by 
blaming the system or blaming the hospital or 
blaming the clinician when you’re under the pump. 
It takes a stronger individual to be able to defend 
those but in a way that actually still benefits the 
patient and the community. You’re not doing the 
community any good if you sell out on the hospital 
or a clinician as well as the patient.”  
[Support Personnel 41-202] 
                                                     
23 Sincere’s etymological root is the Latin adjective sincer-us meaning clean, pure, or sound. The first syllable may be the 
same as sim-, as in simplex. It is not considered likely however that ‘sincere’ relates to ‘sine cera’ meaning ‘without wax’ 
(Oxford English Dictionary Online).  
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Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
3 Staff enact restorative justice. Open Disclosure is 
deemed to be successful when staff are able to engage in 
restorative gestures that make their apology tangible. Such 
gestures include (Wheeler, 2007):  
1. ceasing action that has, is, or will, cause 
further harm;  
2. refunding fees or charges;  
3. waiving fees, charges or debts; 
4. providing special assistance and ongoing 
support.  
 
Financial restoration: One way in which restorative justice is 
achieved is by making ex gratia payments available to those 
harmed for expenses incurred by the harm. Mention of ex 
gratia payments needs to be handled carefully and 
sensitively.  
First, health service lawyers counsel against clinicians’ 
using the word ‘compensation’. 
Second, patient may be offended by offers of money, and 




Personal restoration: It is important for those doing the 
disclosure to remember that victims of harm cannot dictate 
how staff who were involved in the incident are dealt with by 
the organisation. Important restorative gestures, however, 
are seen to be, among others (see section 2.5):  
1. a willingness on the part of the organisation and 
the clinician(s) to meet with those harmed and 
maintain contact; 
2. rapid adverse event investigation and practice 
change; 
3. a full apology (if appropriate). 
 
“…when someone says, ‘What if they ask for 
compensation’, I say, ‘out-of-pocket expenses. Oh, 
we can all cope with out-of-pocket expenses’. So 
you make sure that when you’re having an Open 
Disclosure meeting that if there is that, we offer the 
ability for them to consider some of their out-of-
pocket expenses.”  
[Support Personnel 41-208] 
“On our side of the fence you mention the word 
‘compensation’ everyone goes [swooshing sound], 
all the doors locked, everything goes shut, pullout, 
go and see a lawyer. You mention ‘out-of-pocket 
expenses’ [sound of ping] you’ve just hit the right 
part on the cash register that said, ‘Oh, we’re 
actually allowed to make those in-house decisions 
for you about that.’  
[Support Personnel 41-208]  
“Now, a lot of people actually can find the question 
slightly offensive to even talk about money in the 
middle of that meeting, so it’s got to be brought up 
sensitively, that says, ‘Look, we have the ability to 
assist you with some out-of-pocket expenses’.” 
[Support Personnel 41-208] 
 
“So families will often want to know the person 
involved and to know that they’re never going to 
work in health again, that’s not always an 
appropriate response on our behalf. I think we 
have to be very careful that we don’t have, you 
know, victim um, you know, the victims deciding 
what the punishment’s going to be, because that’s 
not a thing that operates in any of our justice 
systems.”  
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Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
4 The organisation has efficient staff support measures in 
place. Staff support plays a crucial factor in giving the 
clinicians confidence that they are not alone in facing the 
consequences of adverse events that they are involved in. 
Support also signals that the health care organisation does 
not subscribe to a blame-and-shame culture.  
 
“… we’ve got um, staff counsellors … I’ve got a 
clinical superintendent who I mobilise immediately 
for the medical officers … who reports back to me 
and lets me know … how the … staff member is 
travelling.  We give them time off if they need time 
off. The clinical director gets involved. So we’ve 
got resources …  and they’re told all about the 
staff counselling.”  
[Nursing Manager 12-48] 
5 Senior staff participate in Open Disclosure. Participation 
on the part of senior staff in Open Disclosure is crucial for its 
success. If senior staff adopt the ethos of Open Disclosure – 
involving others in the organisation in the planning and 
execution of being open about adverse events – trust is 
created that it is now accepted to discuss and learn from 
adverse events. 
 
If senior staff are unwilling or unable to accept that they are 
responsible for an adverse event, there is little hope that 
more junior staff will be persuaded to adopt Open 
Disclosure, and accept that as clinician one has to be able to 
account for an adverse event one was involved in.  
 
“Well, I think senior clinician involvement is 
absolutely vital to make it work, and that ethos that 
it’s okay to talk to the patients.”  
[Medical Manager 75-135] 
 
“Look I think that it’s the willingness to accept and 
acknowledge error [that determines the success of 
Open Disclosure]. I think that’s the one thing that 
the whole thing hangs on. If there exists within the 
organisation a resistance to the notion that there 
was an error, and that we’re accountable for that, 
so I think it’s that willingness to accept failure and 
accountability, and the acceptance of 
accountability for that are probably the two critical 
things the whole thing falls on.”  
[Senior Medical Manager14-120] 
6 Staff have good communicative abilities. Clinicians, 
particularly those involved in Open Disclosure, need to hone 
their communicative abilities to be able to engage effectively 
in realising in reflective listening, authentic disclosure, and 




This communicative ability is concerned with saying the right 
thing and timing what is said well. However, communicating 
well starts with making the patient (family) central to the 
discussion. Making the patient (and family) central to the 
discussion turns in large part on being attentive to how the 
patient and family member(s) participate in the discussion. 
One way of establishing this is through checking whether 
the patient and family member(s) understand what is being 
spoken about. 
“ … we always ask, you know, ‘What are your 
needs?’ In fact, ideally what we try and do is start 
the whole meeting with you know, ‘What do you 
want? What would you like from us? What can we 
do to help you?’ … ‘What information needs do 
you have, but also what other needs might you 
have, you know, in relation to counselling or other 
support?”  
[Senior Clinical Manager 2-3] 
 
“ … being mindful of the language … you know, if 
they looked puzzled then you address, ‘do you not 
understand?’ We don’t say that but trying to ensure 
that they do understand what you’re saying. [It’s 
about] clarifying, getting them to rephrase and 
paraphrase and all that sort of stuff.” 
[Support Personnel 28-3] 
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Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
 While to date clinical expertise has played a primary role in 
the definition of professional status and authority, Open 
Disclosure, alongside a range of other initiatives (such as 
multi-disciplinary team work, Root Cause Analysis, Clinical 
Practice Improvement, and the like) is bringing 
communicative ability to the fore as pre-condition for 
adequately realising clinicians’ professional expertise 
(Iedema, Jorm, Long et al., 2006). Interviewees repeatedly 
pointed to the importance of organisations’ needing to 
account for staff’s communicative ability in the assessment 




“There is a need to have a bit of an overview of it 
[people’s communicative abilities] from a clinical 
hierarchy perspective.”  
[Medical Manager 95-51] 
7 Clinicians have a pre-established rapport with the 
patient (and family). It is important to have a good rapport 
with one’s patients (and their family), to ensure that in the 
case things go wrong, it is not necessary to build up a social 
relationships post hoc. 
“ … we have already built a rapport with the 
[patient] so having an established rapport … really 
added to the comfort and the trust, yeah.”  
[Allied Health Clinician 92-121] 
 
8 Staff enjoy good inter-disciplinary relationships.  
Interviewees emphasise the importance of good 
relationships with colleagues and other teams for the 
success of Open Disclosure.  
 
“Yes, um, we’ve got very good interdisciplinary 
relationships here. Whether it’s an executive level 
or as you move down the line through the 
organisation, so I think we’ve got a very supportive 
culture of one another.  In other words, it means 
you’ve got the opportunity to talk about Open 
Disclosure cases and be able to be fairly frank 
about it without feeling that you’re going to be put 
down or criticized.”  
[Medical Manager 73-51] 
9 Organisational-structural prerequisites have been put in 
place. Interviewees point to the need to have a number of 
structures in place without which Open Disclosure runs the 
risk of failing.  
 
 
The systems that should be in place before Open Disclosure 
occurs include the full array of risk management 
mechanisms:  
1. effective complaints handling,  
2. no-blame error reporting and  
3. well-established incident investigation processes.   
“… the time you prepare for Open Disclosure is 
years back.  You try and … work with policies and 
procedures and frameworks that are already in 
place and that people are familiar with”  
[Senior Medical Manager 8-136] 
“ … in a sense you’re already using systems that 
are already there, you’ve got the system for 
interacting with patients and families, you’ve got the 
system for managing corporate legal risk, you got 
the system for dealing in a just, fair and reasonable 
way and hopefully in a supportive way with staff, 
you’ve got the system for investigating and finding 
out what really happened.”  




Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors (cont’d) 
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 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
10 Bereavement counselling benefits patients and family 
members. Interviewees emphasise needing to be able to 
recommend bereavement counselling to patients and family 
members. Bereavement support enables frontline staff to 
concentrate on the more technical and mechanical aspects 
of the adverse event. 
“And that’s why I think very, at the beginning when 
we identify that there has been a serious adverse 
event that we put in place bereavement support, 
the families can start to separate out the clinical 
bereavement response from the um, uh from the 
feedback process.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 8-116] 
11 Staff training and general roll-out of Open Disclosure is 
arrranged. Interviewees emphasise the importance of staff 
training in order to enhance clinicians’ familiarity with Open 




a.  Calibrated training. The training should focus on those 
charged with doing Open Disclosure, but it should also 
include frontline clinicians generally to compensate for 
attrition of those who received training. 
The strategy advocated is a calibrated one, where 
those most involved with Open Disclosure are given 
intensive simulation training and refresher courses, 
with other staff being invited to more general and less 
time-intensive overview sessions. 
 
b.  Integrated Open Disclosure awareness sessions. 
Alongside a calibrated training roll-out, interviewees 
propose integrating Open Disclosure into staff induction 
and orientation sessions, as well as spreading the ‘just-
in-time’ Open Disclosure mentoring approach. This 
latter approach involves inviting staff who have had no 
or minimal contact with Open Disclosure to pre-
planning and possibly patient/family meetings. Such 
invitations will of course depend on the nature of the 
incident, the frame of mind of the patient (family), and 
the degree of involvement in the adverse event on the 
part of the personnel invited.  
 
c. On-line Open Disclosure education materials. Another 
strategy proposed is to have on-line education modules 
where front-line staff can go to familiarise themselves 
with Open Disclosure. 
 
“… [we need] more staff training in what it means 
and having more than just the [peer support 
personnel] relied upon to facilitate it. I think … 
having more key people [is important] because the 
key people, of course, that we trained originally 
come and go, and some of them have probably 
left.”  
[Senior Support Personnel 34-74] 
“There are different levels of training required at 
each level. There’s got to be a basic understanding 
by the staff that the process is there and what it 
involves and who to talk to when they need to. 
Then you have to have the clinicians having a little 
bit more, or the seniors start having a bit more of 
an idea of how it all works, then you have to have 
the facilitator level, and that needs ongoing 
support.” 
[Support Personnel 66-100] 
“OK when something goes wrong there is an open 
disclosure process for this person and they’ll walk 
you through it.  That’s five minutes discussion, it’s 
not a two day discussion.  And, in many ways I 
think that’s actually more we need to be doing then 
trying to take people off the floor for a couple of 
days.  We need a big enough group of people who 
are trained to be support officers and we’ve got that 
now.   I mean keep renewing that over time but the 
message out for the rest of the staff I think can be 
delivered in small bits.”  
[Medical Manager 34-90]  
“… having some kind of on-line education, because 
it’s always difficult for regional [areas] like ours to 
have time off and to be back-filled to [go to the city] 
to do training down there.”  
[Senior Support Personnel 34-74] 
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Table 2.10: Open Disclosure Success Factors (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure Success Factors Relevant Interview Quotes 
 d.  Enhanced medical staff participation in Open Disclosure 
training. A number of interviewees commented on the low 
level of participation in Open Disclosure training on the 
part of medical personnel. Given that medical personnel 
are well-represented in senior positions of most health 
organisations, it is crucial to engender interest among 
doctors in Open Disclosure. One way in which this can be 
achieved is through engaging junior doctors in Open 
Disclosure (university- or College-based) education24.  
 
e.  Comprehensive risk information. Interviewees 
commented strongly on the need to educate consumers 
about the risks inherent in receiving health care services. 
This can be achieved in two different ways: 
 
1st. Extended Informed Consent: by extending informed 
consent from a discussion that is narrowly 
concerned with the treatment provided, to a 
consideration of the general risks inherent in 
hospital treatment, consumers’ idealised 
expectations of health care services may be 
mitigated. 
 
2nd. Public education through diverse channels: The 
public deserves to be educated about the level and 
quality of services that are available in their public 
health services. Currently, public ‘education’ is 
achieved on the strength of ‘gee-whiz’ media 
announcements about medical discoveries many of 
whose effects and impacts reach well into the 
future, staged documentary television series that 
mostly portray medical successes, fictional 
programs that are filmed in clean, quiet and over-
staffed hospitals, and cascades of damning reports 
targeting ‘bad apples’ (Lupton, 1998). Forums need 
to be organised that bring hospital clinicians 
together with community representatives, health 
department officials, policy makers and media staff 
to discuss – in realistic and no-blame terms – what 
standards of care Australia’s health system is 









“Tell patients about the bad things that can 
happen up front, so when they do happen it’s, 
‘Oh.’ ‘Sometimes people get the wrong leg cut off’. 
‘I got the wrong leg cut off’. It’s not a surprise. It 
happens. I mean we have these ridiculously long 
consent forms and all that sort of stuff but …we 
only have consent forms for procedures. When 
you come in with pneumonia, you never sign a 
consent form but you might get an infected canula 
and end up having your finger cut off because of 
some terrible infection and you get a clot in your 
legs. Maybe there needs to be some sort of 
overriding statement [about these additional 
treatment risks]. You might come into hospital, you 
might have a drug error, you might have this 
happen … so when they do happen, ‘Oh, yeah, 
well this is part of the risk of being sick and being 
treated’.  
[Medical Clinician 27-237] 
 
“I think the overall tolerance has changed and 
people are more um, likely to, you know, develop 
road rage and supermarket rage and, I think, 
hospital rage. I think that is also another rage that 
is not spoken of often. And unfortunately it’s the 
staff that bears the brunt of that very often.” 
 [Clinical Manager 4-36] 
 
 
                                                     
24 In New South Wales, junior doctors are currently engaged in Open Disclosure simulation training (involving actors). 
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2.4.5 Open Disclosure - Perceived challenges 
 
Open Disclosure faces a number of challenges. These are listed below. 
 
Table 2.11: Open Disclosure – Perceived Challenges 
 Open Disclosure - Challenges  Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Consumers may mobilise ‘Freedom of Information’ 
and/or ‘Discovery’ laws. Consumers may request 
information relating to Open Disclosure, such as pre-
planning documents, to be released.  
It is advisable that staff not record anything on the pre-
planning pro-forma or elsewhere that, if subject to FOI 
or Discovery, could be used against them.  
 
“… that FOI-able stuff on the pre-meeting planner sits 
there, but should it? Should I just push the delete button 
because it’s a pre-planner? I don’t know.”  
[Support Personnel 38-199] 
2 Outside institutions promote and demand blame. 
Staff have reason to be wary of institutions whose 
practices are not (yet) aligned with those of health care 
organisations that practice Open Disclosure. Such 




Interviewees commented on the need to ‘get adverse 
events’ out of the courts. 
 
Above we presented our views on the proposal for a no-
fault system in Australia (see pages 50 and 75 above). 
“I think part of the problem there is that, you know, we 
talk about a no-blame culture or a just culture or whatever 
you want to call it, but the problem still remains that when 
something goes wrong it ends up in the public domain. 
Sorry, but the politicians are just after somebody to sack, 
and we saw that with Bundaberg in Queensland, we saw 
that with Camden-Campbelltown in New South Wales.” 
[Medical Manager 27-33]  
 “I’m of the belief that we should get all compensation 
issues out of the courts because until you actually get 
them out of the courts, out of the traditional courts where 
you’re finding somebody to blame and penalising them as 
a consequence, until we do that I actually don’t think that 
we can put in place a robust system of patient safety and 
quality in the health care system.”  
[Medical Manager 27-33]  
3 Primary and tertiary care are misaligned in their 
communications with the patient. The primary-tertiary 
care divide in Australia leads to referral and discharge 
problems, but also creates problems with regard to 
expectations that patients entertain about the service 
they are referred to. GP referral practices need to be 
aligned with the extended informed consent approach 
advocated here (Harris, 2002). Patients need to be 
informed of the treatment they need and of the hospital 
that is likely to be able to provide it, but patients also 
need to be told about the broader range of risks that are 
inherent in hospital treatment. Equally, referral needs to 
be made in a way that does not overstate what the 
hospital can or should provide. 
 
“Of the referrals that are sent to me, over half of my 
patients are put at risk before they arrive. I do not get 
adequate information on them. I do not have their drugs. I 
do not have their past history. I do not have a clear 
clinical description of what’s happening or the blood 
results or anything, necessarily and the worst folks …a 
GP who will send a patient up with a pre-conceived idea 
of what’s going to happen. For instance, ‘I’ll send you up 
to the hospital and they’ll do a CT scan’, or ‘I’ll send you 
up to the hospital and they’ll take your appendix out’.” 
[Medical Manager 27-33] 
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Table 2.11: Open Disclosure – Perceived Challenges (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure - Challenges  Relevant Interview Quotes 
4 The resource implications of Open Disclosure are 
considerable. Open Disclosure consumes a lot of 
resources, particularly in terms of staff time.  
Interviewees insisted that enhancing the quality of care 
inevitably means making care more expensive.  
 
“The actual meeting went from two o’clock till after six 
o’clock. So there was a lot of ground covered.”  
[Medical Manager 45-167] 
“So I spent about three hours that Saturday morning, just 
going around the parents.” 
 [Medical Manager 41-127] 
“People don’t like to talk about funding with quality. They 
think quality comes from nothing and it doesn’t require 
any money. It just requires an attitudinal change or 
something like that, but, unfortunately that’s not true in 
my opinion. Quality costs money and to have a good 
quality program costs a large amount of money and 
usually you can’t make guarantees to the family that this 
will be improved because the amount of funding required 
to improve it is not available. So that’s how it improves it, 
but that’s, mm. I mean we had no radiology at this 
hospital for over a year so, I mean we had a lot of 
problems with misses and things on scans. So the family 
go, ‘Well, aren’t you getting radiologists?’”  
[Medical Manager 45-167] 
5 Clinicians need to engage in work process mapping 
and design. For Open Disclosure to work well, 
explanations are necessary about how the service 
works and where and why it went wrong. To counter-
balance their rising complexity, health care 
organisations have begun to map their work processes 
in the form of clinical pathways and related devices. 
Generally, however, clinicians are not taught well and 
sufficiently about the organisational dimensions of care: 
these dimensions are part of the ‘hidden curriculum’ of 
clinical education. For staff to be able to offer 
explanations about how care processes operate, it is 
necessary for them to take the time to sit down with 
each other and (re)design their tasks and overall work 
processes. This process mapping and task design, 
moreover, should not be a static process, but involve 
‘flexible systematisation’: that is, ongoing discussion 
about the contours of the care provided to patients 
(Timmermans & Berg, 2003).  
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Table 2.11: Open Disclosure – Perceived Challenges (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure - Challenges  Relevant Interview Quotes 
6 Multi-cultural sensitivity is crucial. Open Disclosure 
requires multi-cultural sensitivity. If Open Disclosure 
with Anglo-Australian patients and families is 
challenging, it is equally if not more challenging when 
involving Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) 
patients and families.  
Research done in oncology points to patients and 
families from most cultural backgrounds wanting to hear 
and appreciating being told the truth (Atsushi, 1995). 
This does not mean that approaches to Open 
Disclosure that suit Anglo-Australian consumers can be 
directly applied to non-Anglo-Australian patients and 
family members. Research done in oncology on 
breaking bad news about cancer diagnoses has 
relevance here and needs to be appropriated into the 
Open Disclosure literature (Gattellaria, Butow, & 
Tattersall, 2001; Goldstein, Thewes, & Butow, 2002).  
“…  some of the different ethnic groups, … they have 
different expectations and different values associated 
with health care.”  
[Support Personnel 7-29] 
 
7 Staff do not sufficiently appreciate the emotional 
labour that is needed for Open Disclosure. In cases 
where staff interpret the problem of the adverse event 
as being a purely technical matter, disjunctions can 
emerge between the emotional needs of the patient and 
the priorities of the staff.  
“Everything he [clinician] was saying was, was um, you 
know logical, it was rational, it had process behind it, but 
it wasn’t empathic and he never kind of at all 
acknowledged the fact that she [patient] was hurting. 
That’s all that she wanted to hear. That’s all she wanted 
to hear.”  
[Nursing Manager 33-101] 
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Table 2.11: Open Disclosure – Perceived Challenges (cont’d) 
 Open Disclosure - Challenges  Relevant Interview Quotes 
8 Open Disclosure can exacerbate the clinician-
patient (family) relationship. Above reference was 
made to disclosure going wrong. The potential of Open 
Disclosure failing to achieve its intended objective of 
improving clinician-patient (family) relationships is not 
negligible, particularly in this initial period with health 
care staff around Australia beginning to come to terms 
with Open Disclosure.  
The reasons for failure can include:  
a.  ‘staff saying wrong or contradictory things’,  
b.  ‘staff assuming Open Disclosure puts them (rather 
than the patient and/or family) centre-stage’ 
c.   ‘staff assuming that Open Disclosure constitutes a 
licence to acknowledge responsibility for the 
incident before its facts are established’,  
d.  ‘staff remaining unwilling to acknowledge the 
rights and emotions of the patient ’  
e.  ‘staff proving unable to manage patients’ (family 
members’) distress and anger’, 
f.  ‘staff sliding from ‘we have made mistakes’ 
towards ‘we are mistakes’ and guilt’, 
g.  ‘staff unable to ‘hear’ patients’ and family 
members’ needs and feelings’, 
h.  ‘patients (family members) wanting to blame 
clinical staff, and  
i.  ‘patients (family members) deciding to sue upon 
being told of unexpected outcomes’. 
 
 
Open Disclosure going wrong should not be used as a basis for arguing against this 
practice, however, even if there are occasions when Open Disclosure prompts rather than 
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avoids litigation (Studdert, Mello, Gawande, Brennan, & Wang, 2007)25. Instead, and 
bolstered in this recommendation by the resounding support of Open Disclosure by all 
health care professional interviewees (as well as patient and family interviewees; see 
section 2.5 below), we advocate that unsuccessful instances should be analysed to benefit 
staff in their attempt to enhance their disclosures. In addition, research needs to be initiated 
that matches the quality of organisations’ Open Disclosure practices to the rates of 
complaints and levels of litigation. Such research would provide an evidence base useful for 
promoting Open Disclosure across the health care system. 
 
                                                     
25 In alerting us to the possibility that Open Disclosure may prompt more claims and complaints than avert them, Studdert 
et al’s paper adopts a highly ambivalent stance. Its title classifies Open Disclosure as ‘an improbable risk management 
strategy’. The article proceeds to deploy a rather idiosyncratic method to assess the economic risk of Open Disclosure 
(Wakefield, Jorm, & Ryan, 2007). The article acknowledges in its conclusion that Open Disclosure is the ethical thing to do, 
in terms that establish a zero-sum relation between economics and ethics. This stance positions the article in tension with 
three related literatures: one that elaborates the positive influence of ‘being open’ on the clinician-patient relationship 
(Berlinger, 2005; Woods, 2007); a literature that discusses the increasingly open and deliberative processes needed for the 
governing of public institutions (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Mooney, forthcoming), and the literature that outlines the 
benefits of Open Disclosure for the economics of medical insurance and indemnity (COPIC, 2004). 
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2.5  Patients’ And Family Members’ Views On Open Disclosure 
2.5.1 Introduction  
 
This section of the Final Report presents an analysis of the 23 interviews we conducted 
with consumers. These consumers included 11 patients and 12 family members.  
These consumer interviews provide important insights on a number of fronts. First, 
consumers’ views on Open Disclosure make clear what it is about Open Disclosure that 
works and what does not work for them. Further, their views are important for assessing 
whether clinicians are conducting Open Disclosure in ways that are appreciated by 
consumers. Finally, consumers’ views are a crucial means for clinicians to build confidence 
in their ways of working and communicating, and for validating their approaches to doing 
Open Disclosure. 
The remainder of this sub-section is organised as follows. We will describe:  
 
1. Receiving news of the adverse event in ways that are problematic;  
2. Being asked to become involved in Open Disclosure;  
3. Participating in Open Disclosure;  
4. Following up the initial Open Disclosure meeting(s);  
5. A numerical analysis of patients’ and family members’ Open Disclosure 
scenarios.  
 
Before commencing this part of the report, we need to make the following point. 
Consumers’ experiences of Open Disclosure are extremely complex. This is because in 
several instances consumers received excellent attention and feedback from some staff but 
not from other staff; some consumers’ experiences moved from being positive to negative 
and vice versa due to how the disclosure unfolded and what and how much they were told, 
and on occasions consumers’ views were ambivalent and/or self-blaming, making it hard to 
draw firm conclusions about what happened. These complexities notwithstanding, the data 
reveal important issues that need to be taken account of to improve the ways in which 
Open Disclosure is practised.  
 
2.5.2 Receiving news of the adverse event  
 
Above in Section 2.4.1.1 we listed the various external and internal channels via which 
health care staff said they received and communicated notification of adverse events. 
Interview statements by patient and family members equally demonstrate that there are 
various ways in which they too are alerted to the occurrence of adverse events. In their 
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case, news of an adverse event can reach them ‘internally’; that is, the adverse event is 
revealed by staff involved in the care provided or working for the facility where the adverse 
event occurred. News can also reach the consumer ‘externally’; that is, via people not 
associated with the health care facility where the care was provided. As is evident from the 
statements provided below, patients and family members prefer to hear about the adverse 
event from staff at the facility where the incident occurred, although this in itself does not 
guarantee that revelation of the adverse event will be unproblematic. 
 
2.5.2.1  The patient (and/or family member) is (inappropriately) informed about the 
adverse event by (staff at) the health facility 
 
Interviewees recount how adverse events may be revealed by clinicians working in the 
health facility where the care was provided and where the adverse event occurred. Three 
problematic scenarios were described: informal disclosure, ad hoc disclosure, and 
contradictory disclosure. 
 
Table 2.11: Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the adverse event from a 
clinical team member or members 
 Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure 
about the adverse event from a clinical team 
member or members 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Staff should recognise that consumers are 
sensitive to Open Disclosure being done too 
informally, and that the patient and/or family may 
feel the need for a more formal apology and 
explanation.  
 
Informal and immediate notification of the adverse 
may be appreciated by consumers (“It was very 
useful”, Cons 12, 103). However, if these informal 
discussions are not followed up with a more formal 
meeting they may ultimately fail as a response and 
information sharing mechanism.  
 
If the adverse event is deemed serious by the patient, 
superficial disclosures and informal apologies made by 
clinicians on the ward may not meet consumers’ 
expectations, and a more formal disclosure process 
should be initiated.  
 
“[my wife] came back and said ‘look there’s about 8 or 
10 doctors standing around in a circle, something’s 
going on’. A couple of minutes later two of these people 
came over heading our way. So in the meantime [they] 
must have found the mistake with the wrong plasma 
and they learned about it. So, they came over and told 
us what had happened.”  
[Cons26 12, 102] 
“Oh, [I had] informal ones [disclosure]. The doctor just 
kept coming up to my bed and seeing if I was alright. So 
it was only the doctor [who came and told me about the 
adverse event].”  
[Cons 7, 65]  
“He [doctor] came and apologised a few times … [then] 
I had to press for it, for the information I wanted”  
[Cons 7, 62/8].  
 
                                                     
26 The abbreviation ‘Cons’ will be used to indicate quotes are taken from the patient and family members’ interviews. The 
first number represents the Interviewee Number; the second number represents the page number in the transcript. 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 85
Table 2.11: Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the adverse event from a 
clinical team member or members (cont’d) 
 Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the 
adverse event from a clinical team member or members 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Disclosure of an adverse event should not be delayed as 
a result of inadequate team communication. 
The administration of an overdose during one patient’s 
operation had not come to the wider clinical team’s attention, 
and the seriousness of this only transpired thanks to the 
patient commenting on feeling ‘strange’ to their treating 
doctor some time later. This case suggests there may have 
been a lack of communication, a lack of attention to the 
details of care, or a lack of acknowledgement that this 
adverse event deserved to be formally notified, discussed 
and disclosed.  
Clinicians’ finding out about incidents in an ad hoc way may 
result from:  
1.  the patient’s documentation not being fully 
representative of the care that is provided, 
2. the patient’s documentation not having been 
adequately consulted by the treating clinician, or  
3.  adverse events not being approached as needing 
adequate preparation, investigation and explanation.  
 
Communicating the occurrence of adverse events of relative 
severity to consumers in ad hoc ways may point to a 
syndrome of operational shortcomings in the unit or 








“… nobody told me in the beginning and then I 
learnt how much I’d had, and I actually was 
really, really upset … I went for a … two-weekly 
check up and in that check up I told the doctor 
then what had happened [near-death 
hallucination] and he said, ‘Oh, my goodness me, 
I’ve not heard anything about this.’ And from then 
that’s what started the ball rolling so that I had 
the interview with the other people. I would think 
it was, probably about a month after that.”  
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Table 2.11: Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the adverse event from a 
clinical team member or members (cont’d) 
 Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the 
adverse event from a clinical team member or members 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
3 The disclosure should not reveal inter- or intra-
professional fragmentation.  
In some instances, patients and family members recount how 
a clinician reveals to them that something has gone wrong in 
the care provided by a clinical colleague, advising them to 
follow it up with a complaint or otherwise.  
A clinician’s advice to file a complaint manifests intra-
organisational fragmentation and tensions. Instead of 
informing the patient and/or family member(s) of the options 
that are available to them following an adverse event, 
negotiating the details of the adverse event with the clinicians 
responsible, and preparing an organisationally-coordinated 
response, the clinician in the quote on the right ‘exploits’ the 
adverse event for their own purpose (alerting senior 
management to the problems caused by agency staff), 
disregarding the needs of the patient and family member(s) in 
the process.  
Intra-professional and inter-professional tensions are a not 
uncommon theme in the consumer interviews, with comments 
from clinicians about the inadequate standards of colleagues’ 
practices pointing to the possibility that disclosure be used as 






 “… the supervisor of [profession], he came 
tearing through after the other two [clinicians] had 
rushed down and told me about it [the incident], 
and he told me to … immediately … get in 
contact with the … woman that deals with all 
complaints.” [Cons 16, 123] 
 
 
Open Disclosure may affect how health care professionals communicate with and relate to 
one another, since Open Disclosure promotes: 
 
  1. people being open with one another;  
  2. attention to the complexity of adverse events not being sacrificed in favour of    
   hasty conclusions and personal blame;  
  3. people’s right to know being linked to a duty to achieve a more sophisticated    
   understanding of health organisational processes and incidents, and  
  4. the organisation mobilising a coherent and supportive response to both staff    
   and consumers.  
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“Taking professional responsibility for an adverse event if it comes to a 
professional’s attention, whatever its source or origin”. 
 
Rather than clinicians who become aware of an adverse event having occurred in a 
colleague’s care channelling their judgment through the patient (and/or family), they 
should remember that their judgment places an onus on them to initiate notification 
via formal, hospital-internal channels. This does not obviate discussing the adverse 
event with the patient (and/or family), nor pointing out the various options open to 
them (including complaint and litigation). However, it is inappropriate for staff to 
presume that their judgment about an event having occurred while the patient was 
under the care of others is acquitted by encouraging consumers to take action 
against colleagues and/or neighbouring services. 
 
 
2.5.2.2  The patient (and/or family member) is (inappropriately) informed about the 
adverse event from people not employed at the health facility where the adverse 
event occurred 
 
As in the case of news being broken internally, when unexpected outcomes become 
evident after the patient has left the health care facility, the following problems with 
disclosure can arise.  
 
Table 2.12: Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the adverse event from 
someone not connected with the health organisation where the patient was treated 
 Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the 
adverse event from someone not connected with the health 
organisation where the patient was treated 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Clinicians who are not employed at the facility where the 
adverse event occurred should not burden consumers with 
both the knowledge of the unexpected outcome and the task 
of acting on its implications.  
Patients and/or family members may be informed about adverse 
events after they have left the health facility where the event 
occurred. For patients to find out that an adverse event occurred is 
traumatising. To find out about such an event in a way that is less 
than ideal can be additionally distressing. In the quote reproduced 
on the right, the consumer recounts being burdened with knowing 
and acting on an unexpected outcome, even though it is s/he who 
is least practically trained and emotionally prepared to act on the 





“I didn’t get told that there was an internal 
investigation going on by [name hospital] 
into [baby’s] death. I didn’t get told about 
that by [name city]. I was told about that by 
my [clinician] in [name town]. So I then 
wrote letters to [name hospital] regarding 
[baby’s] death.”  
[Cons 1, 6] 
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Table 2.12: Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the adverse event from 
someone not connected with the health organisation where the patient was treated (cont’d) 
 Consumers receive (inappropriate) disclosure about the 
adverse event from someone not connected with the 
health organisation where the patient was treated 
Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Clinicians should not inform the consumer that there are 
conflicting expert opinions about an unexpected 
outcome without asking the consumer whether they 
expect the clinician to resolve this conflict on behalf of 
the consumer.  
If hearing about an unexpected outcome from people not 
originally involved in the care can be unsettling, being 
confronted with divergent expert opinions about its causes 
may be even more so.  
Clinicians are valued for their expert opinions, and for their 
ability to shed light on the medical-clinical specifics of 
unexpected outcomes. When they assume care of a patient, 
and their opinion conflicts with colleagues about the details of 
care provided in the past (particularly in the case of an 
adverse event), they should not merely burden the consumer 
with their views and leave the consumer to act on the 
consequences. Instead, the treating clinician should ask 
whether the consumer would like them to assume the task of 
clarifying this difference of perspective with the relevant 
colleague(s) (at the facility where the adverse event 
occurred), in order that the consumer may receive:  
1. a professional (rather than just a personal) explanation 
about what happened, and  
2. be provided with a coordinated response that helps them 







“when I took [name baby] to [name town] then 
when I came home to see a paediatrician, she 
told me that what actually happened was, that 
through my birth, twenty minutes before I had 
[name baby] I had this really big blood loss”  
[Cons 3, 24] 
 
“The [second] surgeon [not originally involved in 
the operation] said to me there and then there is 
a hernia suspected, through the stitching, it was 
not stitched up tight enough, which turned out to 
be quite true. He said after the operation [done 
by the first surgeon] he could put his thumb 
through to the stitching.” [p 13, p. 107] 
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“From professional autonomy to responsible autonomy” 
Clinical autonomy has functioned as an important principle in medicine: it has 
ensured that medical decisions have benefited first and foremost the patient 
(Degeling, 2000). At the same time, an excess of professional autonomy may lead 
to inadequate negotiation and engagement among clinicians, with patients’ 
processes of care not benefiting from shared discussion among professional 
experts. What is needed is ‘responsible autonomy’ (Cruess & Cruess, 1997): 
1 intra-professional negotiation of opinions, practices and plans, and 
2 professional-organisational arrangements and agreements to take responsibility 
for the provision of health care in general (even if that care spreads across 
services, specialties or systems), and for unexpected outcomes in specific. 
 
 
2.5.3 Being asked to become involved in Open Disclosure 
 
Patients and family members express the expectation that the Open Disclosure meeting be 
preceded by at least two activities on the part of the clinical team and/or health facility: 
involving the patient (and/or family) in establishing the severity of the adverse event, and 
preparing (the patient and/or family) for its disclosure.  
 
Table 2.13: Preparing for the Open Disclosure meeting 
 Preparing for the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 The patient and/or family should be involved in 
determining the severity of an adverse event.  
Formal definitions of adverse events as are contained in the 
Sentinel Event list, and structured approaches to establishing 
the severity of the adverse event that use Severity 
Assessment Codings provide important guides for clinicians 
in their attempt to gauge the seriousness of an adverse event 
and tailor their response to it. However, it is evident from the 
consumer interviews that if these activities take place without 
involving the patient (and/or their family) they run the risk of 
contravening the expectations of those harmed. The risk here 
is not just that Open Disclosure is not done when it should be 
done, but also that Open Disclosure is initiated when those 
affected do not want to meet with the relevant clinicians or 







“And, like one said, like, you know, ‘It’s not life 
threatening’, like, you know, ‘You can cope’, and ‘It’s 
not as if he’s got leukemia’, but it is bad to me. I 
would rather him be born with nine fingers or nine 
toes! There’s nothing more important than your sight 
and your hearing!”  
[Cons 3, 26] 
 
 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 90
Table 2.13: Preparing for the Open Disclosure meeting 
 Preparing for the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
 An important role is played by intermediaries (whether Patient 
Liaison Officers, Quality Coordinators, Complaints Officers, or 
clinicians who act as Peer Support Officers) liaising and 
channelling information between those affected by harm and 
those intending to disclose the adverse event. It is clearly of 
great importance that those charged with conducting Open 
Disclosure act on information relayed from the patient (and/or 
family) by those intermediaries, to prevent disagreement 
about the level (high/low) and style (membership, articulation 
of the apology, framing of the adverse event, and follow-up) 
of the disclosure. 
 
“We were offered a family conference but by this 
time we’d had so much conflict in the family … 
Speaking to the managers of [name facility] they 
suggested that we sit down and have it explained 
what happened. But I didn’t think that that would 
serve a useful purpose because of the amount of 
anger [in the family].”  
[Cons 10, 98] 
 
2 The patient and/or family should be allowed time to pre-
plan for Open Disclosure.  
It is as important for patients and family members to have 
time to prepare for Open Disclosure as it is for clinicians (see 
Section 2.4.1.3). Interviewees value being given the time to 
prepare for Open Disclosure. This is achieved by 
intermediaries signalling they are invited to an Open 
Disclosure meeting, or by engaging the patient and/or family 
in an Open Disclosure pre-meeting where the formal meeting 
is discussed. By having signalled to them that Open 
Disclosure needs to take place, consumers are enabled to 
prepare questions, think about statements they want or need 






“I was visited once by the obstetrician when I was 
in hospital…she came to visit me then, but it 
wasn’t a planned [meeting]… she just popped up 
to see me… so I didn’t have any questions 
planned or anything.”  




2.5.4 Participating in Open Disclosure 
 
Patients were very explicit about their experiences of the Open Disclosure meeting itself. 
Issues that came to the fore here include: appropriate timing; clarity about hospital-internal 
ranks, relationships and functions; active listening and sincerity; planning ahead for kinds of 
support that are needed; and the possibility of making contact with those most closely 
involved in the adverse event.    
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Table 2.14: Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting 
 Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Patients and family members expect clinicians to time 
the Open Disclosure meeting appropriately.  
 
Above, when discussing the health care staff interviews, we 
commented on the complex nature of making sure that Open 
Disclosure is appropriately timed (Section 2.4.1.4). Good 
timing is difficult to achieve, because it is subject to 
competing considerations. As just noted, it is important to 
give the patient and/or family enough time to prepare for 
Open Disclosure. At the same time, it is also crucial not to 
leave them too long without information, as is evident from 
the quotes on the right. 
 
Good timing is achieved by being sensitive to the needs and 
expectations of all parties involved. Here too, the role of the 
intermediary or liaison person becomes crucial: it is they 
whose advice about the patient’s and the family’s feelings, 
needs and expectations should be carefully heeded. It is this 
advice that the Open Disclosure team in turn should translate 
into appropriate action.   
 
“If it had have been all brought out in the open 
straight away, if they had’ve come to me straight 
away, the doctors that is, explained to me exactly 
what happened and why, we should never have 
had that meeting. It should have been all done 
before I left the hospital.”  
[Cons 2, 20] 
 
“And it wasn’t until after the [complaints body] 
had done their formal investigation that I finally 
got notified, it was about a week later, that 
[Support Personnel] from [name hospital] actually 
rang me and said, ‘We need to talk to you. We 
need to have an Open Disclosure.” 
 [Cons 1, 9] 
 
“[Were you invited for a meeting?] Well, no, well 
yes and no. Mum had died by this time. By the 
time I’d put in the formal complaint and they got 
round to actually doing a meeting, mum had died 
in the meantime.”  
[Cons 18, 147] 
2 Patients and family members should have a 
patient/family support person present during the Open 
Disclosure meeting(s). 
Interviewees were concerned that they be involved in 
deciding who (of the staff) be present during the Open 
Disclosure meeting. Again a delicate balance needs to be 
struck: the Open Disclosure meeting should not be too 
informal, but at the same time it may be that consumers 
dislike being confronted by too many ‘suits’. Instead, 
interviewees prefer that there is a support person who is on 
their side and who understands their lifeworld. 
Such a support person would also be able to ensure that the 
patient and/or their family would receive regular updates 
about the investigation, and that they are invited to come in 
for a final meeting when the investigation is completed to 
ensure consumers can ask questions about the explanatory 
information provided to them in writing.  
 
“I probably didn’t like the fact that they were in 
suits and you know like it was ’we’re going to fix 
this because we’re the hierarchy’ that sort of 
thing.  Do you know what I mean?”  
[Cons 13, 101] 
“Probably if we had a nurse in there as well and 
some other support people, that would have 
made it less clinical.  Can I say, we probably 
would have benefited [and] I personally would 
have benefited greatly from having some contact 
with some support from a social worker, for 
example, just somebody to support us through 
that time. The nursing staff can’t do it. They are 
too busy. It’s not to say that they are not very 
good, they are, but they can’t give the support 
that I felt we needed.”  
[Cons 13, 101] 
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Table 2.14: Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting (cont’d) 
 Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
3 The patient and/or family need(s) to be told about 
hospital-internal ranks, relationships and 
functions.  
It may happen that patients and/or family members do 
not know where hospital staff fit into the overall 
structure of the hospital or health service: what 
department are they? How do they relate to the 
doctors and nurses who originally treated me (or my 
relative)? Why are they talking to me now?  
It is important for those arranging Open Disclosure to 
make clear not just verbally, but also in written form, 
where they and colleagues fit into the organisation.  
 
“Um, [there was the doctor] and his off-sider. Um, I’m 
not sure how she fits in. I think she works directly with 
him, um… but as doing what, she’s definitely not his 
secretary, she hold a lot more pull or push than that. 
Um, I’m not sure what her position actually is.”  
[Cons 4, 37] 
 
“Um. Yeah there was one lady from the hospital, who 
does the… uh… [asking someone in the background] 
what was her name? From the hospital? Lady at the 
meetings? Yeah I can’t remember. She was part of the 
health and safety thing at the [name] hospital.” 
Interviewer: Yeah, a patient safety officer was it? 
“Yeah. Yup. And um, oh, can’t even remember who the 
other fellow was.” 
Interviewer: Do you know whether they were 
doctors, or nurses or…? 
“I think they were like um, the managers of the doctors, 
like the… you know, the… I don’t even know what you’d 
call them. Supervisors of…” 
Interviewer: A medical supervisor? 
“Yeah, something like that.”  




“The ‘Open Disclosure advice booklet’” 
An Open Disclosure record for the patient and/or family: It may be of value to provide the 
patient and/or family with a written document or an Open Disclosure advice booklet that 
explains what Open Disclosure is about, how it satisfies the health facility’s policy, which 
staff is likely to be involved (depending on severity), what options are open to patients 
and/or families (e.g. complaint, etc), and how the Open Disclosure process is likely to 
unfold. Rather than a single letter being sent following an Open Disclosure meeting, such 
document provides a much more comprehensive information resource. Additionally, the 
Open Disclosure advice booklet could contain pages where the patients and/or family can 
make notes about different meetings, different things that are communicated, and the 
plans that are agreed on. 
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Table 2.14: Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting (cont’d) 
 Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
4 The patient’s and family members’ concerns need 
to be heard by clinicians; clinicians need to 
practise ‘active listening’.  
Patients and family members express being 
appreciative of staff taking the time to listen to their 
concerns.  
 
Interviewee are specific about the benefits of being 
able to ‘let off steam’, and get angry at the clinicians 
without having to fear they will retaliate and turn 
defensive. 
 
“[The patient liaison person said] ‘We need to talk to you 
about [name son]’, and then when we did go to the 
meeting he actually, well he said he’d like to shut up and 
let me talk, but it was really good that he sort of, he 
asked me like, … ‘What do you want to get out of it?’ 
And basically my answers were I wanted to make sure 
that it never happened again. … You know, and it was 
really good because [name liaison person] allowed me 
to say that”  
[Cons 1, 9] 
I liked that I could talk and I could ask questions and I 
didn’t, like even though at times I felt like I was 
attacking, it wasn’t passed on….there was no retaliation 
like as if I was attacking. Like I said to Dr Sherman, 
‘Look, I’m sorry for saying this but this is how I felt at the 
time when you said this….’, and I felt like, yes, I was 
attacking exactly what she said and how it felt to me, but 
she didn’t retaliate, like just defensively. She tried to 
explain why she said it. [okay, she accepted your views 
and responded] Yeah. [and you say you felt listened to.]” 
[Cons 1, 13] 
 
 




“The ethics of ‘active (reflective) listening’” 
Active or ‘reflective’ listening – remaining attentive and silent while the other speaks - is 
an important skill for those charged with doing Open Disclosure. Its importance lies in 
patients and/or family members gaining the opportunity to frame the adverse event in 
their own terms, whether emotional, practical, or social. The power of ‘active listening’ 
(Egan, 2006) is that it mitigates people’s distress, anger, and guilt. By the same token, 
gaining the skill of active listening places an additional onus on staff who wield it: it is 
important that it not be used to silence consumers’ feelings and misgivings, in the interest 
of reconciling them with self-protective risk-managerial priorities of an organisation, 
department or unit. Open Disclosure should therefore produce a tangible outcome for 




Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 94
Table 2.14: Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting (cont’d) 
 Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
5 Patients and family members should be issued a 
sincere apology.  
Patients and family members comment frequently on 
the nature of the apology they received. In general, full 
apologies are commented on positively. 
Consumers may experience disclosure as insincere 
when staff decline to take responsibility for events that 
the consumer judges them to be responsible for. 
Insincerity can also be experienced when staff who 
were not involved in their care or who have the role of 
intermediaries are the only ones to offer an apology. 
 
The complexity of clinical work and the difficulty – if 
not impossibility - of separating human from 
technological errors and pinpointing incident causes 
means simple explanations for adverse events are 
rare (Dekker, 2005). Many staff are involved in care, 
they have demanding working hours and work with 
complicated technologies and dangerous drugs for 
patients who may present with multiple co-morbidities. 
These factors often put the accuracy of clinical 
decisions and the integrity of medical treatments at 
risk in ways that is beyond the capacity of well-
intentioned and well-trained staff to control. These 
factors also mean that explaining adverse events to 
patients and families is challenging, particularly 
because clinical complexity is often talked about only 
after an adverse event occurs.  
The problem that arises here is that mention of clinical 
complexities after an adverse event may be perceived 
by consumers as clinicians’ attempt to obfuscate. 
Above we noted that this dilemma should be 
addressed by broadening the scope of informed 
consent to include comprehensive risk information 
(see table 2.10 above). Forewarning consumers about 
the complexities of care therefore is crucial. Doing this 
more comprehensively may help the difficult 
discussions following an adverse event, minimising the 
risk that pointing to clinical complexity as the reason 
for being unable to specify clear causes is regarded 
and rejected as insincere. 
 
 
“… telling us the procedure they have done and 
apologising about what happened … Yes, they did 
apologise, both from [hospital 1] and [hospital 2].”  
[Cons 12, 103-4] 
 
“One thing I will say, um, is that the doctor, the patient 
safety officer um, apologised profusely.”  
[Cons 4, 39]  
 
“The only thing they really admitted to was losing the 
document and that procedure is being looked at. They 
apologised for our [loss].” 
Interviewer: But not for what happened to your 
father? 
“No, they did not take any blame except for the power of 
attorney document. So, there is three pages of excuses 
[in the letter they sent]”.  
[Cons 10, 99] 
 
“Er, I mean…from what I can remember, I was quite sort 
of upset at the time. They were basically…the whole 
thing it seemed like they were covering their tails, 
basically. The doctor at the time did apologise but no-
one’s really taken responsibility for it.” [Cons 9, 88] 
 
“I would like to have an apology…a sincere apology, that 
[said], ‘yes, we shouldn’t have put you in that position.’” 
[Cons 9, 91] 
 
“… an apology is one thing [but] this is coming from the 
patient safety officer, not coming from the doctor who 
decided not to scan my spine further.”  
[Cons 5, 41] 
 
“I still don’t know. Like all the reports and everything I’ve 
got, like, still really I don’t know whether the medication 
did it or whether just all the, like, you know, it was a 
pretty traumatic birth.” 
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A general guide for distinguishing sincerity and insincerity is provided in the work by Chris 
Wheeler represented in table 2.14b below (Wheeler, 2007). For Wheeler, sincerity realises 
a focus on and concern with those harmed; insincerity maintains a focus on and concern 
with self. Sincerity associates with a focus on the victim of harm, where insincerity 
associates with concern for the apologiser. Equally, sincerity associates with taking 
responsibility; insincerity with not acknowledging responsibility.  
 
 
Table 2.14b: Sincerity defined 
More Sincerity Less Sincerity 
Focus – on the ‘victim’ Focus – on the apologiser 
 
• on the consequences of the action for the 
‘victim’ 
 
• on the apologiser’s relationship with the ‘victim’, 
 or 
• on the apologiser’s reputation 
 
Objective – for the ‘victim’ Objective – for the apologiser 
 
• to respond to the ‘victim’s’ pain and suffering 
• to address the ‘victim’s’ needs 
• to allow the ‘victim’ to move on 
 
• to appease the ‘victim’ – to get acceptance 
• to justify the action – looking for exoneration or 
 defending the action, or 
• to allow the apologiser to move on through 
 release from blame 
 
Responsibility – acknowledged Responsibility – not acknowledged 
 
• for the wrong 
• for the harm 
 
• responsibility not acknowledged , or 
• responsibility denied, or 
• responsibility placed on ‘victim’ 
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“The tension at the heart of the Open Disclosure apology” 
Apologising for errors in care is challenging. Patients and family members are anxious 
and not always receptive. Staff are constrained by insurance contracts, the law and their 
own inclination to protect reputations. Consumers tend to be highly scrutinising of how 
staff perform their apology, who they are in the organisation and how much weight their 
apology is therefore likely to carry, how much remorse and acknowledgment of 
responsibility is invested in the apology, and whether and what kind of reparation 
accompanies the apology. A sincere apology from the right person can clear the air, even 
in very serious situations. The Open Disclosure Standard (Australian Council for Safety 
and Quality in Health Care, 2003) limits staff to the partial apology27. Yet it is evident from 
both health care staff and the consumer interviews that sincerity is most valued and 
performed if deemed possible and/or necessary, the limit inscribed into the Standard 
notwithstanding28. A problem posed by this limit is that – paradoxically - people’s sincerity 
will lead them to transgress that formal limit. People resolve problems and 
misunderstandings by being sensitive to their and others’ morality and humanity, not by 
rigidly observing a rule that loses its relevance in the face of lived practice. The unique 
opportunity offered by Open Disclosure resides in the radical notion that being open 
about adverse events is more congruent with the objective to provide care and therefore 
more effective than any legal and bureaucratic protection (Wojcieszak et al., 2006). 
 
 
Table 2.14: Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting (cont’d) 
 Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
6 Enabling consumers to plan ahead and plan for 
their practical, personal and emotional needs into 
the future. Immediately following an adverse event, 
the patient and/or family may not know what kinds of 
things to ask for, or how to assess the implications of 
the incident for their own future. For this reason, it is 
important that the patient (and family) be provided with 
the resources and opportunities needed for making 
both a practical and an emotional assessment 
possible. One interviewee saw himself forced to take 
legal action because the future implications of his 
adverse event remained uncertain. 
 
 
“So I was, and I knew that … even though I was sort of 
on the repair, that I’m going to pay for this later on in life. 
I’ll have further consequences down the track. … it was 
looking like I was going to lose my job… so, I was going 
to take it further.”  
[Cons 4, 40] 
 
                                                     
27 The Standard does not contain the words ‘apology’ and ‘apologise’.  
28 Open Disclosure allows an ‘expression of regret’ (a ‘partial apology’) but not a ‘full apology’ that acknowledges 
responsibility for harm (Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2003; Vines, 2005). 
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Table 2.14: Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting (cont’d) 
 Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
7 Making it possible for patients and family 
members to make contact with those most closely 
involved in the adverse event if that desire is 
expressed. Some interviewees express 
disappointment at not being allowed to make contact 
with those most closely involved in their incident. 
Maintaining a distance between patients (and/or family 
members) and the clinician(s) most closely involved 
with the incident is done on the assumption that there 
will be blame and anger on the part of the victim of 
harm, that such a meeting will be too hard and 
threatening for the clinicians involved, and that such a 
discussion would be too hard to manage for peer 
support staff (the Open Disclosure Peer Support 
person or equivalent). These assumptions are not 
necessarily justified. One interviewee expressed regret 
at not being allowed to speak to ‘the poor students 
who delivered me’ and reassure them that she did not 
blame them for her inadequate surgery and 
subsequent incontinence. 
Another interviewee resented her not being allowed to 
meet with the clinicians involved in the incident 
because she felt properly addressing the cause of her 
baby’s disability (a drug overdose and other less 
















“they wouldn’t let me speak to the poor students who 
delivered me”  
[Cons 9, 92] 
 
“No [I did not get an explanation for the overdose]. All I 
could get out of the doctor was,  ‘The nurses feel very 
bad. Some nurses even quit their jobs over this’, you 
know, ‘when they make a mistake’. And, well, I don’t 
really care. I don’t really care if they quit their jobs or 
whatever. You know, like this is my baby.”  
[Cons 3, 26] 
 
 
Additional Note: Arranging and conducting a meeting between victims of harm and the 
clinicians who were involved in the incident. Arranging and conducting a meeting between 
victims of harm and the clinicians who were involved in the incident is challenging (cf. 
Braithwaite, 2002)29. To live with the consequences of an adverse event as patient (and/or 
family) is also challenging, if for different reasons: victims may not just have physical 
problems to deal with (potentially leading to further injury), but also psychological ones, such 
as anxiety in the face of upcoming operations, guilt at having allowed clinicians to act as they 
did, and worry about how the effects of this incident will affect them (physically, financially) in 
the future. It is further not self-evident that displacing the burden of coming to terms with the 
                                                     
29 Professor John Braithwaite’s work on restorative justice focuses on bringing criminal offenders and victims of crime 
together. 
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adverse event onto the patient and/or family is entirely and necessarily in the health 
organisation’s interest.  
For clinicians involved in incidents, not meeting with the victims of harm and not having the 
opportunity to explain that they never intended the incident to happen may result in their 
experiencing a lack of closure themselves. Possibly too, not speaking with those affected may 
cement in junior staff an attitude of detachment and a lack of personal care for patients and 
families. This is not just the opposite of what the Open Disclosure initiative is trying to 
achieve; it also goes against a trend in the clinical professions towards becoming more 
emotionally open and more affectively attuned to professionals’ own, their colleagues’ and 
their patients’ experiences and sentiments (Berlinger, 2005). 
On both counts, then, Open Disclosure should be structured such as to make it possible for 
those involved in the adverse event and the victims of harm to meet. This is in the interest of 
all involved. It obviates imposing organisational views of what is appropriate for the patient 
and/or family and thereby making light of their expectation to talk to the original clinician(s) 
about how the event occurred and reach closure, and it reverses the kind of professional 
disregard of patients that has been normalised and legitimated in clinical education as 
‘detached concern’ (Lief & Fox, 1963). 
In the final analysis, of course, staff in charge of Open Disclosure need to make decisions 
about these matters in ways that are in the best interest of all involved. However, if patients 
and/or family members express a desire to meet clinicians who were ‘close to the incident’, 
and who may be able to reveal details that others don’t have access to and thereby produce 
closure, serious consideration needs to be given to patients’ and family’s right to have this 
wish granted.  
 
Table 2.14: Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting (cont’d) 
 Participating in the Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
8 Conducting the Open Disclosure meeting with an appropriate 
level of respect. It is of great importance that the Open 
Disclosure meeting is treated with respect by those who 
participate in it. One interviewee expressed disappointment at her 
meeting being disrupted, and at the senior clinician bringing along 
a student without this being negotiated in advance.  
Given the relative severity of this particular adverse event (this 
patient was given unsuccessful surgery resulting in incontinence 
and requiring further surgical interventions), staff’s handling of the 
meeting was inappropriate.  
Health facilities need to ensure that staff who are in charge of 
Open Disclosure have appropriate communication and social 
skills. This is important: if Open Disclosure is handled badly the 




“And the doctor at the time who repaired me 
had a student of his own [when they came 
for the disclosure meeting], and was … being 
paged, and was being called to theatre. Like, 
just the whole thing had been so rushed, and 
then they tried to sort of brush it under the 
carpet and, yeah, so … I just didn’t feel 
comfortable with the whole situation at all.”  
[Cons 9, 88] 
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2.5.5 Following up the initial Open Disclosure meeting(s) 
 
Patients and family members express dissatisfaction with the lack of continuity 
following the initial Open Disclosure meeting(s). Table 2.15 presents the sources of 
discontinuity mentioned. 
 
Table 2.15: Following up the initial Open Disclosure meeting  
 Following up the initial Open Disclosure meeting Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Obviate discontinuity that may result from staff 
movement.  
Involving several staff in handling Open Disclosure is 
at times inevitable due to staff turn-over, leave and 
shift constraints. It is important for these reasons that 
a ‘single desk’ be maintained; that is, a specific group 
of people who are able to locate the necessary 




In health care, the risk of discontinuity of minimised by 
asking consumers to repeat their version of events to 
several different staff. This repeated questioning can 
become embarrassing for the patient however. One 
patient interviewee felt her case became too widely 
known around the hospital, and she resented too 
many clinicians visiting her to talk about her case. 
 
“Um, while I was in hospital, the first day was a 
Wednesday because, like he was born [and died] on a 
Tuesday night, so Wednesday a social worker came to 
see us … and I went through the story and everything. 
Then the Thursday, because the social workers were job 
share, I had the other social worker come so I had to tell 
her about the whole story again. And then when I left 
hospital I got the name of yet another counsellor to talk 
to. Then I came back to … well [name patient liaison 
person] had a meeting with us.”  
[Cons  1, 8] 
“I had a lot of people coming up to me asking me how 
[name son] was when I was in hospital, and I was happy 
for their concern, like I was thankful for their concern but 
after a while it was a little overwhelming because I still 
felt like I was in a bit of shock over what had happened 
and sometimes I just didn’t want to see…like I didn’t 
want to make eye contact with someone or… because I 
knew that they would just ask me and just having to 
explain over and over again I guess.”  
[Cons 8, 84] 
2 Prevent discontinuity that results from incident 
investigations taking very long.  
Discontinuity can also result from the incident 
investigation taking too long in the eyes of the patient 
and/or family. This may prompt them to write to the 
health facility for an update or a report. Further 
discontinuity can result when the health facility is 
unable to respond appropriately to such 
correspondence and address people correctly. 
 
 
“I probably would like to have known a bit more of the 
process that went on after that interview. We were just 
left … by both parties. We were just given an idea of a 
date where we might receive information … I actually 
had to write to [name health facility] to get any feedback 
from them … And then the letter came back and they 
were … addressing it to him [not to me], as [if] I … 
wasn’t a part of it.”  
[Cons 13, 106] 
 
Appropriate follow-up of the Open Disclosure meeting involves remaining sensitive to the 
dynamics of patient’s and family’s expectations and needs. Such sensitivity can be shown by 
the patient liaison person, and interviewees are appreciative of such person’s care. To 
enhance the tangible impact of Open Disclosure and the reality of its intent, staff need to 
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consider involving patients and families in their efforts to improve their own practices. For 
example, patients and family members may be invited in for interviews about the adverse 
event. During such interviews, questions about what happened can be coupled to eliciting 
views about what might resolve the problem. This would grant patients and affected family 
members a constructive role in ensuring the adverse event does not reoccur, and in 
strengthening their sense that the health facility is not just capable of erring but also of being 




“Involving consumers in patient safety” 
Open Disclosure is a communicative practice that can mitigate negative public 
experiences and perceptions of their health care (Woods, 2007). Conducting Open 
Disclosure in inappropriate ways however can exacerbate patients’ and families’ 
experiences and perceptions through multiplying inadequate care by inadequate 
communication. For consumers, the obligation on the part of health services to be 
accountable for inadequate care is not discharged by uttering a ‘few more little sorries’30. 
Open Disclosure is contingent on sincerity and a relationship that arises from a mutually 
(by the consumer and the clinical team) satisfactory form of closure; that is, a sincere 
apology and tangible reparation. As part of this aim to render the relationship and the 
reparation tangible, consumers should be asked to become involved in organisational 
investigation and improvement processes. 
 
 
                                                     
30 Viz. “we do pop in a few more little sorries now” [Support Personnel, 23-31].  
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2.5.6  A numerical analysis of patients’ and family members’ Open Disclosure 
accounts 
 
The table below (table 2.16) includes information about the twenty-three cases revealed in 
interviews with patients and family members. It shows that in eight cases High Level Open 
Disclosure was arranged (as defined in the Australian Open Disclosure Standard), and in 
another ten cases, Low Level disclosure was conducted (clinicians disclosing adverse 
events informally: during ward rounds, while ‘popping in’ to see the patient, or as part of 
brief consults). In another four cases no Open Disclosure was said to have taken place 
(although these interviewees were referred to us by organisations as having participated 
in Open Disclosure).  
The table also provides severity estimates and information about whether interviewees 
judged Open Disclosure to be successful. Overall, the patients and family members 
interviewed had been involved in nine High Level cases. Of the twenty-three interviewees, 
eight interviewees judged their experience of Open Disclosure to have been satisfactory, 
twelve judged their experience of Open Disclosure to have been unsatisfactory, and two 
were unable to state clearly whether Open Disclosure could be judged to be successful in 
their case.  
The table further displays how the adverse event was notified, and whether an apology 
was offered. Ten notifications were made via channels external to the hospital; eleven 
notifications occurred internally (by the staff involved or by representatives of the hospital), 
and one notification was a mixture of internal (a second surgeon at the hospital alerts the 
patient to a problem produced by previous surgeon’s treatment) and external (the 
husband files a complaint). Out of the twenty-three interviewees, eleven acknowledge that 
they were apologised to fully (that is, staff expressing regret and accepting responsibility 
for the error); eight state they were not offered an apology; three state that they were 
offered a partial apology (an ‘expression of regret’), and one states that some staff 
apologised and then appeared to retract their apology. 
Finally, the table sets out whether the consumer(s) was (were) able to meet with the 
clinicians most closely involved in the adverse event, and whether there was evidence of 
tangible reparation and/or support. As the table shows, in thirteen instances the patient 
and/or family were able to make contact with one or more staff who were close to the 
incident. This contact was not always achieved at the time of a formal Open Disclosure 
meeting however, and includes occasions when staff were on the ward and engaged in an 
informal exchange about the adverse event with the patient and/or family. Similarly, in 
twelve out of twenty-two instances was the health facility said to provide some form of 
reparation and/or support. This includes both counselling and other kinds of clinical 
treatment, ex gratia payments to cover travel, and the like, and improvements made to 
procedures and clinical processes.    
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Consumer Accounts of Adverse Events: An Overview 
Bringing together issues raised by consumers about their experiences with Open 
Disclosure, table 2.16 draws attention the following issues: 
1. full apologies are made by staff other than those originally involved in or present 
at the adverse event; 
2. staff are happier disclosing less serious adverse events with the consequence 
that serious adverse events may not be handled according to minimal Open 
Disclosure standards; 
3. the patient liaison person acts as buffer between the health organisation and the 
clinical professionals on the one hand, and the patient and family on the other 
hand, limiting the support available for patients and families to social-emotional 
support; this obviates tangible involvement on the part of clinical professionals in 
disclosure, reparation and learning from the incident and from the consumer; 
4. disclosure may be initiated by staff employed in sites other than that where the 
adverse event occurred without such staff recognising the need for appropriate 
Open Disclosure, thereby burdening patients and family with distressing 
information and with the task of acting on that information without the benefit of 
clinical, professional or organisational experience and support; 
5. alongside patients, family members play a crucial role in ensuring that clinical 
staff take the disclosure of unexpected clinical outcomes seriously, by initiating 




The table (2.16) below sets out the details of the individual interviews under the following 
ten headings: 
1. Consumer interviewee number (+ pages in transcript & identity/age of the 
interviewee) 
2. What were the details of the adverse event?  
3. Did Open Disclosure take place, and was it Low or High Level Open Disclosure?  
4. Was an apology offered, and, if yes, was it partial or full?  
5. Was there internal or external adverse event notification?  
6. What is the estimated severity of the adverse event?  
7. What is the estimated severity of the adverse event as seen by the consumer?  
8. Was the outcome of Open Disclosure process judged to be successful?  
9. Was there an offer of reparation?  
10. Was contact possible with the clinician(s) most closely involved in adverse event? 
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What was the adverse 
event? Did it have a 
clear cause? 
Did Open Disclosure take 
place?  
Was it Low or High Level 
Open Disclosure? 





Severity seen by 
pt? 
Outcome of OD 
process judged to 
be successful? 
Was there reparation? Was contact possible with 








vomiting, received (in 
her judgment) too little 
clinical attention for 
some hours, then 
suddenly taken to 
theatre for an 
emergency caesarean, 
but the baby dies. 
Conflicting accounts 
offered: one clinician 
claims there was 
clinician-caused vaginal 
golden staph infection, 
but this was denied by 
others. 
Yes, high 
“And it wasn’t until after the 
[complaints body] had done 
their formal investigation that 
I finally got notified, it was 
about a week later, that 
[PSO] from [hospital] actually 
rang me and said, ‘We need 
to talk to you. We need to 
have an Open Disclosure.” 
(p. 9) 
Yes, full  
[staff blame other clinicians? Backflip?; “… the 
first meeting was she apologised. She told us 
that I didn’t get the care that I deserved, that 
you know, I should have been monitored, I 
should have been this and I should have been 
that. Then when I handed her the birth 
certificate that said staphlococcal coriamianitis 
she backtracked and say, ‘No, no, no. We 
knew that there was something else wrong. 
There was nothing we could have done. It 
came on so fast, you know, nothing could 
have saved it’ rah..rah…rah..rah. And that to 
me seemed like she just completely and utterly 
was not sorry any more. Just completely and 
utterly did a backflip and blamed the infection 
fully rather than saying, ‘Well, it was a 
contributing factor that both of them led to his 




High  high No: not everyone 
open;  
Yes: changes made 
to hospital 
procedure. 
Flights to city yes, financial 
support with IVF no 
Yes, but doctor only person present 





Older lady is 
administered 
anaesthetic overdose; 
she feels strange 
following operation, but 
only receives disclosure 
of the incident 2 months 
after the operation. 
Yes, high  
“a lovely lady there who 
organised this meeting with 
the head of the anaesthesia 
department, the head nurse 
and, I can’t remember her 
name just off the top of my 
head, but she was such a 
lovely lady and the three of 
us were there in the room. 
We had organised this 
meeting a month ahead of 
time, and it was then that I 
learnt what had actually 
happened.” (p. 15) 
Yes, full 
“It was the nurse’s fault because of the way 
the dosage is given and they told me that they 
had put in place measures that will not allow 








Measures put in place to make 
sure it never happens again (p. 
19) 





Baby is given twice the 
amount of antibiotics 
following previous dose 
not being documented, 
loses hearing. Baby 
‘grunts’ following birth 
but this is not 
immediately diagnosed. 
Patient receives 
conflicting accounts: one 
clinician claims blood got 
into the baby’s lungs as 
a result of earlier 
intervention.  
Yes, low level (‘pop in’)  
“that night that’s when that 
doctor came up to me and 
said that he had been 
overdosed and that it was 
most likely that he failed the 
hearing test because of that 
drug, and, yeah, I was 
devastated.” (p. 22) 
 
No apology, but clinicians accepted that 
nurses were responsible.  
“We’ve got no idea. They wouldn’t even tell us. 
All the doctor said was the person was very 
upset and, yeah, some of them even quit their 







realised extent of 
incident) 
No,  





(grunting due to 
baby swallowing 
blood after placenta 
ruptured). 
Some financial support, but not 
enough to cover disability costs 
and challenges later in life. 
No (nurses absent from OD 
meeting). 
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What was the adverse 
event? Did it have a 
clear cause? 
Did Open Disclosure take 
place?  
Was it Low or High Level 
Open Disclosure? 






seen by pt? 
Outcome of OD process 
judged to be 
successful? 
Was there support? Rectification? Was contact possible with clinician(s) 






patient has a spinal 
injury that is not 
diagnosed due to partial 
x-ray of the spine.  
Yes, high.   Yes, full.  
“One thing I will say, um, is that the 
doctor, the patient safety officer um, 
apologised profusely.” (p. 39) 
External  




high No.  
“I decided to do it [sue] 
because I am going to 
pay for this later.” (p. 40); 
“You know, that apology 
was really great, at the 
time, [but] it’s not going to 
help me in future if I have 
to cease work or… or 
whatever.” (p. 42) 
Some financial support, but not enough 
given potential future expenses; “They 
did arrange for me to… see an 
orthopaedic specialist to view the x-rays 
of my spine, because I had never seen 
them and had never wanted to see 
them, uh, while I was still in hospital. 
Um, and they arranged that, so… you 
know, I suppose whatever support I 
may have asked for, they probably 
would’ve provided.” (p. 35) 
Yes. 
“… they were very open and said that if I 
had any questions, you know, feel free to 
come back to them, you know, if I, 







There is disagreement 
between doctors during 
a birth. This explained 
as having to do with 
understaffing. No real 
harm caused. 
Yes. “Uh we had two. We 
had one, um, just before they 
were starting the 
investigation. And then a 
couple of months later when 
the investigation was 
finished, we had another one 
which was just sort of a wrap 
up.” (p. 48) 
  
No apology.  
(“That’s what the meeting was 
supposed to be about, but it was 
just a big defense mechanism for 
them. There wasn’t much admission 
of anything that went wrong, they 
tried to.” (p. 47) 
External  
[Pt complaint] 
Medium low low No.  
“One of the doctors that 
was in there [OD 
meeting], he even tried to 
defend the other doctor, 
trying to use the wrong 
scissors.” (p. 47) 





Patient advises nurse to 
change surgery side 
before operation; she 
does and wrong-side 
surgery results. While 
patient says “I caused 
it.” (p. 54), the hospital 
admits it needs to 
investigate its 
procedures. 
No. “No I wasn’t called at the 
hospital, they just asked me 
for my view, over the phone.” 
(p. 55) 
No apology.  






Medium low Low (‘his 
fault’) 
Yes. Yes. Operation offered to rectify; “And 
they rang me back later and just said, 
well… the outcome was that they just 
have to tighten up on procedure, and 
when I come back in again, you would 
probably find you’re gonna be asked a 
lot of questions, the same questions by 






When a stent sheath is 
withdrawn from patient’s 
groin, her blood 
pressure drops rapidly, 
and is administered a 
metaramine overdose. 
Yes, low level (dr coming to 
bedside)  
Yes, full. 
“Well, um, the doctor came and 
they, they apologised for, he said 
there’d been a mix-up in the 
catheter … He came and 
apologised a few times.” (p. 62); 
“Well, I had to press for it, to get the 






High High   No. 
“You know, I’ve had to 
wait all that extra time to 
get the, the analysis 
report before I could find 
out. Nobody would tell me 
why this drug wasn’t, I 
asked repeatedly, ‘Why 
wasn’t it checked? Why 
wasn’t it checked?’ 
Nobody could tell me.” (p. 
70) 
Limited support (husband can’t fly with 
pt to Brisbane for operation). 
No.  
“The nurses didn’t come and see me. They 
just came, it was just the two doctors that 
kept coming to the bedside.”  (p. 65) 
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What was the adverse 
event? Did it have a 
clear cause? 
Did Open Disclosure 
take place?  
Was it Low or High 
Level Open 
Disclosure? 








Outcome of OD process judged 
to be successful? 
Was there support? 
Rectification? 
Was contact possible with clinician(s) most 





Woman has an 
emergency caesarean 
due to prolapsed cord, 
but because the alarm 
went off in wrong area 
operation was delayed. 
Yes, high level. No apology.  
“I got along with all the health care 
professionals. I thought they were very 
professional and very positive experiences 
with all of them.  I didn’t feel negative about 
any of my interactions with any of the 










High. Yes.  
“I think the midwife spoke to me 
about it.  There are lots of people 
that spoke to me about it. I 
couldn’t really put a number on it.  
But I don’t  think … probably just 
the midwife in detail. I don’t think 
anyone really spoke to me about it 
in detail.” (p. 81) 
Procedure 
improved/rectified. “I 
know they did tell me 
that they rectified the 
problem and that they’ve 
done a test, like a mock 
test to make sure it’s 
going off correctly, and 
that.” (p. 86) 
 
Yes. 
“One thing that maybe I would have liked is for 
the surgeon that did my caesarian, maybe to 
speak to me about that side of it ‘cause no-one 





Student midwife and 
junior doctor attend to 





Yes, low level 
(‘popped in’). 
Yes, partial apology.  
“Er, I mean…from what I can remember, I 
was quite sort of upset at the time. They 
were basically…the whole thing it seemed 
like they were covering their tails, basically. 
They haven’t….The doctor at the time did 
apologise but no-one’s really taken 
responsibility for it.” (p. 88); “I would like to 
have an apology…a sincere apology, that, 
‘yes, we shouldn’t have put you in that 







High. No.  
“I’ll be seeing a lawyer … I just 
wanted someone to say ‘I’m 
sorry.’” (p. 91) 
 
No.  No, senior doctor only attends OD meeting, and 








er of pt) 
Patient had a mild stroke 
and went into a hospital 
for rehab physio; he fell 
out of his wheelchair and 
ended up with 
pneumonia in ICU where 
he died shortly after. 
Family refused OD 
due to family conflict 
and suspected 
whitewash. 
Yes, partial apology.  
“The only thing they really admitted to was 
losing the document and that procedure is 
being looked at. […] They apologised for 
our [loss].” 
But not for what happened to your father? 
“No, they did not take any blame except for 
the power of attorney document [..]. So, 











of 23 yo 
male 
23 yo man attempts 
suicide after being giving 
a prescription of 400 
pills. He ends up in a 
nursing home. 
Yes, low.  No.  
“No [they didn’t apologise]. It wasn’t their 




High. Yes. Nursing home costs 
covered by public purse. 
Yes. 
“I actually liked that everyone that was involved 





Patient given wrong 
plasma. 
Yes, low. (“So, they 
came over and told us 
what had happened.” 
(p. 102) 
Yes, full.  
“… telling us the procedure they have done 
and apologising about what happened” (p. 
103); “Yes, they did apologise. Both from 












“It was very useful” (p. 103) 
“Royal treatment” 
following adverse event. 
Yes. 
“So, they came over and told us what had 
happened.” (p. 102) 
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What was the adverse 
event? Did it have a 
clear cause? 
Did Open Disclosure take 
place?  
Was it Low or High Level 
Open Disclosure? 






seen by pt? 
Outcome of OD process judged 
to be successful? 
Was there support? Rectification? Was contact possible 
with clinician(s) most 









Patient given wrong 
plasma. (pt 12) 
Yes, low. (“So, they came 
over and told us what had 
happened.” (p. 102) 
Yes, full.  
“But I actually had to write to [name 
institution] to get any feedback from 






High. Yes.  
“The meeting was somewhat useful. 
They couldn’t let us know what was 
going to happen to his body and 
what the consequences would be.”; 
“I think there was not a lot I liked 
about the meeting at all. What I liked 
about the meeting was that they 
said they would make sure that they 
would review the procedures […] 
and the hospital to identify how this 
could have happened, that was 
probably it.”; “I didn’t like the fact 
that they were in suits and you know 
like it was ’we’re going to fix this 
because we’re the hierarchy’ that 
sort of thing” (p. 105) 
“The support of ‘Hospital in the home’ was 
marvellous because they were monitoring 
him as well as me. And they were a very 
good service support for me as well. 
Because if anything goes wrong they are 







Patient had gallbladder 
surgery and suffered 8 
months severe pain 
post-op. Because suture 
wasn’t tight enough she 
developed a hernia. 
Different surgeon 
operated on the hernia. 
Yes, low. [No OD other than 
with Hospital Liaison person]. 
No.  
“I actually spoke to a lawyer.  I was 
so peeved off, that’s how bad I 











High (lots of 
pain) 
No.  
“I actually spoke to a lawyer.  I was 
so peeved off, that’s how bad I 
was.” (p. 109) 
Hospital pays for hernia operation; patient 
given a choice of three surgeons to correct 
surgery. 
No (original surgeon did not 
make contact or attend OD 
meeting).  
“I felt very belittled there. I 
was given morphine there 
every time I went and was 
told you will be right to go 









Young man run over by 
car, and during his 10 
hour operation a Hep-C-
infected piece of 
equipment was used.  
Yes, high. (“But they were 
very very good. Like, they 
sort of sat there very quietly 
after they’d told us and let us 
process it all. Um, and… then 
they said to us, do you have 
any questions and we did, 
you know, like we had lots of 
questions. And they were 
very good. They answered all 
of our questions” (p. 115) 
Yes, full.  





‘couple of days 








“I liked the fact that it was never a 
rigid thing. You could, you felt 
comfortable with these people, 
um… they spoke to you… not like 
you were an idiot, they spoke to you 
like you were a person.” (p 117)  
Support from social workers, QC, nurses, 
doctors; process improved. “They, they 
looked after him very very well.” (p. 111) 
 
Yes.  
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What was the adverse 
event? Did it have a 
clear cause? 
Did Open Disclosure take 
place?  
Was it Low or High Level 
Open Disclosure? 






seen by pt? 
Outcome of OD process judged to be 
successful? 
Was there support? 
Rectification? 
Was contact possible with 
clinician(s) most closely 











Patient has cancer in the 
leg. He is supported by 
only 1 nurse (while notes 
say he needs 2 at all 
times); he falls, breaks 
his leg. He has an 
operation 24 hrs later, 
and dies 3 weeks after 
that from a blood clot. 
Family is on-site in the 
hospital when agency 
nurse drops patient and 
announces doctor is 
needed; doctor comes to 
treat patient but has to 
leave ‘for more serious 
case’. 
Yes, high. Yes, full from agency nurse, but 
then partial apology from other staff.  
“.. they admitted that they made a 
mistake” (p. 125). 
External.  
[Fam asked for 












high No.  
“It wasn’t, it wasn’t enough at the time.”  
Intwr: Would it have been ‘good enough’ if they had 
said, ‘Look, we, ar, we’ve looked into the case and 
we recognise that the problem is that agency 
nurses don’t read the notes and from now on we’ll 
…’. 
 “No. Never ever heard that ever. Even when we 
had the meeting, with the head honchos, and can I 
just say that they have actually filed our complaint 
and put it away. That we’ve, they thought we had 
already had a meeting and we hadn’t. They thought 
that that nurse, that the head, ar, officer in charge 
of relations, um, [name], they thought that because 
we, we talked to her the next morning, that that was 
sufficient.” 
(p. 127) 
Patient moved to 
smaller hospital for 
further care (family: 
‘to free up bed in 









of 29 yo 
female 
pt) 
Young woman suicides 
after several previous 
attempts following 
discharge. Her family is 
refused information 
about the case and is 
denied answers to 
questions about the 
woman’s mental 
diagnosis. 
No. (meeting granted, but not 
a disclosure meeting)  
No.  
“… well the head of the  department 
you know couldn’t fault ah what 
occurred during the course of the- 
the consultation and more or less 
said that um [patient name] was 
advised to seek help from drug and 





High high Yes. “I think we felt that we were you know treated 
quite well apart from the head of the department 
who, he said to us that, um, it is everybody’s 
responsibility to keep themselves alive.” (p. 137);  
No. “So I didn’t receive an opportunity to follow up 
with my diary and try to understand the whole-what 
led to this event” (p. 138) 
No, no support 
analyzing pt diaries to 
establish cause of 
depression & suicide 
and inform family of 
risk for other fam 
members 
Yes.  
Head of Dept offers meeting. 
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What was the adverse 
event? Did it have a 
clear cause? 
Did Open Disclosure take 
place?  
Was it Low or High Level 
Open Disclosure? 






seen by pt? 
Outcome of OD process judged 
to be successful? 
Was there support? Rectification? Was contact possible with 
clinician(s) most closely 










Older patient is taken to 
the toilet by two young 
nurses; she is left alone 
and falls when she tries 
to get off the toilet. She 
breaks her hip which 
cannot be operated on. 
She dies 3 weeks later. 
Yes, high. “Well, no, well yes 
and no. Mum had died by this 
time. By the time I’d put in the 
formal complaint and they got 
round to actually doing a 
meeting, mum had died in the 
meantime. But my sister and 
I went up to Brisbane to the 
meeting.” (p. 147) 
Yes, full. (by doctor who cries).  
No (by nurse). 
“… they said that in the meeting that 
she [nurse who left pt] was very 














High. Yes.  
“Um, well, open and honest and 
they told me how the young girl was 
so remorseful, and that they’re 
going to put a woman in to talk to 
the young nurses”. (p. 154) 
No. “Yeah, oh, they said that in the 
meeting that she was very remorseful.” 
(p 148) 
Yes.  
New rule disseminated through 













Patient goes into 
hospital for physio on 
Friday, and he falls out 
of bed after making a 
family phone call. He is 
not discovered for some 
time, during which his 
breathing gets worse. 
Family claims he was 
given insufficient fluids 
and medication on 
Saturday. He dies on 
Sunday. 
No.  
Formal meeting refused by 
family due to fam conflict, 
suspected and whitewash. 
Yes, full (from one doctor).  
No (other doctor). 
“He also stated and apologised to 
us that she’d slipped between 
cracks” (p. 157),  
“No, we made an appointment with 
him. He went overseas the following 
week and I rang up his secretary 
that week he was away. I didn’t 
realise he was away and I said, ‘I 
would like to make an appointment 
with Dr B because, ar, there’s a lot 
of questions unanswered’.” (p. 162) 
External  
[Fam query] 
High High. No. No. No (disclosure did not 






er of 93 
yo pt 
Patient is discharged 
from hospital despite 
daughter’s protests that 
she is not well enough. 
Patient gets sick during 
the 300km car trip home, 
suffers from dehydration 
and dies. 
Yes by QC, not by clinical 
team. 




High High. No. No. No (no disclosure from 






Patient given saline 
overdose following 
alcohol-related collapse.  





Low. Immaterial to patient. Incident and 
subsequent care resolved his 
alcoholism. 
Yes. Offer of clinical services. Yes.  
22 
Mother 
of 17 yo 
male 
Patient has unsuccessful 
spinal operation. 







High. No. Offer of further surgery (refused due to 
lack of trust). 





Patient’s colonoscopy is 
done with unsterilised 
equipment. 
Yes, by members of the 
clinical team. 





Low. Yes.  Yes. Check-ups carried out to assess 
impact. 
Yes.  
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2.5.7 Patients’ and family members’ reservations about Open Disclosure 
 
As interview statement cited above show, consumers were not unanimous in their 
appreciation for the way in which Open Disclosure was conducted. Indeed, some 
consumers expressed misgivings about how they had been communicated with by 
hospital staff. It is not surprising, of course, for a new and innovative practice advocated in 
recent policy to display some degree of ‘lag’ in implementation, and for Open Disclosure 
communication skills to spread among staff. What is noteworthy about our findings 
however is that the patients and family members who are entirely satisfied with how their 
adverse events were handled were in the minority. While most interviewees expressed 
relief upon being openly told about the adverse event in the Open Disclosure meeting, few 
patients and family members recounted their experiences without touching on (perceived) 
problems and shortcomings. We have outlined the reasons for this exhaustively above. 
Here we note some final considerations about why disclosure is not experienced positively 
by patients and family members:  
-  staff fail to recognise there is escalating dissatisfaction on the part of the family 
and/or patient; 
-  staff change their position or view on what happened, thereby exacerbating 
uncertainty and potentially engendering suspicion; 
-  the health facility moves patients to neighbouring hospitals (due to deterioration or 
improvement) without adequate Open Disclosure continuity and involvement in the 
adverse event history of staff at the second facility; 
-  family members are denied access to clinical-medical information pertaining to the 
patient’s care (on grounds of privacy legislation); 
-  the health care facility representatives determine whether closure has been 
achieved rather than the family or patient. 
 
Overall, the interviews suggest the following inverse proportion: the less the health care 
system is responsible for the adverse event, the better it is deemed to support those 
harmed, and vice versa: the more the system is (or staff working in the system are) at 
fault, the less supportive it (they are) is of consumers, and the less open it is (they are) to 
consumers. This notwithstanding, none of the patients and family members express regret 
at participating in Open Disclosure. While thirteen out of twenty-three patient/family 
interviewees judge their Open Disclosure experience not to have been successful (or not 
successful enough), only in a minority of cases do they report not having experienced any 
benefit at all from participating in this process.  
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3  ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS’ QUESTIONNAIRE 
SURVEY DATA  
3.1 Executive Overview 
 
Survey responses (health care professionals only) show the following:  
1.   Survey responses (total 80 surveys; response rate 74%) show that health care  
  professional respondents are in agreement that Open Disclosure is of benefit:  
a.  Respondents strongly agree that Open Disclosure benefits health care staff 
and health care services.  
b. Respondents strongly agree that Open Disclosure benefits patients and 
 families. 
2.  Health care professional respondents also agree that Open Disclosure: 
c. Imposes an emotional burden;  
d. Imposes a resource burden; but it 
e. Has advantages that outweigh its emotional and resource costs.  
3.   Health care professional respondents are uncertain about: 
f. Whether Open Disclosure will ultimately be detrimental to professionals’ or 
 organisations’ reputation;  
g. When, how and with whom to enact Open Disclosure. 
4.   Nursing and medical survey respondents differ on the following points:  
h. Nursing staff may be more burdened than medical staff by the emotional impact 
 of Open Disclosure. 
i.  Medical staff may be more conscious (than nursing staff) of unexpected 
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3.2 Survey Data – Methods and Findings 
3.2.1  Survey Data Analysis 
 
An Open Disclosure questionnaire survey for health professionals was developed for this 
evaluation and validated by scientific research committees (subcommittees of Human 
Research and Ethics Committees) and the Survey Resource Group in Canberra. The 
questionnaire survey tool was piloted in three Victorian sites and slight changes made to 
the tool. The questionnaire survey was administered to the same group of health 
professionals that was involved in the Open Disclosure interviews, and they were 
approached as part of the same (interview) process with the request to fill out the 
questionnaire survey. In total, 108 health professionals were asked to complete the 
questionnaire survey. The response rate for this questionnaire was high. A total of 80 
questionnaire surveys were completed31, giving a response rate of 74%. 
The survey for health care professionals is comprised of three parts: Part 1 contains 
demographic and work related questions. Part 2 asks questions about staff experiences of 
doing Open Disclosure. Part 3 asks about Open Disclosure policies and practices in 
respondents’ organisations.  
 
3.2.2 Survey Data Findings - Questionnaire Part One: Basic demographics 
 
Professional background 
As shown in Figure 3.1, 45 questionnaires were completed by staff with a nursing 
background (58%), 32 by staff with a medical background (37%), 2 by staff with an allied 
health background (2%) and 1 by a Human Resources employee (1%).  
 












                                                     
31 Two surveys were excluded from the analysis because their responses were incomplete. 
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Further details about the survey respondents are provided in table 3.1. The table shows 
respondents have a high level of health care experience (average of 24 years), many of 
them have a considerable (average 66%) administrative-managerial load, the majority 
(51%) work in metropolitan hospitals, and the highest percentage of survey responses (just 
over 46%) came from Queensland.  
 
Table 3.1: Health Professional Respondents’ Demographics And Background 
 
Category Respondents’ demographics and background 
Gender 52% of respondents are female; 47% male.  
Age 63% are below the age of 50. 
Working experience in health 
care 
 
The average time the respondents have worked in the health care sector is 24 years, 
ranging from 3 to 42 years, with 7.6% being in health care less than 10 years and 31.6% 
for 30 years or more.  
Management versus clinical 
duties 
 
The average time the respondents spent their time with management duties is about 66% 
compared to 33% with clinical duties. 30% and 2% of respondents spend 100% of their 
time on management and on clinical duties, respectively. 43% spend more than 50% on 
management duties. 
Type of hospital 
 
The majority of respondents (51 %) work in metropolitan hospitals, 32% in regional and 
16% in rural facilities. 
State 
 
About 46% completed questionnaires were received from Queensland, 21% from Victoria, 
16% from South Australia and 16.3% from New South Wales (see Figure 2.2 below). 
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Queensland also had the highest response rate with nearly 75% of health professionals 
completing the survey. New South Wales had the lowest response rate with about 56% 
returning the survey.  
Sixty-two of the 77 respondents (77%) have received Open Disclosure instruction. Of these 
62 respondents, 91% attended a structured presentation or course. In addition to attending 
a structured course or presentation, 15% of respondents indicated that they have also 
undertaken other types of training such as self-directed reading and/or online and CD-
based instruction. When asked if the training provided them with the skills to take part in an 
Open Disclosure session, 56 (93%) agreed or strongly agreed. No one disagreed (Table 
3.2). 
 
Table 3.2: Respondents’ Open Disclosure Training And Open Disclosure Experience 
Category Respondents’ experience and training 
Open Disclosure Training 77% of respondents (62 out of 77) have undertaken training in Open Disclosure 
Experience Doing Open 
Disclosure 
87% of respondents attended an Open Disclosure session with a patient and family 
member(s) 
 
With regard to having participated in Open Disclosure meetings, the overwhelming majority 
(87%) of respondents claim having experience doing Open Disclosure (Table 3.2). When 
asked how many Open Disclosure sessions respondents had attended, 46% answered one 
to two; 35% answered between three and nine, and 18% answered ten or more. Of those 
that have attended an Open Disclosure session, 44% have never led a session, 23% led 
between one and two sessions and 16% have led ten or more sessions32.  
 
3.2.3  Survey Data Analysis - Questionnaire Part Two: Health Professionals’ Views of 
Consumers’ Responses and of Their Own Experiences 
 
This part of the questionnaire explored staff perceptions about consumers’ and clinicians’ 
experiences with Open Disclosure. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement with statements about Open Disclosure. Answer categories in the form of a 
Likert scale were provided ranging from strongly agree, agree, uncertain to disagree and 
strongly disagree. The questionnaire statements were grouped under the following 
categories:  
1.  Health Professionals’ Views of Patient (or Family) Responses to Open 
Disclosure, and  
                                                     
32 NB: the percentages listed do not distinguish between High Level Open Disclosure (for high severity adverse events) 
and Low Level Open Disclosure (for low severity adverse events).  
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2.  Health Professionals’ Views on How Clinicians Themselves Experience Open 
Disclosure.  
 
1. Health Professionals’ Views of Patient (or Family) Responses to Open Disclosure 
 
Nine statements were grouped under this category. There was overwhelming agreement in 
response to the following statements (Table 3.3): 
 
Table 3.3: Health Professionals’ Views About Patient And Family Responses To Open 
Disclosure: Percentage Of Respondents In Agreement 
 
Survey Statement % agreement 
Overall I think patients’ well-being benefits from Open Disclosure 96% 
Patients appreciate receiving information through Open Disclosure 92% 
The information is given in a way that the patients seem to understand 90% 
Patients seem to appreciate being honestly informed through Open Disclosure 88% 




Health professionals surveyed were divided about whether ‘Patients become angry when 
informed about adverse incidents’. 39% agreed or strongly agreed, however, 37% of 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed and the remaining 23% were unsure.  The 
pattern was different with regard to their view on whether families tend to become angry 
when incidents are disclosed to them. Perhaps reflecting the unpredictable nature of 
people’s responses to incidents, 63% agreed or strongly agreed that families become angry 
and 25% disagreed or strongly disagreed (refer to Figure 3.3).  
 
The majority of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that ‘Open Disclosure 
practices reduce patients’ faith in the health care organisation’ (77%), while 15.0% of 
respondents were unsure. 
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Figure 3.3: Health Professionals’ Views About Whether Families And Patients Become Angry 


















Of significance is that 75% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement that ‘Open Disclosure causes patients and their families unnecessary distress’. 
Given the earlier finding that Open Disclosure tends to be seen as upsetting, agreement 
with the statement that ‘Open Disclosure does not cause unnecessary stress’ suggests that 
respondents do not regard the intensity of emotions generated by Open Disclosure as futile 
and unnecessarily stressful. Put differently, the emotional intensity of Open Disclosure may 
be seen to produce positive rather than negative outcomes. 
 
2. Health Professionals’ Views on How They Themselves Experience Open Disclosure. 
 
Eight statements were grouped under this category. All were responded to with high levels 
of agreement. There was overwhelming agreement with the statement ‘I feel satisfied with 
the outcome of the Open Disclosure sessions I have attended’ (90%; see Table 3.4). There 
was overall agreement with the statement ‘I am in favour of Open Disclosure of all adverse 
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Figure 3.4: Health Professionals’ Concern About Litigation And Personal Reputation If 
Involved In An Adverse Event Requiring Open Disclosure 
 
Statements which were responded to with agreement but which also elicited uncertainty 
include ‘Health professionals worry about litigation if an adverse incident is disclosed to 
patients’ (71% agreement; 18% unsure) and ‘Health professionals worry about their 
reputations if they are involved in an adverse incident requiring Open Disclosure’ (78% 
agreement; 13% unsure; see figure 3.4). Here, respondents articulate a tension here 
between colleagues’ and the wider organisation’s reserved stance towards Open 
Disclosure and respondents’ own support for the policy and their positive practical 
experience. 
The survey statement ‘In my experience Open Disclosure reduces litigation’ was responded 
to with agreement by 55% of respondents, while 41% expressed uncertainty. This 
comparatively low level of agreement and high level of uncertainty (in the context of this 
survey’s findings) may be due to the limited period of time that Open Disclosure has in fact 
been part of frontline clinical practice in Australia, rather than to employees’ doubt that 
Open Disclosure will impact on litigation levels. This is certainly an issue that deserves 
further research investigation. 
 
Survey Statement Strongly agree / 
agree 
Unsure Strongly disagree / 
disagree 
I feel satisfied with the outcome of the Open 
Disclosure sessions I have attended 
90% (67) 6% (5) 2% (2) 
I am in favour of Open Disclosure of all 
adverse events to patients 
81% (65) 11% (9) 7% (6) 
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More than half (60%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 
‘Health professionals involved in Open Disclosure are often upset by the Open Disclosure 
session’ (figure 3.5 above). These responses point to a degree of apprehension with regard 
to the emotional impact of Open Disclosure on staff. When asked if ‘Open Disclosure 
causes health professionals involved unnecessary distress’, however, 63% disagreed. As 
already noted above, Open Disclosure is seen to be emotionally challenging, but at the 
same time Open Disclosure is seen to produce worthwhile outcomes. 
 
3.2.4 Survey Data Analysis - Questionnaire Part Three: Health Professionals’ Views on 
Organisational, Policy and Process Factors Pertaining to Open Disclosure 
 
Eight statements were grouped under this category. Perhaps not surprisingly, 95% of 
respondents agreed that ‘The organisation where I work supports an Open Disclosure 
policy’ and about 25% of respondents indicated that ‘The organisation where I work 
provides education for staff in Open Disclosure practices’. All of the sites surveyed were 
Open Disclosure pilot sites in most of which some form of training had been initiated. 
 
1. Health Professionals’ Views on Organisational and Policy Factors Pertaining to Open 
Disclosure 
 
Two tensions affect respondents’ answers about organisational and policy factors. First, 
respondents’ answers diverge with regard to their views on Open Disclosure principle and 
Open Disclosure practice. For practice, about 20% of respondents were unsure if ‘Only 
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severe adverse incidents are openly disclosed in my organisation’, with 56% disagreeing 
and 20% agreeing with this statement. When it comes to principle, 81% of respondents are 
in favour of Open Disclosure of all adverse incidents to patients. This divergence between 
views about what is done and about what should be done points to respondents’ awareness 
of a ‘lag’ between policy and practice, and to their support for Open Disclosure generally. 
Support for Open Disclosure as principle is evident from respondents’ (strong) agreement 
(82%) with the statement that ‘In my experience Open Disclosure leads to improvement in 
the quality of health care delivered’.  
Second, tension is evident between health professionals’ experience that ‘The outcomes of 
the Open Disclosure sessions I have attended are satisfactory for the organisation’ (82%), 
and health organisations nevertheless being seen to harbour apprehensions about the 
effect of Open Disclosure: ‘The organisation is fearful that Open Disclosure will lead to bad 
publicity’ with 48% disagreeing, 27% agreeing and 23% being unsure. This tension 
reappears when we consider health professionals’ interview responses: staff have positive 
experiences doing Open Disclosure, but they are concerned at the limited spread of this 
practice. 
These tensions notwithstanding, 72% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that ‘Health 
professionals involved in Open Disclosure sessions receive strong support from hospital 
managers’. As the interview data analysis confirms, this may link in with managers’ 
regarding Open Disclosure as an opportunity for enhancing staff-management 
relationships. When respondents are asked whether ‘Health professionals involved in Open 
Disclosure sessions receive strong support from their colleagues’, their confidence is lower: 
61% agreed or strongly agreed, meaning that as many as 39% felt unsure or disagreed 
about receiving support from colleagues when disclosing adverse events. 
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2. Health Professionals’ Views on Open Disclosure as Process 
 
Fifteen questions were grouped under this category. There was overwhelming agreement in 
response to survey statements about the practices of explaining the adverse event, 
apologising, and taking responsibility33.   
Table 3.5a shows there is overwhelming agreement among staff surveyed that explanations 
are given accurately and sympathetically, that an apology is made, and that information 
about the incident is shared with the patient and family members. 
 
Table 3.5a: Health Professionals’ Views On Open Disclosure As Process  
Survey Statement % agreement 
The explanation given of what has happened to the patients is accurate 97% 
The explanations are given sympathetically 98% 
An apology is made to the patient 96% 
The harm that the patients have experienced is acknowledged by the health professional 
leading the session 
97% 
If responsibility for the harm done to patients is highly evident, this responsibility is 
acknowledged by health professionals in attendance 
83% 
 
Table 3.5b further confirms these positive views: health professionals regard the way that 
Open Disclosure is conducted as near exemplary (table 3.5b). 
 
Table 3.5b: Views On Open Disclosure As Process 
Survey Statement % agreement 
The patients have the opportunity to ask questions 100% 
The consequences of the event are clearly explained to the patients 93% 
The patients are told that steps are taken to avoid adverse incidents occurring again 97% 
An offer is made to share with the patients the findings of any further investigation into the 
cause of the specific incident 
89% 
The patients are told what steps are being taken to manage the event 96% 
A support person for the patient is present (or readily available) 86% 
                                                     
33 As seen, our analysis of patient and family interviews revealed a less positive picture of how Open Disclosure is 
conducted in practice. Health professionals (legitimately) regard their uptake of Open Disclosure as an important advance 
on traditional practice. However, we may in fact be in a ‘grey space’ where Open Disclosure is enacted without as yet 
meeting patients’ and family members’ expectations. It is important, we suggest therefore, that health professionals’ uptake 
of Open Disclosure be supported (not least due to overwhelmingly positive responses from all stakeholders), but at the 
same time mechanisms be put in place for gauging and improving consumers’ overall service satisfaction (Parakasuraman, 
Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).  
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Equally, with regard to the timing of Open Disclosure, most respondents regard their 
organisations as promptly arranging Open Disclosure (68% in agreement). A comparable 
proportion (64%) also agrees that ‘The patients are invited to an Open Disclosure meeting 
within a reasonable timeframe following the incident’, with only 12% disagreeing and 24% 
being unsure. This finding too needs to be contextualised with the experiences of patients 
and family members discussed above. 
 



















In response to the statement ‘The health professionals who explain the events are known to 
the patient’, 53% agreed or strongly agreed, 31% disagreed and the remaining 15% of 
respondents were unsure. That is, just over half of all respondents agree that those who are 
likely to have had involvement in the adverse event meet with the patient and/or their family 
to explain what happened. Foreshadowing our consumer interview analysis presented 
below, this figure is not likely to be inflated, but may rely on instances of Low Level Open 
Disclosure (i.e. addressing low severity adverse events) rather than High Level Open 
Disclosure (i.e. for high severity adverse events). 
Similarly, the statement ‘Patients are not informed about less severe adverse incidents 
involving their care and treatment’ met with 56% (strong) disagreement and only 18% 
agreement. 25% were unsure. Here, a slight majority of respondents confirms that the 
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patient is likely to be appropriately informed about low severity adverse events occurring 
during their care34.  
Finally, 79% of respondents agreed with Open Disclosure being ‘structured as an ongoing, 
iterative process’ as opposed to being a one-off event (20% were unsure about this, but 
none disagreed). This points to staff accepting that Open Disclosure is a complex and 
demanding process that relies on ongoing feedback from all stakeholders for how it unfolds. 
Here, too, however, it becomes evident that it is important to contextualise these survey 
responses with health professionals’ and consumers’ interview statements about these 
matters. The lag between espoused views (as expressed in surveys) and enacted 
positionings (as displayed in interviews) becomes evident when we turn to the rather more 
nuanced meanings conveyed in semi-structured talk. 
 
3.2.5  The Influence of Professional background: Differences in views of and experiences with 
Open Disclosure between medical and nursing staff 
 
This section outlines the differences in views of and experiences with Open Disclosure 
between the medical and nursing profession. The professional background referred to here 
relates to the initial training/profession of the respondents. It however does not refer to their 
current position. A patient safety officer might have trained as a nurse before moving on to 
become a patient safety officer. In the following analysis this patient safety officer is 
considered to belong to the nursing profession35.  
 
About 58% of questionnaire surveys were completed by nursing staff and about 38% by 
medical staff. As table 3.6 below shows, medical staff respondents tend to be male, and 
nursing staff respondents female. Both professions have an average of more than 24 years 
experience in health care and for some respondents a considerable percentage of their 
work is devoted to managerial duties. Overall, nursing staff tend to spend more time on 
management duties than medical staff do.  
                                                     
34 Patients’ and family members’ interviews analysed above confirmed that low severity adverse events tend to pose limited 
problems in terms of their disclosure. However, their interviews also suggested that disclosure of high severity adverse 
events can resemble low level disclosure in that it is done with insufficient procedural formalisation. As the consumer 
interviews indicated, this poses a risk: a serious adverse event is disclosed but it is done in a way that may not be attuned 
to consumers’ sense of interpersonal dignity and social expectation.  
35 This classification differs from the one utilised in the interview data analysis section, where a ‘patient safety officer’ and a 
quality coordinator are categorised as ‘Support Personnel’, irrespective of clinical background. 
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Table 3.6: Medical And Nursing Staff Respondents’ Demographics And Background 
Category Medical and nursing staff respondents’ demographics and background 
Gender 81% of medical staff are male; 73% of nurses being female  
Age Both medical and nursing groups have a similar age distribution with 62% and 63% of 
medical and nursing staff being below 50 years old, respectively 
Working experience in health 
care 
 
None of the medical respondents have worked in health care less than 10 years, 
compared with 11% of nursing staff. The majority (56%) of medical staff have worked 
longer than 20 years in health care and 25% more than 30 years. A higher percentage 
(34%) of nursing staff stayed in health care longer than 30 years 
Management versus clinical 
duties 
 
Nursing staff tend to spend more time on management duties than medical staff do: 13 % 
of nursing staff spend up to 50%, 86% more than 50% with 37% 100% on management 
duties. Almost half (46%) of the medical staff respondents spend up to 50% on 
management duties, with 15% being a 100% occupied with management duties 
 
Medical staff tend to have more experience with attending and leading Open Disclosure 
sessions than do nursing staff. Almost every medical staff respondent (93%) has been 
involved in an Open Disclosure session with a patient and family member. Of those, 41% 
attended between 1 and 2 sessions and 24% attended 10 or more sessions. About 35% 
indicated that they have not led an Open Disclosure session and 14% led between 1 and 2 
sessions. In comparison, a slightly lower percentage of nursing staff (84%) have been 
involved in Open Disclosure sessions. Half of those respondents specified that they have 
attended 1 or 2 sessions, and 13% say they attended 10 sessions or more. 1 in 2 (51%) 
nursing staff respondents have not led an Open Disclosure and 2 in 6 (31%) between 1 and 
2 sessions.  
 
Table 3.7: Medical and Nursing Staff Respondents’ Open Disclosure Training And Open Disclosure Experience 
Category Respondents’ experience and training 
Open Disclosure Training About equal percentages of medical (78%) and nursing staff (75%) have been trained in 
Open Disclosure 
Experience Doing Open 
Disclosure 
93%and 84% of medical and nursing  staff respondents attended an Open Disclosure 
session with a patient and family member(s) 
 
3.2.6 Health Professionals’ Views Of Patient (Or Family) Responses To Open Disclosure 
 
There was little to no difference between how respondents from medicine and nursing 
backgrounds responded to statements relating to how clinicians understand patients’ and/or 
family members’ experiences of Open Disclosure. However, there were divergent views on 
the following four statements. These are discussed below. 
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Difference One: Patients become angry when informed about adverse events 
One in every two medical staff respondents (50%) disagreed that “Patients become angry 
when informed about adverse events”, with 21% expressing uncertainty. For their part, 
nursing staff tend to agree that patients become angry (47%), with 25% expressing 
uncertainty (figure 3.8).  
This difference may be explained by nurses who work at the patient’s bedside becoming a 
target of patients’ and family members’ distress and anger.  
 
Figure 3.8: Medical And Nursing Staff Respondents’ Views About Whether Patients Become Angry When Informed 



















Difference Two: Families become angry when informed about adverse events 
Nursing staff also strongly support the statement that “Families become angry when 
informed about adverse events”, with 3 in 4 nursing staff (77%) agreeing. A high 
percentage – but not as high - of medical staff (46%) also agreed with this statement. This 
difference may again have to do with the professional’s proximity to bedside dynamics.  
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Figure 3.9: Medical And Nursing Staff Respondents’ Views About Whether Families Become Angry When Informed 




















Difference Three: Open Disclosure practices reduce patients’ faith in their health 
professionals 
Medical and nurses staff have different views on the statement “Open Disclosure practices 
reduce patients’ faith in their health professionals”. About 10% of nursing staff supported 
the statement, 20% were uncertain with 70% disagreeing. In contrast, 90% of medical staff 
disagreed. It may again be that medical staff, thanks to their position, role and mobility, are 
less susceptible to patients’ and families’ negative feelings than are nurses.  
 
 
Difference Four: Open Disclosure causes patients and their families unnecessary 
distress 
None of the medical staff respondents agreed that “Open Disclosure causes patients and 
their families unnecessary distress”. This compares to about 10% of nursing staff being in 
favour of the statement. This is a marginal difference.  
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The majority (81%) of medical staff disagreed with the statement that “Open Disclosure 
causes patients and their families unnecessary distress”. This percentage is higher than 
that expressed when doctors are asked if “Open Disclosure causes health professionals 
involved unnecessary distress”, where 71% disagreed. Nursing staff responses show that 
73% disagreed with the statement that patient and their families are caused unnecessary 
distress, compared with 55% disagreeing that health professionals are caused unnecessary 
distress (refer to the section below). Here too a professional-background difference is 
manifest, with nursing staff placing greater emphasis on the emotional burden of Open 
Disclosure. 
 
3.2.7 Health Professionals’ Views On How Clinicians Themselves Experience Open Disclosure  
 
Again, medical and nursing staff respondents shared similar views on most of the 
statements relating to their experiences with Open Disclosure. Leaving those similarities 
aside (they have been addressed in Section 2.2.3 above), we will focus the analysis here 
on three noteworthy differences.  
 
Difference One: Open Disclosure causes health professionals involved 
unnecessary distress 
A quarter (24%) of nurses agreed that “Open Disclosure causes health professionals 
involved unnecessary distress”, compared to only 3% of medical staff agreeing (table 3.10).  
 
Figure 3.10: Medical And Nursing Staff Respondents’ Views About Whether Open Disclosure Causes Health 
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Nursing staff responses seen thus far suggest nurses experience a greater burden than do 
their medical counterparts in dealing with the emotional intensity of Open Disclosure. This is 
further evident when considering that the majority of nurses (61%) agreed that ‘health 
professionals involved in Open Disclosure are often upset by patients’ and families’ 
responses’ (see table 3.5 above). By the same token, nursing staff tend to feel more 
supported by their colleagues and their hospital managers than do medical staff (see 
below).  
 
Difference Two: Health professionals involved in Open Disclosure are often upset 
by patients’ and families’ responses 
The majority (56%, 61%) of medical and nursing staff agreed that ‘Health professionals 
involved in Open Disclosure are often upset by patients’ and families’ responses’. This 
shows nurses to feel slightly more susceptible to negative responses from consumers than 
do doctors.  
 
Difference Three: Health professionals involved Open Disclosure sessions receive 
strong support from their colleagues 
When asked if “Health professionals involved in Open Disclosure sessions receive strong 
support from their colleagues”, about half of the medical staff respondents agreed and 40% 
expressed uncertainty. This compares with 65% of nurses supporting the statement and 
21% expressing uncertainty. This difference suggests that while nurses experience a 
greater emotional burden following disclosure of adverse events, they also provide each 
other with better peer support.  
In contrast, respondents in both groups were in favour of the statement that ‘Health 
professionals involved in Open Disclosure receive strong support from hospital managers’, 
with 68% of medical respondents and 75% of nursing respondents agreeing. We know from 
the interview data that, without senior management support, staff have little faith in Open 
Disclosure.  
 
3.2.8  Health Professionals’ Views on Organisational and Policy Factors Pertaining to Open 
Disclosure 
 
Medical and nursing staff have expressed similar views in the eight statements about 
organisational and policy factors. However, there are a few minor differences worth 
commenting on (table 3.8).   
Table 3.8 shows that nurses have slightly more faith in support from health managers than 
do doctors, and that nurses at the same time have greater fear that Open Disclosure may 
lead to bad publicity. These two differences confirm our earlier emphasis on nurses’ being 
attuned to the social network structures and dynamics surrounding Open Disclosure. This 
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carries a cost of course, in so far that for nurses, management, frontline staff and consumer 
reactions to Open Disclosure may be less mitigated by interpersonal distance and everyday 
mobility.  
 
Table 3.8: Medical And Nursing Staff Respondents’ Divergent Views On Statements On Organisational And Policy 
Factors 
Statement Medical and nursing staff responses 
Health professionals involved in Open 
Disclosure receive strong support 
from hospital managers 
A slighter higher percentage of nursing staff (75%) agreed than medical staff 
(68%) 
The organisation is fearful that Open 
Disclosure will lead to bad publicity 
A lower percentage of medical staff (44%) agreed compared to nursing staff 
(53%). 
Only severe adverse events are 
openly disclosed in my organisation 
1 in 4 (25%) medical staff respondents agreed compared to 15% of nursing staff 
In my experience Open Disclosure 
leads to improvement in the quality of 
health care delivered 
No medical staff respondents disagreed; 18% expressed uncertainty; 81% 
agreed.  
6% of nurses disagreed and 11% were unsure; 82% (strongly) agreed. 
 
 
3.2.9 Health Professionals’ Views on Open Disclosure as Process 
 
Medical and nursing staff respondents agreed on the majority of statements relating to 
enacting Open Disclosure as dialogic process (table 3.3 further above). Table 3.9 below 
outlines a minority of differences in opinion and experiences between nursing and 
medicine. 
The table suggests that doctors have more faith than nurses in explanations given to 
consumers about adverse events, and that they are more likely to accept responsibility for 
adverse events. However, and in contrast with this, doctors are less likely to regard Open 
Disclosure as an iterative process. In light of the differences outlined above showing 
nurses’ higher levels of emotional burden resulting from Open Disclosure, the present 
responses may be seen to give further weight to the view that doctors may be less inclined 
to approach Open Disclosure as interpersonal and supportive dialogue and more as a 
formal information dissemination opportunity consonant with doctors’ ‘detached concern’ 
(Lief & Fox, 1963). 
 
Table 3.9: Medical And Nursing Staff Respondents’ Divergent Views On Open Disclosure as Process 
Statement Medical and nursing staff responses 
The consequences of the event are 
clearly explained to the patients 
12% of nurses expressed uncertainty or disagreement; 86% agreed. 
All medical staff agreed. 
 
If responsibility for the harm done to 
patients is highly evident, this 
responsibility is acknowledged by 
health professionals in attendance 
21% of medical staff were uncertain or disagreed with this statement. 
12% of nursing staff were uncertain or disagreed with this statement. 
Open Disclosure is structured as an 
ongoing, iterative process” 
24% of medical staff were uncertain, compared to 15% of nurses 
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As figure 3.11 below displays, the majority of nursing staff (62%) disagreed with the 
statement that “Patients are not informed about less serious adverse events involving their 
care and treatment”. Medical staff also disagreed but to a lesser extent (43%). At the same 
time, almost one third or 31% of medical staff agreed with this statement, suggesting that 
medical staff are more conscious (than nursing staff) of unexpected outcomes not being 
communicated fully and appropriately.  
 
Figure 3.11: Medical And Nursing Staff Respondents’ Views About Whether Patients Are Not Informed About Less 












3.3 Concluding Discussion 
Acknowledging that these questionnaire surveys were submitted to staff who had 
volunteered to become involved in Open Disclosure, the survey responses received confirm 
that Open Disclosure is highly favourably regarded.  
 
The survey results reported are noteworthy for the following three reasons.  
1.  Taking into account that we were dealing with a self-selected group of health care 
professionals, the high response rate suggests there is a high level of faith in Open 
Disclosure on the part of those who completed the survey.  
2.  Many of the survey responses show high levels of uniformity36, which further confirms 
Open Disclosure harbours highly defined advantages and challenges.  
                                                     
36 That is, survey responses group into quite distinct domains of agreement, disagreement and uncertainty across health 
professional groups, organisational types and jurisdictions. 
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3.  In contrast with these positive assessments of Open Disclosure as practice and as 
policy, uncertainty is expressed about: 
a. external factors, such as the threat of litigation, and loss of personal reputation.  
b. internal factors, such as when, how, and with whom to conduct Open Disclosure. 
4. Nursing staff may be more burdened than medical staff by the emotional impact of 
Open Disclosure. 
5. Medical staff may be more conscious (than nursing staff) of unexpected outcomes not 
being communicated fully and appropriately. 
 
We note that these responses may paint an unduly positive picture of how Open Disclosure 
is enacted and received. When considered in the context of the interviews we conducted 
(presented and analysed below), the survey responses show more evidence of optimism 
and enthusiasm than of critical reflection and realistic appraisal. This is no reason to 
diminish the significance of these reported survey outcomes, however. Given the 
challenges and delays that policy implementation ordinarily confronts, we do well to 
recognise that Open Disclosure achieving this level of support in such a brief period of time 
in the pilot sites (since implementation in 2006) is nothing short of remarkable.  
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 130
4  OPEN DISCLOSURE – AN INNOVATIVE POLICY 
4.1  What Open Disclosure offers 
 
As our report has shown, both health care staff and patient and family member 
interviewees regard Open Disclosure in mostly positive terms. Even if specific aspects of 
the process could and should be improved, overall Open Disclosure is seen as harbouring 
the promise of if not actually realising openness and honesty. To emphasise this point, let 
us consider two further quotes from the many that support this practice, one from a 
clinician and one from the patient/family interviews: 
 
“Well, all my experience with [Open Disclosure] is positive.  It is contributing to the 
culture thing, it is about getting it off people’s chest thing, there is no dealing of hidden 
agendas, there is no feelings of [distrust], there is true transparency.”  
[Nursing Manager 89-155] 
 
“Before March I blamed the hospital, I blamed myself, I blamed everybody. Like, the guilt 
was just so raw with me. My own guilt and the guilt that I’d let my son down, and the 
blame that I needed to pass on to the hospital, and all of that. Since the Open Disclosure I 
know for a fact that there has been measures put in place so that this doesn’t happen 
again and I’ve also been in contact with legal since then. The Open Disclosure for me 
itself actually lifted a great weight off my shoulder. I didn’t feel like it was about guilt any 
more. It was about acceptance. This happened which shouldn’t have happened but it did 
and I have to accept that and move on.” 
[Cons 1, 7] 
 
The majority of interviewees support Open Disclosure. There was not one interviewee 
among the 131 health care staff that we spoke to who had reservations about Open 
Disclosure, and of the 23 consumers we interviewed not one regretted having been invited 
to an Open Disclosure meeting. While health care staff were keenly attuned to the risks of 
Open Disclosure (Section 2.4.5 above) and consumers are very aware of the 
shortcomings in current practice (Section 2.5.7), most interviewees were also able and 
willing to articulate benefits.  
Drawing on both the clinician and the patient/family interview data, we finish this section 
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Table 4.1: Benefits of Open Disclosure  
 Benefits of Open Disclosure Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Open Disclosure may provide closure. Open 
Disclosure can help consumers move on from an 
incident. 
“Well, clearly, the big thing is closure for, an attempt at 
closure. You’re probably never going to get a hundred 
percent closure but you at least get people to be able to 
get back to moving on with their lives, not stuck in a time 
warp about an incident and becoming bitter and twisted 
which can have an effect for the rest of their lives.”  
[Support Personnel 29-205] 
“The guilt that I felt because I was his mother I was the 
person who was supposed to look after him so [you felt 
you let him down]. Yes, and the Open Disclosure 
process that we finally had been through has been 
beneficial for me in the fact that I don’t feel as much guilt 
now.”  
[Cons 1, 3] 
2 Open Disclosure may assist healing. Open 
Disclosure can ensure that the patient trusts the 
organisation and the clinical staff. This trust is central 
to improving patients’ healing process 
“Well, health care is a trust game.  … If you undermine 
the trust, you undermine the therapeutic relationship 
which is important for the patients as well as it is for the 
comfort of the staff.  If they don’t feel like they can trust 
it’s much harder for them to get better.”  
[Medical Manager 33-86] 
“Well, I didn’t know what was happening or what is the 
worst thing that could have happened to me. They 
explained the possibility of dialysis, and they also 
explained that all the cells in my body would change 
within 90 days or so. That made me feel better and they 
reassured me that I was going to get better.”  
[Cons 12, 104] 
3 Open Disclosure may lower complaint levels. One 
health care staff interviewee makes mention of 
anecdotal evidence that there has been a reduction in 




“Yes. I think it’s been successful … Certainly from one of 
the health service’s perspective … that has had huge 
success in terms of one of their areas and overall in the 
hospital [name] was saying that their complaints have 
gone down 42% which is amazing but whether that just 
relates to this or not who’s to know without doing more 
evaluation.”  
[Support Personnel 78-81] 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 132
 
Table 4.1: Benefits of Open Disclosure (cont’d) 
 Benefits of Open Disclosure Relevant Interview Quotes 
4 Open Disclosure may improve organisational 
culture. Interviewees comment on how Open 
Disclosure:  
1.  strengthens staff’s willingness to learn from 












4.  improves how people speak about each 
others’ work and their clinical outcomes.  
 
 
“To start with when it first occurred they both wanted to 
resign and leave and never nurse again, and they’re 
now still working so I think it certainly helped them as 
well and they, the error occurred because of a practice 
that was happening in that it wasn’t a standard that we 
would have accepted and they’ve actually been the 
change agents in changing that practice in that facility. 
So they not only benefited from it, they learned from it 
and they’re now teaching others.”  
[Support Personnel 67-37] 
“Well, I think inherently, the whole concept of a more 
transparent organisation, I think it makes for a healthier 
organisation.”  
[Medical Manager 29-170] 
 “I initially had a few issues with my staff simply looking 
at me as a manager and saying whose side are you 
taking, sort of thing. … I think, but all this is gone now.” 
 [Nursing Manager 87-152] 
“Open Disclosure stops that tittering that happens about 
things [the corridor talk] …  certainly for the junior staff 
that sort of, ‘He is an idiot because he did this’.”  
[Medical Manager 86-52] 
 
5 Open Disclosure can integrate consumers’ 
perspectives and experiences into the (re)design 
of services (Bate & Robert, 2007). 
 
“Another thing that’s a benefit, um the … the information 
you get, from the patient’s perspective, before you 
actually commence your [Root Cause] analysis, you can 
actually use it in your analysis sometimes, ‘cause you’re 
getting their version of events as well, so that … that 
helps with the um, analysis sometimes.”  
[Support Personnel 34-149] 
“Yeah, he came up a few, a couple of weeks back, and 
he said that they’re reviewing all their procedures in 
Townsville and double checking what happened. See, 
my question was, if I was given this, ar, injection, why 
wasn’t it checked and double checked before it was 
administered. Um, that was my, it’s been my question all 
along, you see. And this is what I wanted to get across 
to Dr AJ, he’s the administrator. Anyway, he found out 
that it hadn’t been checked and everything, and it came 
out in the HEAPS report, so now they’re going to have, 
they’re all being educated on this aromine, the drug that 
I was given.”  
[Cons 7, 69] 
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Table 4.1: Benefits of Open Disclosure (cont’d) 
 Benefits of Open Disclosure Relevant Interview Quotes 
6 Open Disclosure may lead to much better relations 
with patients and family members: 
“ … when you actually saw that it worked on occasion, 
you actually got letters of thank you, you know from 
people who, you’d told horrible stories to about things 
that you had done to them or their families, um, you 
know, so, um, so that enabled us to continue to do it.” 
[Nursing Manager 32-76-7] 
“Well, it’s helpful as a voice for me. I don’t have a voice 
because I’m just a one here and one there. Um, so I 
think, and the ladies that I’ve spoken with, and the lady 
that helped me here, has given me I suppose you’d call 
it reassurance that something’s been done and that 
people are listening to people like me.”  
[Cons 2, 19] 
 
4.2 Open Disclosure – What is needed in the future  
 
Interviewees regard Open Disclosure as a significant turning point in the provision of health 
care. They sense that Open Disclosure cannot be rolled back, that it will spread rather than 
recede, and that it will become a standard part of providing health care services. This sense 
of ‘turning point’ links in with a number of proposals to realise a carefully structured roll-out 
and to obviate inappropriate Open Disclosure practices (table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: What is needed in the future 
 What is needed in the future Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 Make available awareness training before asking 
staff to participate in Open Disclosure. 
 
“So now we’re at this risky stage where we’re sort of 
thinking well we can’t you know, we’ve taken the lid of 
this box, you can’t go and stuff it all back in.  We’re now 
thinking what we need to do is roll out more 
comprehensive, more awareness training for people so 
that they know when they might get into trouble, and 
strategically training up some [staff] early catching them 
before they’ve needed to disclose.”  
[Medical Manager 47-86] 
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Table 4.2: What is needed in the future (cont’d) 
 What is needed in the future Relevant Interview Quotes 
2 Expose medical and nursing students to education 
about Open Disclosure. 
“I think that undergraduates need to know about it. I 
think it needs to be built into our undergraduate 
program, with the understanding that there are highly 
trained people who will help you. You need to tell them 
before you do anything.”  
[Support Personnel 75-98] 
 
3 Compensate for the dearth of (High Level) Open 
Disclosure opportunities by enabling those skilled 
in Open Disclosure to meet regularly, or by making 
on-line Open Disclosure resources available. 
 
“I think we would all benefit from learning from our 
experiences for a few more years yet. Having a forum 
where facilitators could come together, debrief and 
perhaps reinvigorate their training as we learn more 
about it.”  
[Support Personnel 75-98] 
 
“… you almost like it to have it online, so that people 
can, you know, if they’ve got say, half an hour free … 
you can say okay … just hear what this group have 
done, you know,[how they’ve]  experienced Open 
Disclosure.” 
 [Medical Manager 36-131] 
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4.3 Open Disclosure – Questions remaining 
There are some matters that we have not been able to resolve or deduce recommendations 
for. These matters include the following (table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Questions remaining 
 Questions remaining Relevant Interview Quotes 
1 What can clinicians and Open Disclosure support 
staff commit to paper? Staff working on Open 
Disclosure cases need to keep notes about the case. 
These notes may include conjectures about what 
happened and who was involved, as well as refutations of 
particular understandings and approaches to the case. 
These notes constitute ‘soft information’: they are 
dynamic in that their content changes and serves only as 
a temporary heuristic and mnemonic for staff. They are 
not ‘hard information’ that they are confident of and 
willing to publicise. Given there is (Discovery, Freedom of 
Information and Privacy) legislation that enables people 
to request such ‘soft information’, it may be advisable to 
review the legislative provisions relating to  Qualified 
Privilege so as to provide certainty to clinicians about the 
applicability of statutory Qualified Privilege to all aspects 
of the Open Disclosure process, including pre-meeting 
documentation.  Such as review could investigate the 
possibility of enacting specific legislative provisions 
relating to Open Disclosure, much like those currently in 
existence for Root Cause Analysis under s20Q of the 
Health Administration Act 1982 NSW and ss71-74 of 
the Health Care Bill 2007 SA. Alternatively, such 
information could be classified as the clinician's personal 







“It structures that meeting using that form. But you’ve 
got to be careful what you write in case it is FOI-able. 
So you would never include some things in a 
meeting.” 
[Support Personnel 28-196] 
 
 
“I would see that [pro-forma] document as a working 
document. It’s not the document I would say should 
be the FOI-able component of Open Disclosure. [But] 
I don’t think it’s protected. I think it probably does 
have some concerns because we don’t know where 
that document sits in FOI land or its disclosurable-
type status. Some places don’t use it or write on it [for 
that reason].” [Support Personnel 28-196] 
                                                     
37 Unlike with Root Cause Analysis, there are currently no specific Qualified Privilege legislative provisions in relation to the 
Open Disclosure process. Open Disclosure could of course be considered to come under the general legislative privileges 
covering ‘Quality Activities’.  When these legislative provisions are next reviewed (August 2008 for the New South Wales 
Root Cause Analysis provisions) the Review could consider the merits of having specific legislative recognition of Open 
Disclosure under Qualified Privilege, and the review could take into account the dynamics and details of the Open 
Disclosure process, including the status of pre-Open Disclosure notes. The Review could consider enacting sections 
specifically pertaining to Open Disclosure as it has done for Root Cause Analysis, on grounds that the Root Cause 
Analysis section be mirrored by an Open Disclosure section. Equally, the general Qualified Privilege and Quality Activity 
section could be reviewed to incorporate all incident management activities, rather than have separate provisions for Root 
Cause Analysis and Open Disclosure. For its part, Root Cause Analysis is covered under section S20Q (1): “A person who 
is or was a member of a RCA team and the relevant health service organisation for which the RCA team was appointed are 
neither competent nor compellable: a) to produce any document in his or her or its possession or under his or her or its 
control that was created by, at the request of and solely for the purposes of the RCA team, or b) to divulge or communicate 
any matter or thing that came to the notice of a member of the RCA team as such a member. (2) Subsection (1) does not 
apply to a requirement made in proceedings in respect of any act or omission by a RCA team or by a team member of a 
RCA team as a member”. S20R states: “A notification or report of a RCA team under s20O is not admissible as evidence in 
any proceedings that a procedure or practice is or was careless or inadequate”. 
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Table 4.3: Questions remaining (cont’d) 
 Questions remaining Relevant Interview Quotes 
 On the other hand, if Open Disclosure attracts 
Qualified Privilege (as quality improvement process), 
this could contravene the ethos of openness with 
which staff are to approach adverse event information. 
This, in turn, could risk Open Disclosure by restricting 
it in terms of who has access to such information. No-
fault legislation differs in that it provides staff with the 
certainty that proof of fault will not lead to litigation. 
 
2  Who can be invited to the Open Disclosure 
meeting(s)? Patients and family members set much 
store by being allowed to invite people to Open 
Disclosure meetings to support them. Staff 
interviewees have made comments about it being 
difficult to know where to draw the line between 
personal support and other kinds of support, and this 
impacting in different ways on the dynamics of the 
Open Disclosure meeting. For example, staff 
interviewees talk about consumers bringing friends 
who are lawyers and people who are local politicians.  
As a guiding principle, who can be invited to the Open 
Disclosure meeting should be informed by the aims of 
Open Disclosure itself: the provision of factual 
information to the patient, the expression of an 
apology and the explanation of the consequences of 
the adverse event to the patient. The relevant parties 
are therefore the patient, associated clinicians and the 
patient’s caregiver and/or next of kin.  Lawyers and 
politicians have means other than Open Disclosure of 
accessing information for reasons outside of the stated 
aims of Open Disclosure: FOI, Discovery, and 
published reports38.  
 
“I think the onus on management is to invite the next of 
kin… and give them a semi-open offer to bring with them 
whoever they choose. Having said that, you’ve then got 
to be careful about issues such as privacy … I attended 
[an Open Disclosure meeting] recently, where there was 
no family member present but there were significant 
friends … who didn’t have closure following a death, and 
they wanted information that they had no right to had 
because they weren’t relatives.”  
[Medical Manager 9-58]  
 
 
                                                     
38 Open Disclosure is not compulsory mediation or even a collaborative law process. The major aim of Open Disclosure is 
to provide factual information to the patient, an apology, and outline the medical consequences and future actions. Given 
that, only the immediate parties (i.e. clinicians, patient and patient support person in the form of the person caring for the 
patient or next of kin) should attend. To be sure, applying Qualified Privilege to Open Disclosure would nullify the problems 
generated by having lawyers there (or consumers wanting to tape-record or video the meeting; see below). Privilege would 
render information obtained in that way inadmissible in court. No-fault would further alleviate these problems. This brings 
us back to the point above: if the applicability of statutory Qualified Privilege or no-fault to Open Disclosure is made more 
certain, then such reform would provide certainty that adverse event information does not become an object of litigation 
(see point 4 below).  
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Table 4.3: Questions remaining (cont’d) 
 Questions remaining Relevant Interview Quotes 
3  In what ways can or should Open Disclosure 
meetings be (tape/video) recorded? Health care 
staff interviewees are uncertain about the extent to 
which audio and/or video recordings of the Open 
Disclosure meeting put them or their organisation at 
risk. Their main concern is that they ‘say the wrong 
thing’ (as can happen; see Table 3.6 above), and that 
such statement ends up being used against them.  
Others who are more confident in their attitude 
towards disclosure have fewer concerns about such 
recordings. This confidence may depend on 
experience in doing Open Disclosure meetings. 
Ultimately, Open Disclosure is not compulsory 
mediation or even a collaborative law process. The 
major aim of Open Disclosure is to provide factual 
information to the patient, an apology, and outline the 
medical consequences and future actions. To be sure, 
applying Qualified Privilege to Open Disclosure would 
nullify the problem generated by consumers wanting to 
tape-record or video the meeting (or by having a 
lawyer attend as support person, for that matter). 
Privilege would render information obtained 
inadmissible in court. No-fault would eradicate the 
problem altogether: if the applicability of statutory 
Qualified Privilege or no-fault to Open Disclosure is 
made more certain, then such reform would provide 
certainty that adverse event information does not 
become an object of (for) litigation.   
“I would not normally [allow tape-recording]. Personally I 
would not participate in a recorded session … because I 
think … that it hinders the relationships that you should 
be forming, the dialogue between yourself and the 
patients, and if you make a recording, even a good 
recording, it can’t pick up all the nuances that go on. 
What I have been prepared to do in the past is take 
minutes of the meeting and provide a draft of the 
minutes to the family and the patient. So I’m not averse 
to recording it but I’m against, well I personally wouldn’t 
take part in one with either a tape recorder or a video 
machine.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 29-46] 
“I think you have to be especially wary of it [tape-
recording] and would absolutely insist that, say a 
recording made locally for us as well, [we’d make] 
copies of that tape or we’d take away a recording at the 
same time.”  
[Senior Medical Manager 29-23] 
4 Should Australia consider introducing no-fault 
liability? The issue of no-fault liability has been 
previously considered in  Australia (Kirby, 2000: fn39). 
It was largely dismissed on grounds of constitutional 
civil rights and due to the political and legal problem of 
according special immunities to some professional 
groups whilst other groups face decreasing immunity. 
The results of the present empirical study suggest 
however that there may be a need to revisit no-fault, 
particularly given the (growing) complexity of adverse 
events, the resource-challenged nature of health care 
work, and the limited training staff are given to deal 
with organisational and communicative complexities.  
 
 
“‘Yes, we know people make mistakes, yes we 
acknowledge that ninety-nine percent of mistakes are 
innocent mistakes caused by a variety of factors that are 
generally outside the control of the individual and if you 
self-report, then you cannot be disciplined in any way, 
shape or form in relation to that error’, and it’s 
embedding into that system the culture of ‘Yes, we’re 
highly skilled professionals, but yes, we do make 
mistakes and we actually need to learn and act on those 
mistakes, and not blame.”  
[Support Personnel 35-6] 
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Table 4.3: Questions remaining (cont’d) 
 Questions remaining Relevant Interview Quotes 
 Further support for no-fault liability is that the 'reporting 
culture' and disclosure of incidents in health 
organisations improves. In New Zealand, for example, 
no-fault liability has been found to increase reporting 
of adverse events, and is on that basis argued to 
improve safety, quality, accountability and public value 




This concludes our report, but not the work. It is clear that Open Disclosure has inspired 
many frontline staff, but also that it is not yet embedded into clinicians’ everyday practices. 
Work needs to be done on how patients and family members regard Open Disclosure and 
on informing clinicians about what patients and family members find important. Work needs 
to be done on extending openness into other domains, such as informed consent and 
outcomes reporting. Work needs to be done on training staff in communicating with and 
listening to their patients and their families.  
Open Disclosure provides an opportunity for realising patient-centredness in a way that 
may re-invest health with Public Value (Moore, 1995): consumers becoming engaged in 
improving health services by being given the opportunity to speak about their care from 
their perspective; consumers speaking with those involved in adverse events and thereby 
understanding the pressures clinicians are under, and consumers becoming allies in health 
care provision and medical treatment by being listened to by those who care for them.  
We regard Open Disclosure as an innovative policy: it pre-empts complaints and litigation 
by encouraging staff to tell the truth. It is a 21st century policy that gives up on old-world 
oppositions between professional experts and the lay public; between risk management 
and truth, and between economics and ethics. As several health care staff interviewees 
said, ‘there is no going back’. We can now only move forward towards more ubiquitous 
disclosure, and towards more realistic engagement with the full array of complexities, 
achievements and shortcomings that characterise health service delivery.  
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APPENDIX A: A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS: THE INTERVIEWS 
Findings: Health Care Staff Interviews 
 
In total 131 interviews were conducted with health care staff between January and 
November 2007.  
 
1.  Analysis of the interview data confirms that health care staff support Open Disclosure:  
b. all of the 131 health care staff interviewed, without exception, expressed 
approval of the Open Disclosure initiative, confirming the high 
percentage approval expressed in the questionnaire survey responses 
c. Open Disclosure enhances relationships not just with consumers but 
also among health care staff themselves 
d. Open Disclosure is challenging because (particularly in the case of 
severe adverse events) it requires ongoing attention to how the various 
stakeholders see and experience responses and initiatives 
2.  The interview data reveal staff are uncertain about:  
a. how to decide whether to conduct Open Disclosure, and if so, whether it 
should be High or Low Level Open Disclosure  
b. their colleagues’ support of their disclosure of adverse events  
c. colleagues’ skills in disclosing adverse events  
d. the meaning of ‘disclosure of unexpected outcomes’  
1.  for most interviewees it is clear that Open Disclosure involves 
apologising, but for some the apology is not intrinsic to Open 
Disclosure   
2.  for many interviewees it is clear that Open Disclosure moves 
clinicians’ attention to the needs of the patient, but for others it 
remains defined as a process of medical-technical information 
dissemination, of explaining the occurrence of ‘known risks’, 
and in some instances, of justification of decisions taken and 
actions carried out 
3. Pre-planning encompasses the following tasks (table 3.4 below):  
 
a. Understand the adverse event, which involves: 
b. Establishing the (nursing, medical, allied health and administrative-
managerial) facts of the adverse event 
c. Deciding whether the adverse event requires High Level Open 
Disclosure or Low Level Open Disclosure  
d. Establishing whether the adverse event needs to be reported to the 
Coroner or Crown Solicitor  
e. Establishing whether there are any legal, insurance and financial 
implications (such as ex-gratia payments) and related information that 
needs to be gathered beforehand  
f. Assemble the team, which involves: 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 140
1. Establishing a reliable team of clinical and/or administrative-
managerial staff who can be drawn on for urgent High Level 
Open Disclosure meetings  
2. Enquiring into staff attitudes towards and feelings about the 
adverse event  
3. Determining who of the clinical staff to invite to the Open 
Disclosure meeting and to what extent it is necessary to involve 
them in a separate pre-planning meeting  
4. Deciding whether the person most closely involved in the 
incident should be invited to come to the Open Disclosure 
meeting 
5. Negotiating with staff who are attending the Open Disclosure 
meeting the disclosure strategy that is to be adopted; this 
planning needs to be done without risking the meeting’s 
authenticity 
6. Devising a strategy for junior staff who are involved in adverse 
events: whether they should be protected from confronting 
victims of (particularly serious) harm and talked to separately, 
or whether they should be invited to observe the Open 
Disclosure process, providing the Open Disclosure sessions 
are carefully selected so they are likely to benefit from 
observing them 
i. Assess the dynamics of the patient/family, which involves: 
1.  Finding out details about the patient’s and family’s reactions to 
the unexpected outcome  
2.  Determining who of the patient’s family should be invited to the 
meeting  
3. Identifying a family member as the single spokesperson and 
contact person; this is important to obviate different family 
members conducting unrelated conversations with staff 
 
ii. Plan the disclosure, which involves: 
1. Planning language to use and practising how to apologise given 
the specifics of the adverse event (without jeopardising the 
authenticity of the meeting) 
2. Preparing a strategy for and position on how to record the Open 
Disclosure meeting and whether to share that record with the 
patient (family) 
3. Arranging a suitable space for the Open Disclosure meeting; such 
space may need to be an isolated one in case privacy is needed 
for the expression of emotions; it needs to be one that has easy 
access and exit, one where there are no dangerous unattached 
(throw-able) objects, and one that has a low table with tissues 
and water (or tea) for everyone  
4. Determining when disclosure of adverse event information is not 
appropriate or needs to be deferred 
iii. Decide how to interface Open Disclosure with other Incident Management 
processes, which involves: 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 141
1. Deciding on how to interface Open Disclosure with Root Cause 
Analysis 
2. Deciding to what extent to involve consumers in these 
investigation processes 
4. Doing Open Disclosure encompasses (table 3.6 below):  
i. Excellence in Communication 
1. Saying sorry sincerely 
2. Active (reflective) listening 
3. Dealing with complex patient and family dynamics 
4. Determining the cultural appropriateness of Open Disclosure in 
situation where one deals with patients and families with culturally 
and linguistically diverse backgrounds 
5. Ensuring Open Disclosure avoids conflicting and/or unverifiable 
accounts 
6. Deciding how the desired level of privacy and confidentiality 
affects the use and dissemination of disclosure information 
ii.  ‘Organisational Citizenship 
1. Distinguishing between conventional ways of dealing with ‘known 
risks’ and the openness and no-blame ethos of Open Disclosure 
2. Managing staff who are most closely involved in the incident and 
support their needs 
3. Taking responsibility for addressing and resolving unexpected 
outcomes even if those outcomes were not produced by one’s 
own unit, department or facility 
 
5.  Interviewees expect that frontline staff will behave in the following ways to realise Open 
Disclosure:  
b. Approach ‘complications’ and ‘known risks’ as adverse events potentially 
requiring Open Disclosure 
c. Make themselves available for pre-planning and conduct of Open Disclosure 
meeting(s) 
d.  In cases where they were closely involved in the incident, consider and 
discuss with others the possibility of attending the Open Disclosure 
meeting(s) and the implications of doing so 
e. Skill themselves in eliciting from patients (and family members) perceptions 
and feelings to establish whether the disclosure satisfies their needs and 
expectations 
f. Show in what they do and say that disclosure communication is integral (not 
peripheral) to their clinical-professional role and skills 
g.  Acknowledge that Open Disclosure requires learning from the adverse 
events that is not purely technical and systems-based, but also team-based, 
interpersonal, and even personal, in so far as that each disclosure inevitably 
reshapes the patient-clinician relationship 
 
6.  Interviewees propose the following strategies for following up Open Disclosure meetings: 
h.  Patient-oriented follow-up strategies 
i. Make sure that the patient and the family spokesperson can contact 
a designated staff member 
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ii. Send out a letter out to the patient (and family) within 48 hours that 
summarises the Open Disclosure discussion and, if there was one, 
the plan that was agreed on  
iii. Offer the possibility of additional Open Disclosure meetings 
iv. Be pro-active in organising additional Open Disclosure meetings 
v. Ensure the follow-up meeting(s) are appropriately timed 
i.  Staff-oriented follow-up 
i. Involve staff in a factual debrief 
ii. Involve staff in an emotional debrief (following an adverse event 
and/or an Open Disclosure meeting) 
j.   Organisation-oriented follow-up 
i. For staff in charge of Open Disclosure, liaise with those engaged in 
Root Cause Analysis 
ii. Systematically record the Open Disclosure process, and keep 
records in pre-allocated places (The conduct of Open Disclosure 
follow-up processes will benefit from a well-developed in-house 
adverse event register) 
iii. Arrange monthly meetings among those involved in doing Open 
Disclosure (A Community Advisory Committee involvement is 
recommended to signal progress of Open Disclosure roll-out in the 
organisation and publicise the level of its success to members of 
the community) 
 
7. Interviewees see the following as constituting success factors: 
k. Communication success factors 
i. Staff are proficient in Active Listening or Reflective Listening 
ii. Staff display and enact sincerity 
iii. Staff maintain good inter-disciplinary communication and relationships 
l. Service success factors 
i. Clinicians have a pre-established rapport with the patient (and family) 
ii. Bereavement counselling is available for patients and family members 
iii. Minimal chance exists that there will be conflicting accounts of adverse 
events  
iv. Staff enact restorative justice  
m.  Organisational success factors 
i. Staff training and general roll-out of Open Disclosure is arranged 
ii. Medical staff participate in Open Disclosure training 
iii. The organisation has efficient staff support measures in place 
iv. Incident management is effective and supportive; that is: 
1. Organisational-structural prerequisites (incident reporting, 
investigation and feedback) have been put in place 
2. Rapid turn-around of and access to adverse event information 
occurs through the health service’s incident reporting system 
3. Staff self-report adverse events 
4. Service-internal notification outweighs external notification of 
adverse events 
5. Reassurance is given that reporting will not incur blame on the 
part of the health service or colleagues  
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6. Staff are familiar with the types of adverse events that require 
Open Disclosure  
7. A ‘single adverse event desk’39 has been set up 
 
8. Interviewees propose the following as constituting challenges: 
n. Internal challenges 
i. Emotional challenges 
1. Multi-cultural sensitivity is crucial and resource-intensive 
2. Staff may not sufficiently appreciate the emotional labour that is 
needed for Open Disclosure  
3. Open Disclosure can exacerbate the clinician-patient (family) 
relationship  
ii. Technical-administrative challenges 
1. The resource requirements of Open Disclosure may exceed what 
clinicians and/or organisations can provide 
2. Clinicians need to engage more in work process mapping, design 
and research-based feedback 
3. Primary and tertiary care are misaligned in their communications 
with the patient 
o. External challenges 
i. Consumers may mobilise Freedom of Information and/or Discovery 
legislation to force the release of health and clinical information 
ii. Outside institutions (the media, agenda-driven bodies) promote and 
demand blame 
 
Summary of the Findings: The Consumer Interviews 
 
1. The interviews reveal that:  
a. Thirteen out of twenty-three consumer interviewees judge their Open Disclosure 
experience not to have been successful (or not successful enough) 
b. Few consumers express regret about participating in Open Disclosure  
c. Only in a minority of cases do consumers report not having experienced any benefit 
at all from participating in Open Disclosure 
 
2. Patients and family members express appreciation about: 
a. Being informed about who (which staff) plays what role in Open Disclosure  
b. Being given a sincere apology 
c. Being attentively listened to  
d. Staff approaching Open Disclosure as an information dissemination exercise and as 
a grief management process 
e. Being allowed to make contact with those most closely involved in the adverse event 
if that desire is there 
f. Having the open disclosure meeting conducted with an appropriate level of respect 
for cultural and linguistic diversity 
                                                     
39 Such a ‘desk’ encompasses a pre-determined set of people who share access to a location where relevant information 
and documentation are securely stored. 
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g. Being enabled to plan ahead, and supported in conceptualising their practical, 
personal and emotional needs in the future 
h. Organisations showing they can learn and have learned from their adverse event and 
will or have put processes in place to prevent similar events from occurring again 
 
3. Consumers express concern about Open Disclosure in so far that: 
b. The patient and/or family is not always involved in determining the severity of an 
adverse event 
c. The patient and/or family are not always allowed sufficient time to pre-plan for Open 
Disclosure (and prepare questions and statements, as well as to come to terms with 
the consequences and meaning of the harm done) 
d. Open Disclosure meetings are not always scheduled appropriately, attended 
punctually, or given enough time 
e. Patients and family members are not always supported in ensuring that a 
patient/family support person is present during the Open Disclosure meeting(s) 
f. Apologies may be offered by staff other than those originally involved in or present at 
the adverse event 
g. Serious adverse events may not be handled according to minimal Open Disclosure 
standards 
i. disclosure of high severity adverse events can resemble Low Level 
Open Disclosure in that it is done with insufficient procedural 
formalisation  
ii. disclosure of high severity adverse events is insufficiently attuned to 
consumers’ sense of interpersonal dignity and social expectation 
h. A patient liaison person or patient safety official acts as buffer between the health 
organisation and the clinical professionals on the one hand, and the patient and 
family on the other hand 
i. support personnel limit the support available for patients and families to 
social-emotional support 
ii. reliance on support personnel risks organisations not achieving tangible 
involvement on the part of clinical professionals in disclosure, 
reparation and learning from the incident and from the consumer 
i. There may be an inverse relation between severity of the incident and facilities’ 
approach to Open Disclosure with consumers’ interviews suggesting that 
i. the less the health care facility regards itself to be responsible for the 
adverse event, the better it is deemed to inform and support those 
harmed 
ii. the more the system is (or staff working in the system are) seen to be at 
fault, the less likely it is (they are) to be supportive of consumers, and 
the less open it is (they are) to consumers  
j. The health care facility representatives determine whether closure has been 
achieved without appropriately involving the family or patient  
 
4. Consumers articulate the following risks presented by Open Disclosure: 
a. Staff fail to recognise there is dissatisfaction on the part of the family and/or patient 
as a result of how the disclosure is done, exacerbating rather than improving 
relationships 
b. Staff change their position or view on what happened without adequate explanation, 
thereby creating uncertainty 
c. Staff contradict one another, thereby exacerbating uncertainty 
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d. The health care facility moves patients to neighbouring hospitals (due to deterioration 
or improvement) without adequate Open Disclosure continuity and involvement in the 
adverse event history of staff at the second facility 
e. Family members are denied access to clinical-medical information pertaining to the 
patient’s care (on grounds of privacy legislation) 
f. Disclosure may be initiated by staff employed in sites other than that where the 
adverse event occurred without such staff recognising the need to take appropriate 
steps to ensure Open Disclosure occurs, thereby burdening patients and family with 
distressing information and with the task of acting on that information (alerting the 
original health care facility) without the benefit of clinical, professional or 
organisational experience and support. 
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APPENDIX B: THE OPEN DISCLOSURE EVALUATION – TENDER SPECIFICATIONS 




Criteria indicating progress and 
success 
C 





The first phase (55 days) 
encompassed the planning and 
organising of the project, including 
applying for Ethics approval from 
relevant institutions, developing 
and piloting the survey 
questionnaire, identifying and 
arranging (phone-conferenced) 
meetings with stakeholders 
(clinicians, patients, carers) at 
main sites to negotiate the details 
of the project, and planning visits 
to case study sites. 
1. Ethics applications submitted to 
Health departmental Human 
Research Ethics Committees 
across Australia, and to UTS, UoM 
and UQ HRECs 
2. Ethics approval obtained from 
UTS, UoM and UQ Human 
Research Ethics Committees, and 
from relevant health departmental 
agencies 
3. questionnaire survey developed, 
piloted and validated  
4. meetings arranged with 
stakeholders at sites 
























The second phase (60 days) 
centred on administering the 
questionnaire surveys, meeting 
with and interviewing stakeholders. 
1. questionnaire surveys 
administered and reasonable 
response rate achieved 
2. representative number of 
stakeholders interviewed at sites 
or by phone 
3. Open Disclosure sessions 
observed and recorded 
 











The third phase of the project (30 
days) encompassed data analysis. 
This involved processing the 
survey questionnaire information, 
interpreting and triangulating 
multiple data sources, formulating 
project recommendations and 
suggestions, and producing an 
interim report. 
1. survey data processed and 
interview and questionnaire data 
analysis completed 
2. outcomes from interview and 
observational studies triangulated 
with survey data 
3. initial project recommendations 
formulated for interim report, 
delivered 29 June 2007 




Section 3: Interview data 
analysis; Appendix E (survey 
result tables)  
 
 






The fourth and last phase of the 
project included further data 
collection, data analysis, report 
writing, negotiating draft versions 
of the report with the 
commissioning agency, and 
finalising the project report for 
submission. 
1. draft version of report submitted to 
commissioning agency for 
comment on 30 November 2007 
2. final report submitted  
3. draft of academic paper prepared 




3. First paper attached in 
Appendix. 
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APPENDIX C: THE OPEN DISCLOSURE EVALUATION – Interview Details 
 
This section provides details of those respondents and their sites whose data form the 
basis of this report. The data collection proceeded as follows. To date, 154 interviews 
have been conducted, 24 in NSW, 33 in Victoria, 68 in QLD and 29 in SA. In total, 23 
interviews were conducted with patients and family members (15 patients and 8 family 
members) and 131 interviews with health professionals.  
 
Figure A.1: Number Of Interviews Conducted In Each    Figure A.2: Total Number Of Interviews  











A full table of interviews conducted is presented below. The family member interviews 
ranged from 11:21 minutes to 39:15 minutes; the patient interviews from 15:08 minutes to 
59:54 minutes; the health professional interviews from 13:00 minutes to 1:58:33 hour. 
More than half of the interviews (81) were conducted over the phone and 73 interviews 
face-to-face. 
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Table A.1: Number Of Interviews Conducted At Open Disclosure Pilot Sites 
 
 
                                                     
40 These facilities have been de-identified for reasons of confidentiality. 
Facility40 # of nursing interviews 
# of medical 
interviews 
# of patient/family 
interviews 




Interviews conducted in Victoria 
Hospital 1  2   2 
Hospital 2 2 3 3  8 
Hospital 3 2 6  1 9 
Hospital 4 1  2  3 
Hospital 5 1 1  2 4 
Hospital 6 1 1  4 6 
Interviews conducted in South Australia 
Hospital 7 2 7  3 12 
Hospital 8 4 2 2 1 9 
Hospital 9 3 1  3 7 
Interviews conducted in Queensland 
Hospital 10    3 3 
Hospital 11  5 2 2 9 
Hospital 12 2 1 3 4 10 
Hospital 13  2  2 4 
Hospital 14  8 3 11 22 
Hospital 15  1 7 6 14 
Hospital 16  1  4 5 
Interviews conducted in New South Wales 
Hospital 17    5 5 
Hospital 18 1 2  5 8 
Hospital 19  2 1 2 5 
Hospital 20 1   1 2 
Hospital 21  4   4 
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APPENDIX D: ETHICS SUBMISSIONS 
 
This section sets out the ethics applications that have been approved, those that were not 
approved and those that were significantly delayed. 
Approvals 
In total, 28 Human Research Ethics Committees have approved the National Open 
Disclosure Evaluation Study:  
 
o Victorian sites include:  
 The Alfred Hospital, initial approval granted 2nd January 2007, 
approval withdrawn on 20th March 2007, approval re-instated on 27th 
August 2007 
 Barwon Health, 12th December 2006 
 Northeast Wangaratta, 15th December 2006 
 St Vincent’s Hospital, 8th March 2007 
 West Gippsland, 2nd June 2007 
 Eastern Health, 9th July 2007 
 
o Tasmanian sites include:  
 Southern Tasmania Health, 8th March 2007 
 
o South Australian sites include:  
 Flinders Medical Centre, 28th February 2007 
 Lyell McEwin Hospital, 28th May 2007 
 Children’s, Youth and Women’s Health Service, 2nd June 2007 
 
o Queensland sites include:  
 Cairns, 1st March 2007 
 Rockhampton, 20th June 2007 
 Townsville, 24th April 2007 
 Bundaberg, 23rd April 2007 
 University of Queensland, 5th May 2007 
 Princess Alexandra Hospital; Queen Elizabeth II Hospital, 24th April 
2007 
 Uniting Health Care, 6th June 2007 
 Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital, 10th September 2007 
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o New South Wales sites include:  
 Prince of Wales Hospital, 14th February 2007 
 Wollongong Hospital, 13th April 2007 
 Nepean Hospital, 3rd May 2007 
 Dubbo Base Hospital, 19th April 2007 
 Wyong Hospital, 29th March 2007 
 Royal North Hospital, 19th April 2007 
 Manning Base Hospital, 22nd May 2007 
 Griffith Base Hospital, 15th May 2007 
 Liverpool Hospital, 22nd June 2007 
 University of Technology, 20th February 2007 
Sites where our ethics applications have not been approved 
• Our ethics application to Wodonga Human Research Ethics Committee was not 
approved on the grounds that (correspondence of 9th May 2007): “the internal site 
researcher may have a conflict of interest by being expected to be both observer 
and active participant in the organisation of the Open Disclosure project, and also 
possibly being involved in post-sessions supporting staff”. 
 
• Our ethics application to ACT Health Human Research Ethics Committee was not 
approved because the research team was unable to obtain information from ACT 
Health and inform to the HREC committee about the Canberra hospital site where 
the project would take place (correspondence of 15 June 2007).  
 
• Our ethics application to Sydney South West Area Health Service (Royal Prince 
Alfred Hospital zone) was not approved on 19th September because the committee 
felt that the evaluation was premature given that the Open Disclosure process had 
not yet commenced in the Sydney South West Area Health Service. 
 
• Our ethics application to North Coast Area Health Service was not approved on 1st 
September 2007 because the research team was unable to address issues the 
committee had asked to be addressed before the study could be approved. The 
research team was further unable to secure management support because the 
Open Disclosure process had not yet commenced in that Area Health Service.  
 
Delayed ethics submissions 
Submission of ethics applications to the following sites were delayed and therefore 
abandoned due to problems affecting the identification of internal investigators or the need 
to obtain management approval: Bendigo Healthcare Group, Southern Health, Goulburn 
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APPENDIX E: ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS USED  
Abbreviations 
ACQSHC Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in Health Care 
OD Open Disclosure 
QH Queensland Health 
Glossary of terms used in this report and their definitions41  
Adverse event An incident in which harm resulted to a person receiving care. 
Attitude A taken-as-given way of thinking and talking, often evolved over years of 
socialisation and education. 
Communication Practices of meaning and sense making which are to some degree 
standardised. Communication usually occurs when there is a difference affecting 
what people do, know, believe, or want to happen, and this difference is to be 
resolved through symbolic exchange (compare: interaction). 
Conflict A kind of interaction or communication which is motivated by excess difference 
whose resolution remains unachieved. 
Context The sphere of the taken-for-granted. Context includes kinds of knowing as well 
as physical dimensions which make up ‘setting’. 
Control A mode of communication and/or interaction oriented towards determining what 
others do and say (compare: power). 
Culture The configuration of attitude and meanings which together can be seen to be 
definitive of ‘what people are’ or ‘where people come from’. Culture can be seen 
as a ‘state’ or something people possess, while it appears more fruitful to regard 
it as a performance, or process. 
Difference Difference is an informational-communicational imbalance: some know or have 
different things compared to others and people’s attempts to resolve such 
differences involve communication as a form of symbolic exchange. Some 
differences may be incommensurable, and no amount of communication may be 
able to resolve it. Much here depends on people’s stances or attitudes as to 
whether they are interested in bridging difference. 
Discourse ethics This term references the view that people’s ethical stance is not arbitrary to the 
way they conduct themselves in interaction, and to how they communicate. The 
focus here is on the process of communication itself, besides what is talked or 
written about, or its substance. Discourse ethics manifests in terms of specific 
speaking rules that are imposed on the communication event. For example, 
people shall not be interrupted; no two people shall speak at once, respectful 
language shall be used, and so forth. 
Ethnography A technique used for describing what human beings do in selected settings, 
usually comprising ‘participant observation’, field notes, narrative accounts, 
interviews, and the like (cf. transformative ethnography). 
                                                     
41 Some of these definitions have been adopted from the Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care Shared 
Meanings project glossary. 
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Ethos A set of values or attitudes that govern what people do, believe, feel or say. 
Evaluation The systematic examination of a policy, program or project aimed at assessing 
its merit, value, worth, relevance or contribution.  
Face-to-face Communication which takes place in situations of co-presence (where two or 
more people are present in time and space). 
Formative 
Evaluation 
Evaluation conducted during a course of a policy’s, program’s or project’s life, 
with the aim to help in its development and improve it, assess process rather 
than outcomes (cf summative evaluation), and provide detailed, diagnostic 
answers rather than concise and unambiguous answers (cf summative 
evaluation). 
Incident An event or circumstance which could have or did lead to unintended and/or 
unnecessary harm to a person, and/or complaint, loss or damage. 
Information A kind of communication which has somehow been displaced from people’s 
concerns in the ‘here and now’, so as to embody a more distant, general and 
sometimes abstract significance. 
Interaction The actions which people can engage in when aiming to accomplish a task (e.g. 
passing bags of sand along a chain of people in case of a flood). Communication 
is a specialised kind of interaction (compare: communication). 
Interactive 
evaluation 
Evaluation will provide information about the delivery and implementation of a 
program, selected component or activity (Owen & Rogers, 1999). 
Interests/ 
concerns 
Issues which (can) motivate people’s communications and/or interactions, and 
which rate highly in terms of people’s sense of rightness, truth, or well-being. 
Liability Liability is the result of committing a breach of legal responsibility, duty or 
obligation.  It means being answerable and chargeable for the breach of 
responsibility, duty or obligation.  Liability can be civil or criminal, depending 
upon the nature of the responsibility, duty or obligation. For example, liability 
may arise from provisions in a contact, from professional negligence, through 
obligations and duties imposed under statute law, as well as from equitable 
obligations and duties such as a breach of fiduciary duty.     
Miscommuni-
cation 
An effect of the way(s) in which we have structured, or failed to structure, our 
communications with others. At a simple level, miscommunication may include 
minor errors, like forgetting information that is not absolutely crucial or central to 
the work, as well as major errors, which affect the quality and outcomes of the 
work. Seen from a systemic or organisational level, miscommunication is a term 
which can be applied (as a form of critique) to what workers may perceive as 
‘routine’ aspects of how they work; for example, conveying crucial information 
‘off the top of people’s heads’ creates risks in so far as issues are easily 
forgotten or get ‘skewed’ in the process of communication; speaking to people 
without writing down what is said; not speaking to people who ought to have 
been spoken to; using single paper copies of documents crucial to the work 
process, and so on. Miscommunication, then, besides uttering statements that 
are inaccurate, also encompasses statements arising from inappropriate 
assumptions about the use of different modes of communication. 
Open Disclosure An open, consistent approach to communicating with patients when things go 
wrong in health care. This includes expressing regret for what has happened, 
keeping the patient informed, providing feedback on investigations and the steps 
taken to prevent a recurrence of the adverse event.  
Patient 
centredness 
Patient centredness has been characterised as requiring a biopsychosocial 
perspective, seeing the ‘patient-as-person’, sharing power and responsibility, 
establishing the therapeutic alliance, and conducting being the doctor ‘as person’ 
(Stewart & Martinez-Lucio, 1998). 
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Positioning The way in which we see ourselves as relating to others, and how this translates 
in what we say, how much we (presume to be able to) say, how we say it, and 
so on. Some people are known as arrogant: their positioning is predictably 
dismissive of others’ views and feelings. Other people are known as considerate: 
their positioning is more often than not observant of others’ concerns.  
Power In traditional accounts, power is the means through which some people can get 
others to do things which they would otherwise not do. This is its ‘negative’ 
definition. In more recent accounts, a more ‘positive’ definition has been put 
forward: power is the totality of actions that contributes to the realisation and 
maintenance of a practice, social institution, or productive organisation. In this 
latter view, power is less about the authority some have over others, as about 
the productivity or products which a community of people can be seen to be 
responsible for and implicated in.  This kind of productivity involves mobilising 
not merely what individuals can do, but what materials and technologies can do. 
Power, then, is a complex of people, their practices, their levels of experience 
and contribution, and all the various ways in which their skills are technologised 
and spatialised (compare: control).  
Practice A term which references a particular and relatively routinised and ritualised way 
of doing or saying.  
Practice 
improvement 
An approach to work that is anchored in routines of measuring, analysing, 
intervening and observing of the effects of the change intervention, with the aim 
of enhancing outcomes.  
Risk 
management 
Risk management centres on the attempt to minimise risks in organisations. 
Recent approaches to risk management prefer to regard risk as capital, in order 
to deploy risk as a source of organisational learning. 
Speech genre This is a particular way of structuring our spoken communications with others: 
‘ward rounds’ are a speech genre, and so are ‘family conferences’. Open 
Disclosure is also a speech genre, albeit an inchoate one. 
Standard A standard sets out specifications and/or procedures designed to ensure that a 
material, product, method or service is fir for the purpose and consistently 
performs the way in which it was intended 
Suffering Suffering involves experiencing anything subjectively unpleasant, which may 
include: pain, malaise, nausea and/or vomiting, loss, depression, agitation, 
alarm, fear, grief or humiliation. 
Summative 
evaluation 
Evaluation conducted at the end of a policy’s, program’s or project’s life to 
assess the overall effectiveness and to certify outcomes in concise and 
unambiguous terms (cf formative evaluation). 
Systematisation The practice of formally mapping the broad outlines of what we do, in an 
attempt to see how what we do on a day-to-day basis measures up against our 
impressions and expectations about the outcomes and quality of what we do. In 
effect, systematisation start with notation, through which we engender reflexivity 
and change. In general, communication relies on systematising how we 
exchange meanings. Social life, in that sense, is conditional upon a modicum of 
systematisation for people to be able to enact it and predict its unfolding. 
The floor This is a technical socio-linguistic term for ‘the space where we (assume the 
right to) speak’: ‘s/he always assumes a right to the floor over others’. Someone 
who ‘takes the floor more than others’ may not be speaking according to the 
rules put forward within discourse ethics. 
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You are invited to complete the following questions relating to open disclosure by 
ticking or circling your response, or by providing comments. There are three sections 
to the survey.  
• Section 1 contains demographic questions and the extent to which you have 
participated in open disclosure sessions.  
• Section 2 has questions about your specific experiences of open disclosure.  
• Section 3 involves questions about open disclosure policies and practices in your 
organisation.  
 
The definition we have applied to open disclosure is the following: honestly telling 
patients or family members about unexpected harm that occurs as a result of 
treatment or care, which is not directly caused by a patient’s illness or underlying 
condition. 
 
Please return the survey in the reply paid envelope.  
 
 
Thank you for your time and support. 
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Section 1. Demographics 
 
Tick or write your responses where appropriate.  
 
1.What is your professional background?  
 
Medicine   
Nursing    
Pharmacy   
Other:     Please specify_______________________________ 
 
2.What is your gender? 
 
Male   
Female    
 
 
3. What is your age? _______________ years. 
 
4a.  What is your current position in your organisation?  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
4b. In what type of hospital do you work? 
 Metropolitan   Regional   Rural   
 
5.  How many years have you worked in health care? (since you gained your  
initial qualification) _________ years 
 
6. What percentage of your present work time do you spend on management  
duties? ______% 
 
7.What percentage of your present work time do you spend on clinical duties? 
_____% 
 
8. Have you undertaken any training in open disclosure?   
          Yes    No   
 If no, skip to item 12.1. 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
 156
 
9.What form did the training take? (tick as many as appropriate) 
Structured presentation or course    
A colleague explained the process    
Online education      
CD/DVD education    
Self-directed Reading     
Other:        Please specify_______________ 
 
10.   The training I received provided me with the skills to take part in an open 
disclosure of an adverse incident to a patient.  
 
Strongly agree   Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly disagree 
                                      
 
11.  Have you ever attended an open disclosure session?   
Yes     No       
 
If your answer is ‘No’ skip to item 13.1 
 
How many sessions have you attended?  _________ 
 
How many sessions have you led?  _________ 
 
Section 2. Your experiences of open disclosure  
 
12.  Indicate from your typical experience in open disclosure sessions your  
agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Please circle your  

















12.1 The explanation given of 
what has happened to the 
patients is accurate. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.2 The consequences of 
the event are clearly 
explained to the patients. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.3 The information is given 
in a way that the patients 
seem to understand. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.4 The explanations are 
given sympathetically. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.5 An apology is made to 
the patients. 
 5 4 3 2 1 
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12.6. The harm that the 
patients have experienced is 
acknowledged by the health 
professional leading the 
session. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.7 If responsibility for the 
harm done to patients is 
highly evident, this 
responsibility is 
acknowledged by health 
professionals in attendance. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.8 The patients have the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.9 The patients are told 
that steps are taken to avoid 
adverse incidents occurring 
again. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.10 An offer is made to 
share with the patients the 
findings of any further 
investigation into the causes 
of the specific incident. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.11 The patients are 
invited to an Open Disclosure 
meeting within a reasonable 
timeframe following the 
incident. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.12 The health 
professionals who explain the 
events are known to the 
patient. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.13 A support person for 
the patient is present (or 
readily available) 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.14 The patients are told 
what steps are being taken to 
manage the event.  
5 4 3 2 1 
12.15 The patients are told 
what steps are being taken to 
prevent a recurrence of the 
incident. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.16 The patients seem to 
appreciate being honestly 
informed through open 
disclosure. 
5 4 3 2 1 
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12.17 Patients appreciate 
receiving information through 
open disclosure. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.18 Patients become angry 
when informed about adverse 
incidents. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.19 Patients’ families 
appreciate receiving 
information through an open 
disclosure session. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.20 Open Disclosure is 
structured as an ongoing, 
iterative process. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.21 Families often become 
angry when informed of 
adverse incidents. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.22 I feel satisfied with the 
outcome of the open 
disclosure sessions I have 
attended. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.23 Health professionals 
involved in open disclosure 
are often upset by patients’ 
and families responses. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.24 Health professionals 
involved in open disclosure 
sessions receive strong 
support from their 
colleagues. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.25 Health professionals 
involved in open disclosure 
receive strong support from 
hospital managers. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.26 The outcomes of the 
open disclosure sessions I 
have attended are 
satisfactory for the 
organisation. 
5 4 3 2 1 
12.27 Overall I think 
patients’ well-being benefits 
from open disclosure. 
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Section 3. Open disclosure policies and practices in your organisation 
 
Indicate from your typical experience in open disclosure sessions your agreement or 

















13.1 The organisation where 
I work supports an open 
disclosure policy. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.2 The organisation where 
I work provides education for 
staff in open disclosure 
practices. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.3 Health professionals 
worry about litigation if an 
adverse incident is disclosed 
to patients. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.4 Health professionals 
worry about their 
professional reputations if 
they are involved in an 
adverse incident requiring 
open disclosure. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.5 The organisation is 
fearful that open disclosure 
will lead to bad publicity. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.6 Only severe adverse 
incidents are openly disclosed 
in my organisation. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.7 Patients are not 
informed about less severe 
adverse incidents involving 
their care and treatment. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.8 This organisation acts 
promptly to set up open 
disclosure of an adverse 
incident. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.9 I am in favour of open 
disclosure of all adverse 
incidents to patients. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.10 In my experience open 
disclosure reduces litigation. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.11 Open disclosure 
practices reduce patients’ 
faith in their health 
professionals. 
5 4 3 2 1 
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13.12 In my experience open 
disclosure leads to 
improvement in the quality of 
health care delivered. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.13 Open disclosure causes 
patients and their families 
unnecessary distress. 
5 4 3 2 1 
13.14 Open disclosure causes 
health professionals involved 
unnecessary stress. 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
14.    Is there anything you would like to change about the way open disclosure is  



















Thank you very much for your time and input
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APPENDIX G: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY RESULT TABLES 
 
Section 1. Demographics 
 
1) What is your professional background? 
 
  




 Medicine 32 40.0 40.0 40.0 
  Nursing 45 56.3 56.3 96.3 
  Allied Health 2 2.5 2.5 98.8 
  Other 1 1.3 1.3 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
2) What is your gender? 
 
  




 Male 38 47.5 47.5 47.5
  Female 42 52.5 52.5 100.0
  Total 80 100.0 100.0  
 
 
3) What is your age? 
 
  




 20-39 years 17 21.3 25.0 25.0 
  40-49 years 26 32.5 38.2 63.2 
  50-59 years 24 30.0 35.3 98.5 
  Above 59 1 1.3 1.5 100.0 
  Total 68 85.0 100.0   
 Missing  12 15.0    
Total 80 100.0    
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4a) In what type of hospital do you work? 
 
  





n 41 51.3 51.3 51.3
  Regional 26 32.5 32.5 83.8
  Rural 13 16.3 16.3 100.0
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
4b) In which state do you work? 
 
  




 NSW 13 16.3 16.3 16.3
  QLD 37 46.3 46.3 62.5
  VIC 17 21.3 21.3 83.8
  SA 13 16.3 16.3 100.0
  Total 80 100.0 100.0  
 
 
5) How many years have you worked in health care? 
 
  




 1-9 years 6 7.5 7.6 7.6 
  10-19 years 15 18.8 19.0 26.6 
  20-29 years 33 41.3 41.8 68.4 
  30-39 years 23 28.8 29.1 97.5 
  More than 39 
years 2 2.5 2.5 100.0 
  Total 79 98.8 100.0   
 Missing  1 1.3    
Total 80 100.0    
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6) What percentage of your time to you spend on management duties? 
 
  




 0% 2 2.5 2.5 2.5
  1%-49% 19 23.8 23.8 26.3
  50%-99% 35 43.8 43.8 70.0
  100% 24 30.0 30.0 100.0
  Total 80 100.0 100.0  
 
 
7) What percentage of your time do you spend on clinical duties? 
 
  




 0% 26 32.5 32.5 32.5
  1%-49% 23 28.8 28.8 61.3
  50%-99% 29 36.3 36.3 97.5
  100% 2 2.5 2.5 100.0
  Total 80 100.0 100.0  
 
 
8) Have you undertaken any training in Open Disclosure? 
 
  




 Yes 62 77.5 77.5 77.5
  No 18 22.5 22.5 100.0
  Total 80 100.0 100.0  
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9) What form did the training take? 
 
  




 Structured presentation 
or course 46 57.5 76.7 76.7 
  A colleague explained 
the process 4 5.0 6.7 83.3 
  Self-directed reading 1 1.3 1.7 85.0 
  Course and self-
directed reading 6 7.5 10.0 95.0 
  Course and a colleague 
explained the process 2 2.5 3.3 98.3 
  Course, online 
education, CD and self-
directed reading 
1 1.3 1.7 100.0 
  Total 60 75.0 100.0   
 Missing  20 25.0    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
10) The training provided me with the skills to take part in an Open Disclosure session 
 
  




 Unsure 4 5.0 6.7 6.7 
  Agree 36 45.0 60.0 66.7 
  Strongly 
agree 20 25.0 33.3 100.0 
  Total 60 75.0 100.0   
 Missing  20 25.0    
Total 80 100.0    
 
  
11a) Have you attended an Open Disclosure session? 
 
  




 Yes 63 78.8 87.5 87.5
  No 9 11.3 12.5 100.0
  Total 72 90.0 100.0  
 Missing  8 10.0   
Total 80 100.0   
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11b) How many Open Disclosure sessions have you attended? 
 
  




 1-2 28 35.0 46.7 46.7 
  3-9 21 26.3 35.0 81.7 
  10 or more 11 13.8 18.3 100.0 
  Total 60 75.0 100.0   
 Missing  20 25.0    
Total 80 100.0    
 
  
11c) How many Open Disclosure sessions have you led? 
 
  




 0 26 32.5 44.1 44.1 
  1-2 14 17.5 23.7 67.8 
  3-9 9 11.3 15.3 83.1 
  10 and more 10 12.5 16.9 100.0 
  Total 59 73.8 100.0   
 Missing  21 26.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
Section 2. Your experiences of open disclosure  
 
12.1) The explanation given of what has happened to the patients is accurate 
 
  




 Unsure 2 2.5 2.7 2.7 
  Agree 35 43.8 46.7 49.3 
  Strongly 
agree 38 47.5 50.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
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12.2) The consequences of the event are clearly explained to the patients 
 
  




 Disagree 3 3.8 4.0 4.0 
  Unsure 2 2.5 2.7 6.7 
  Agree 30 37.5 40.0 46.7 
  Strongly 
agree 40 50.0 53.3 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
  
12.3) The information is given in a way that the patients seem to understand 
 
  




 Disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Unsure 6 7.5 8.0 9.3 
  Agree 39 48.8 52.0 61.3 
  Strongly 
agree 29 36.3 38.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.4) The explanations are given sympathetically 
 
  




 Unsure 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Agree 28 35.0 37.3 38.7 
  Strongly 
agree 46 57.5 61.3 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
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12.5) An apology is made to the patient 
 
  




 Disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Unsure 2 2.5 2.7 4.0 
  Agree 25 31.3 33.3 37.3 
  Strongly 
agree 47 58.8 62.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.6) The harm that the patients have experienced is acknowledged by the health 
professional leading the session 
 
  




 Disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Unsure 1 1.3 1.3 2.7 
  Agree 30 37.5 40.0 42.7 
  Strongly 
agree 43 53.8 57.3 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.7) If responsibility for the harm done to patients is highly evident, this responsibility is 
acknowledged by health professionals in attendance 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.4 1.4 
  Disagree 3 3.8 4.1 5.4 
  Unsure 8 10.0 10.8 16.2 
  Agree 30 37.5 40.5 56.8 
  Strongly agree 32 40.0 43.2 100.0 
  Total 74 92.5 100.0   
 Missing  6 7.5    
Total 80 100.0    
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12.8) The patients have the opportunity to ask questions 
 
  




 Agree 19 23.8 25.3 25.3 
  Strongly 
agree 56 70.0 74.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.9) The patients are told that steps are taken to avoid adverse events occurring again 
 
  




 Unsure 2 2.5 2.7 2.7 
  Agree 31 38.8 41.3 44.0 
  Strongly 
agree 42 52.5 56.0 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.10) An offer is made to share with the patients the findings of any further investigation 
into the causes of the specific event 
 
  




 Disagree 3 3.8 4.0 4.0 
  Unsure 5 6.3 6.7 10.7 
  Agree 32 40.0 42.7 53.3 
  Strongly 
agree 35 43.8 46.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
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 12.11) The patients are invited to an Open Disclosure meeting within a reasonable 
timeframe following the event 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Disagree 8 10.0 10.7 12.0 
  Unsure 18 22.5 24.0 36.0 
  Agree 22 27.5 29.3 65.3 
  Strongly agree 26 32.5 34.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.12) The health professionals who explain the events are known to the patient 
 
  




 Disagree 22 27.5 31.0 31.0 
  Unsure 11 13.8 15.5 46.5 
  Agree 23 28.8 32.4 78.9 
  Strongly 
agree 15 18.8 21.1 100.0 
  Total 71 88.8 100.0   
 Missing  9 11.3    
Total 80 100.0    
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12.13) A support person for the patient is present (or readily available) 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Disagree 3 3.8 4.0 5.3 
  Unsure 6 7.5 8.0 13.3 
  Agree 27 33.8 36.0 49.3 
  Strongly agree 38 47.5 50.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.14) The patients are told what steps are being taken to manage the event 
 
  




 Disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Unsure 2 2.5 2.7 4.0 
  Agree 31 38.8 41.3 45.3 
  Strongly 
agree 41 51.3 54.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.15) The patients seem to appreciate being honestly informed through Open Disclosure 
 
  




 Disagree 2 2.5 2.7 2.7 
  Unsure 7 8.8 9.3 12.0 
  Agree 29 36.3 38.7 50.7 
  Strongly 
agree 37 46.3 49.3 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
22 June 2007 171 
 
12.16) Patients appreciate receiving information through Open Disclosure 
 
  




 Unsure 5 6.3 7.8 7.8 
  Agree 26 32.5 40.6 48.4 
  Strongly 
agree 33 41.3 51.6 100.0 
  Total 64 80.0 100.0   
 Missing  16 20.0    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.17) Patients become angry when informed about adverse events 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.4 1.4 
  Disagree 27 33.8 36.5 37.8 
  Unsure 17 21.3 23.0 60.8 
  Agree 18 22.5 24.3 85.1 
  Strongly agree 11 13.8 14.9 100.0 
  Total 74 92.5 100.0   
 Missing  6 7.5    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 








 Disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Unsure 12 15.0 16.0 17.3 
  Agree 31 38.8 41.3 58.7 
  Strongly 
agree 31 38.8 41.3 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
22 June 2007 172 
 
12.19) Open Disclosure is structured as an ongoing, iterative process 
 
  




 Unsure 13 16.3 20.3 20.3 
  Agree 31 38.8 48.4 68.8 
  Strongly 
agree 20 25.0 31.3 100.0 
  Total 64 80.0 100.0   
 Missing  16 20.0    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.20) Families often become angry when informed of adverse events 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.4 1.4 
  Disagree 18 22.5 24.3 25.7 
  Unsure 8 10.0 10.8 36.5 
  Agree 33 41.3 44.6 81.1 
  Strongly agree 14 17.5 18.9 100.0 
  Total 74 92.5 100.0   
 Missing  6 7.5    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.21) I feel satisfied with the outcome of the Open Disclosure sessions I have attended 
 
  




 Disagree 2 2.5 2.7 2.7 
  Unsure 5 6.3 6.8 9.5 
  Agree 44 55.0 59.5 68.9 
  Strongly 
agree 23 28.8 31.1 100.0 
  Total 74 92.5 100.0   
 Missing  6 7.5    
Total 80 100.0    
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disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Disagree 17 21.3 22.7 24.0 
  Unsure 12 15.0 16.0 40.0 
  Agree 30 37.5 40.0 80.0 
  Strongly agree 15 18.8 20.0 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.23) Health professionals involved in Open Disclosure sessions receive strong support 
from their colleagues 
 
  




 Disagree 7 8.8 9.3 9.3 
  Unsure 22 27.5 29.3 38.7 
  Agree 33 41.3 44.0 82.7 
  Strongly 
agree 13 16.3 17.3 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
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disagree 2 2.5 2.7 2.7 
  Disagree 5 6.3 6.7 9.3 
  Unsure 14 17.5 18.7 28.0 
  Agree 34 42.5 45.3 73.3 
  Strongly agree 20 25.0 26.7 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 








 Disagree 2 2.5 2.7 2.7 
  Unsure 11 13.8 14.9 17.6 
  Agree 41 51.3 55.4 73.0 
  Strongly 
agree 20 25.0 27.0 100.0 
  Total 74 92.5 100.0   
 Missing  6 7.5    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
12.26) Overall I think patients' well-being benefits from Open Disclosure 
 
  




 Unsure 3 3.8 4.0 4.0 
  Agree 29 36.3 38.7 42.7 
  Strongly 
agree 43 53.8 57.3 100.0 
  Total 75 93.8 100.0   
 Missing  5 6.3    
Total 80 100.0    
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Section 3. Open Disclosure policies and practices in your organisation 
 
13.1) The organisation where I work supports an Open Disclosure policy 
 
  




 Disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Unsure 3 3.8 3.8 5.0 
  Agree 32 40.0 40.0 45.0 
  Strongly 
agree 44 55.0 55.0 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 








 Disagree 9 11.3 11.3 11.3 
  Unsure 12 15.0 15.0 26.3 
  Agree 36 45.0 45.0 71.3 
  Strongly 
agree 23 28.8 28.8 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
13.3) Health professionals worry about litigation if an adverse event is disclosed to patients 
 
  




 Disagree 8 10.0 10.0 10.0 
  Unsure 15 18.8 18.8 28.8 
  Agree 27 33.8 33.8 62.5 
  Strongly 
agree 30 37.5 37.5 100.0 
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13.4) Health professionals worry about their professional reputations if they are involved in 
an adverse event requiring Open Disclosure 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Disagree 6 7.5 7.5 8.8 
  Unsure 10 12.5 12.5 21.3 
  Agree 36 45.0 45.0 66.3 
  Strongly agree 27 33.8 33.8 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
13.5) The organisation is fearful that Open Disclosure will lead to bad publicity 
 
  





disagree 4 5.0 5.0 5.0 
  Disagree 35 43.8 43.8 48.8 
  Unsure 19 23.8 23.8 72.5 
  Agree 20 25.0 25.0 97.5 
  Strongly agree 2 2.5 2.5 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
13.6) Only severe adverse events are openly disclosed in my organisation 
 
  





disagree 11 13.8 13.8 13.8 
  Disagree 34 42.5 42.5 56.3 
  Unsure 19 23.8 23.8 80.0 
  Agree 13 16.3 16.3 96.3 
  Strongly agree 3 3.8 3.8 100.0 






Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
22 June 2007 177 









disagree 9 11.3 11.3 11.3 
  Disagree 36 45.0 45.0 56.3 
  Unsure 20 25.0 25.0 81.3 
  Agree 13 16.3 16.3 97.5 
  Strongly agree 2 2.5 2.5 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
13.8) This organisation acts promptly to set up Open Disclosure of an adverse event 
 
  




 Disagree 9 11.3 11.4 11.4 
  Unsure 16 20.0 20.3 31.6 
  Agree 32 40.0 40.5 72.2 
  Strongly 
agree 22 27.5 27.8 100.0 
  Total 79 98.8 100.0   
 Missing  1 1.3    
Total 80 100.0    
 
 
13.9) I am in favour of Open Disclosure of all adverse events to patients 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Disagree 5 6.3 6.3 7.5 
  Unsure 9 11.3 11.3 18.8 
  Agree 36 45.0 45.0 63.8 
  Strongly agree 29 36.3 36.3 100.0 
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13.10) In my experience Open Disclosure reduces litigation 
 
  





disagree 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 
  Disagree 2 2.5 2.5 3.8 
  Unsure 33 41.3 41.3 45.0 
  Agree 31 38.8 38.8 83.8 
  Strongly agree 13 16.3 16.3 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
13.11) Open Disclosure practices reduce patients' faith in their health professionals 
 
  





disagree 13 16.3 16.3 16.3 
  Disagree 49 61.3 61.3 77.5 
  Unsure 12 15.0 15.0 92.5 
  Agree 3 3.8 3.8 96.3 
  Strongly agree 3 3.8 3.8 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
13.12) Open Disclosure practices reduce patients' faith in their health professionals 
 
  





disagree 13 16.3 16.3 16.3 
  Disagree 49 61.3 61.3 77.5 
  Unsure 12 15.0 15.0 92.5 
  Agree 3 3.8 3.8 96.3 
  Strongly agree 3 3.8 3.8 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
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13.13) Open Disclosure causes patients and their families unnecessary distress 
 
  





disagree 11 13.8 13.8 13.8 
  Disagree 49 61.3 61.3 75.0 
  Unsure 16 20.0 20.0 95.0 
  Agree 3 3.8 3.8 98.8 
  Strongly agree 1 1.3 1.3 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
 
 
13.14) Open Disclosure causes health professionals involved unnecessary stress 
 
  





disagree 5 6.3 6.3 6.3 
  Disagree 46 57.5 57.5 63.8 
  Unsure 17 21.3 21.3 85.0 
  Agree 9 11.3 11.3 96.3 
  Strongly agree 3 3.8 3.8 100.0 
  Total 80 100.0 100.0   
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APPENDIX H: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY - OPEN ENDED RESPONSES 
 
Question 14: Is there anything you would like to change about the Open Disclosure process? 
 
Comment 
I think being a bit less dramatic about doing disclosure would make it a lot easier on everyone - it should be treated 
as part of normal life. Making such a fuss about it ("look at us - we are disclosing!!") makes it much more 
mysterious than it needs to be. 
Yes. It needs to be organisation-wide in training and practice. It needs "clinical champions" throughout the 
organisation. The trained OD personnel need extra time to do this. It needs to be immediate and at all levels, not 
just an "OD team" at a later date.  
The challenge is to educate staff that Open Disclosure is essential for the benefits of the patients/families and us as 
a health organisation. There is still a tendency to sweep things under the carpet and a blurred description of what 
constitute adverse/potential adverse outcome. It is important that we all learn from the many experiences and 
challenges of conducting OD! 
Currently education has been restricted to OD consultants. Brief introductory education given at orientation and 
HEAPS training. Structured education planning (about 1 hour sessions) required to inform all clinicians of the 
process and benefits. Other clinicians require more intense training ie. 2 day course offered by PSC. 
More clinicians need to be made aware of its value and it should have a structure around it, not ad hoc by people. 
Well supported by our executive team. 
This is a very timely process that should be regarded as a health procedure. Just like any other health procedure it 
has risks and benefits and needs to have appropriate training provided […]. 
I would like it to be routine practice and not names as it is currently. 
Unsure of emphasis given in organisation's orientation to new employees - expect would be improved. Unhappy or 
rather amused at terminology or concept of a "new process" given to what for me and my department has been 
normal practice for 30 years! It would be nice to have more time for ongoing education and some time for formal 
training of "trainers". 
It is not happening! I did the training - that is the first and last time it has ever been broached. We did a reg 
information session. 
Training of staff 
Needs to be part of normal clinical business; NOT a SPECIAL programme. 
Difficult to ascertain compliance to Open Disclosure and understanding of Open Disclosure. Providing education 
has been difficult 
More support by the organization for a family that has been caused harm and the ex-gratia payment is not 
provided. 
More timely. More staff especially senior medics educated and involved 
Arrangements should be flexible and less prescriptive. One solution is not suitable for all occasions. 
Senior medical staff must be more involved where it is left to Registrars and Nurse Managers to resolve and 
discuss: the patient/client deserves the response from head clinician with ongoing follow-up reassurance. That it is 
a patient's right to know. If done correctly reduces litigation -->education of the unknown issues regarding ethics, 
litigation, patients' rights needs to be attended. 
Process needs to be "normalised". Immediate disclosure @ point of care, followed up as necessary by a possibly 
more formal process. Disclosing of all adverse events/errors regardless of level of harm. 
More Training and resources for the process 
Needs to be formalised and demystified to the "old fashioned" medical practitioners. 
No, it is done well. Maybe some more formal training. 
More resources to be able to provide education. 
I have only been involved with 1 incident - I am unsure of how it is managed. 
Ensure costs met for private consultations, investigations, operations etc. 
Not at the moment. 
One of the very beneficial adjuncts to the verbal meeting is to follow that up with a written piece of correspondence 
from the hospital to the patient/relatives about the item discussed and the response by the hospital to that/them. 
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If anything, apply more widely. 
Encourage direct and early involvement of caring clinician as soon as possible - delays lead to patient perception of 
a cover-up. 
Increased education for clinical staff would be beneficial. Initiating the process through the position of Executive 
Director of Medical Services would be more advantageous, rather than via the Patient Safety officers. 
Much of the OD focussed on OD training for clinicians. There was no or very little advice or suggested plan for how 
roll out OD in a large organisation. It was expected or the perception was that the PSO’s could just roll it out. No 
time or resources were available initially (the CD, lanyard swings, posters etc only came online recently). The 
people doing the education need to be Drs, senior, nurses, not the PSO’s and complaint managers/patient liaison 
etc and yet the staff we trained don’t see it as their role. “Someone else more senior should do it.” 
Education of staff about the process. Briefings prior to and after the meeting. 
I think all adverse events that a patient experiences (whether or not the patient is aware of event), should be 
disclosed to the patient. 
Wider range of education activities, eg at orientation or incorporated into appraisals. 
Has been working fine in my experience. Very concerned about the development of a “policy” as I think this will ruin 
current good practice. 
We have incorporated Open Disclosure as a normal part of our practice (organisational response) to a sentinel 
event as well as for other adverse events whether require management at an organisational level. This seems to 
work well. Open Disclosure is one part of the response to an event and should not be seem as a separate 
response. 
Yes. More practice education and timing for medical staff (especially more senior and prominent staff and support 
some from managers). 
We have adopted the Cognitive Institute method which is quite […]. Timeliness is also still an issue. 
 
Question 15: Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
 
Comment 
The effort goes into preparation – the supporting systems need to be in place. Once that is done, the actual 
disclosure is much easier, and can be done with pretty ordinary skills, provided there is one expert on the team. 
I don’t think it was right to just choose a small division to trial it. It needs organisation wide acceptance.  
I think Open Disclosure gives both parties the opportunity to openly discuss the event and for both to gain an 
understanding as to why the event occurred and reassure the woman that it has been acknowledged and steps are 
put in to place to ensure it does not happen again. Both parties gain closure to the event. 
Excellent practice that both improves patient trust in health care and leads to positive safety/quality initiatives. 
I would like more training. 
There is a real need to incorporate debriefing/support sessions for OD trained staff who undertake OD sessions. 
This is provided for involved clinicians but not necessarily OD officers who may will find the process rewarding but 
stressful and even traumatic. OD officer peer group review is I think something important to sustainability of an 
active and engaged OD officer pool. 
In regards to question 13.6, 13.7 OD occurs when need flagged for it to occur ie. Incident reported directly for OD. 
Complaint management, moral obligation. Successful OD is dependant on good communication. Many times OD 
occurs without formal process Æwith good outcomes ie as part of clinical disclosure directly by treating team. 
Rarely able to capture this natural process. 
An extremely important issue needs as many staff as possible to understand. 
I have attended meetings where incidents and Open Disclosure outcomes have been discussed but I have only 
participated in one Open Disclosure at this facility. My comment reflects some of my personal feelings about the 
process. As Open Disclosure becomes the accepted norm I feel the outcomes will be improved. 
We need to go forward with eyes open. This is not a panacea. But it is an important element of patient safety. 
It should be just part of the way things are done. 
I am an invited member of the reference group for the project; my involvement began only 9 months ago when it 
was realised the group lacked “cross-divisional” representation (from a now “Women’s and Babies” section of the 
hospital). I see my role as providing oversight and critique of the implementation and monitoring of the project. 
Understand that “Open Disclosure” is/has been poorly practiced in some specialities. I think this often is due to lack 
of leadership within departments – units are unaware of it. Non medical staff may likely be not fully aware or even 
unaware of full explanations given. I feel incensed. 
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There is a need to inform patient PRIOR to delivery, of their risks, particularly obesity and drug abuse patients. 
Apologising for events beyond control of the average doctor are unreasonable and do not benefit anyone. 
Addressing issues such as understaffing and medical input will go a long way to PREVENT adverse issues. 
Open Disclosure for everything probably not separate for things which caused harm – makes you more conscious. 
Makes you to prepare for OD. 
1) A sad indictment on society that special programmes like this are needed. 2) You will know that Open Disclosure 
programme has been successful when there is no need for a special programme! 3) Healthy people, healthy 
hospitals, healthy societies are only possible when reality is faced (or openly discloses). “Truth fears no question”. 
I found the QH training (2day) session intimidating and confronting whilst it was realistic (to a degree). I found the 
“actors” seemed to go “overboard” on their reactions. 
QH is developing an excellent program for staff, needs to be further developed for clinicians, however, this will 
come. I was thrilled to be involved. 
We need to learn to speak to the patient. The disclosure involves not ignore and address the families as they 
speak for the patient. Use correct and understandable language for lay patients and families. Speak the truth. 
Open Disclosure should be seen as a cornerstone of trusting relationship between patients and care-givers. Should 
not be turned into “ritualised” practice. Needs to be balanced by “fair compensation” policy. 
It can expose us to unexpected risks but it is still the right thing to do. The political masters need to accept and 
support it. 
Very important! Should be part of medical school and specialty training. 
I think it is a good process. 
I found it a positive experience with improved care outcomes. 
Original education from RACS. 
It is/can be a lot of work administratively – it needs to be become not everyone goes home smiling and later some 
legal action can follow so it does need a reasonable level of executive administrative support. 
I think it’s an excellent strategy. 
Very beneficial to both patients and their families & health care professionals. Support is given to all involved. More 
education to health professionals would be beneficial. 
I believe in the process. It seems to have some benefits for patients and yet not all are satisfied with the process. It 
needs long term executive support and an implementation plan and resources. If it is only done by the willingness 
of committed staff already doing a fulltime job its success as a project will be limited. We need to get executive 
support first, then general education, then training otherwise staff who were trained are not being used early on in 
the time frame and think it was a waste of time doing the training. 
It is a stressful process on staff. More support/education is required 
Needs to be more structured. The type/severity of events which prompt an Open Disclosure meeting need to be 
standardised rather than at the discretion of the health care workers directly involved. 
Incorporate as part of normal organisational response to SAC 1 and 2 events. Clinician level disclosure is often 
sufficient. We have not used our OD peer support group as much as I expected. 
Hooray! At last common decency and common sense are promoting after years of medico legal paranoia 
suggesting to us that you should say “I regret” rather than “I’m really sorry” and “We got it wrong”.  
I’ve been very involved in OD since 2002. […] Firstly, “simply saying sorry” is not so simple. Secondly, see OD in 
the same light as informed consent. It represents a CONTINUUM OF TRUTH which starts from when we first 
encounter to when we finally depart. 
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OPEN DISCLOSURE QUESTIONS  
FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
 
Before starting the interview I would like to provide you with some background information: a 
research team from the University of Technology Sydney has recently been commissioned by 
Queensland Health to evaluate the Open Disclosure pilot program that has been rolled out to 41 
health care sites across Australia. This UTS research team will be supported by researchers from 
the University of Melbourne, and the University of Queensland who will oversee the research in 
their States. My name is […] and I am from the University of [Technology, Queensland, 
Melbourne]. 
This evaluation will seek to provide information about the success of the Open Disclosure pilot. 
Open Disclosure involves: clinicians saying sorry to patients and their carers for mishaps they 
were involved in and informing patients and carers about steps that the organisation will take to 
rectify the situation and prevent similar mishaps from occurring in the future.  
 
We are conducting interviews with health professionals and patients and their families who have 
been involved in Open Disclosure sessions. This is why I am here today: to conduct an interview 
with you about your views and experiences of Open Disclosure. The interview will take about 30-
45 minutes and with your permission I would like to tape the conversation. 
 
 
1. What is your understanding of OD? 
2. Describe to me what the OD process at your organisation entails? 
a. How has the OD Standard been implemented or adapted? 
b. Has the organisation developed an OD response plan? 
c. What types of adverse incidents involve OD? 
d. Who is usually involved in the OD process? Who is the OD Team? Who attends the 
OD session? 
e. How many people typically are present at the OD meeting? Does this change from the 
first meeting to subsequent meetings? 
f. How many OD sessions might typically be required for any given case? 
g. Tell me who drives the conversation in the OD meeting? Who says ‘Sorry..’? 
h. Is there typically a peer support person for the patient? 
 
3. Are you aware of any type of pre-planning that takes place prior to an OD meeting with the 
patient/family? 
a. Do those involved determine what to say? 
b. Do those involved anticipate levels of and kinds of emotions to be expected? 
c. Do those involved determine who to invite to the initial OD meeting with the 
patient/family given the specifics of the case? 
 
4. Describe to me the level, depth and degree of OD Training in your organisation? 
a. Formal training? Informal training? In-house? External? 
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b. Is OD Training information-based or mentor facilitated? 
c. How many staff attend OD Training? 
d. How regular is the OD Training? 
e. Has the OD Training been evaluated? 
f. How is information about the process and OD standard disseminated to staff? 
 
5. Are patients/family given the opportunity to record the OD meeting? 
6. Is there any recording of discussion during the OD meeting – either during or after? 
7. Is there any follow-up communication with the patient/family? What? 
8. Is there a follow-up Root Cause Analysis? (RCA) If so, who is involved in the RCA? Is the 
patient/family involved? 
9. OD meeting and justice: Tell me about who you seek to advocate justice (as fairness) for? 
10. Tell me about any evaluation of the OD process here at this hospital? (not OD Training) 
11. What has been your experience in getting clinicians involved in the OD process? 
12. What makes the OD process work here at (a) an organisational level (b) a meeting level? Is 
there a single determinant? How could the process be improved? 
13. What do you perceive are the risks associated with OD? 
14. What do you perceive are the benefits of OD? 
15. What do you think underpins the implementation of the OD Standard here? Why do it?  
16. What do you think motivates this organisation to implement the standard? 
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OPEN DISCLOSURE QUESTIONS 
FOR PATIENTS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS 
 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your gender? 
3. Are you the patient, a family member or close friend? 
4. What was the main reason why you were admitted to hospital? 
5. What were the unexpected harms that occurred to you that led to the OD meetings? 
6. When were you first made aware the unexpected harm was done to you? 
7. How did you feel when you were told that unexpected harm was done to you? 
8. Did you feel that health professionals had been open and honest with you? 
9. Did you feel listened to and all your questions answered.  Were the answers explained to 
you in simple English? 
10. What supports were you offered and received?  What did you need? 
11. What notification did you get about the meeting?  When, where, duration, attendees, how 
much notice 
12. Were you involved in an RCA and notified of the findings? 
13. How serious was the unexpected harm that occurred to you or your relative or friend (very 
serious, serious, somewhat serious, not serious, not very serious)? 
14. How many Open Disclosure meetings have you attended where a doctor or another health 
worker spoke to you about the unexpected harm that occurred in hospital? 
15. What type of health professionals were present at these meetings? (doctor, nurse, 
pharmacist, other)? 
16. How useful did you find the meetings in dealing with harms that occurred to you or your 
relative or friend? 
17. How involved have you felt in relation to health professionals’ interactions with you since 
your unexpected harms were found? 
18. Do you see Open Disclosure as a useful approach to acknowledging errors in care to 
patients and their families? In what ways? 
19. Have you found the outcomes of these sessions satisfactory? In what ways? 
20. What did you like about these meetings? 
21. What did you not like about these meetings? 
22. Is there anything you would like to change about the way the meetings were carried out in 
the hospital for you or for your relative or for your friend?  
23. Are there any other comments you would like to make about open disclosure? 
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APPENDIX K: 1st ACADEMIC PAPER PREPARED FROM THIS RESEARCH 
 
The paper reproduced below has been prepared from this research, with another draft manuscript 
(focusing on the specifics of learning to apologise using ‘real play’) close to finishing. The paper 
below is being presented at the International Communication Association in Montreal, May 2008, 
and will be submitted (with permission from Queensland Health and the Australian Commission 
for Safety and Quality in Health Care) as part of a special issue of the Journal of Language and 
Social Psychology on health communication, due out 2009. 
 
Title:  
A New Structure of Attention? Open Disclosure of Unexpected Clinical Outcomes to Patients 
and their Families 
 
Abstract: 
This paper presents an inquiry into the enactment of a health policy reform initiative that is being adopted in 
a number of post-industrial nations: Open Disclosure. Open Disclosure mandates that discussions with 
patients/family and team staff about unexpected clinical outcomes or ‘adverse events’ are now no longer ad 
hoc, individualized and without consequences for how the work is done, but planned, collaborative and 
leading to system change. We review policy and research literature that describes Open Disclosure as 
intending to promote ‘open and honest’ discussions about adverse events with affected patients, families and 
with staff involved or implicated, while at the same time constraining how these discussions are enacted. We 
then present an empirical analysis of a corpus of interviews about the impact of Open Disclosure on 
clinicians’ practices. Our article situates Open Disclosure in the context of arguments that health care 
workers are increasingly expected to do ‘emotional labour’ with patients and their families. A significant 
component of the disclosure of adverse events, the data reveal, is that staff need to practise ‘reflexive 
listening’ as a means of managing patients’ and family members’ anger and distress in response to incidents. 
In exploring the relevance of the ‘emotional labour’ thesis to the empirical data, the article elaborates two 
alternative scenarios that such skills and their targeted training entrain. First, the analysis suggests that 
thanks to the intensity of Open Disclosure interactions, clinicians may be introduced to an affective-
interactive space which they were hitherto unaware of and unable to enter. The new practice of reflexive 
listening may be a means enabling staff to appropriate a more reflexive stance towards themselves, or attain 
what Thrift calls ‘a new structure of attention’ (Thrift, 2004a). The often recommended ‘partial apology’ (cf. 
Vines, 2005) may only secure ‘cheap grace’ (Berlinger, 2003) and fail to achieve the emotional dialogue that 
patients and staff require. Yet the need to manage medico-legal risk results in proceduralised rules for staff. 
So secondly the analysis suggests clinicians may be empowered by reflexive listening to handle emotional 






Key words:  
Open Disclosure, adverse event, affect, partial apology, full apology, restorative justice 
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A New Structure of Attention? Open Disclosure of  




This article explores the complexity and practical implications of a policy that is gradually being 
taken up by health departments around the globe. This policy,  usually referred to as ‘Open 
Disclosure’, is the focal point for a complex array of interests and intents. At minimum, Open 
Disclosure involves: 1) an explicit statement that an unexpected clinical outcome (or ‘adverse 
event’) occurred and a basic description of what happened, 2) an apology or expression of regret, 
and 3) an investigation of and intervention in work processes in order to prevent recurrences 
(Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers, Fraser, & Levinson, 2003: 1006). Adoption of Open Disclosure is 
strongly advocated by those who have deployed it in practice (Woods, 2007), as well as by those 
for who regard confession and forgiveness as central to recuperating trust into the clinician-patient 
relationship (Berlinger, 2003). In addition, disclosure of adverse events to patients and families is 
said to reduce the numbers of patients making complaints and pursuing litigation (Lamb, 2004). In 
support of this latter argument, some insurance companies have begun to pescribe Open 
Disclosure in their contracts with health providers (e.g. COPIC, 2004)1. However there is also 
some anxiety about new financial risk due to the chance that Open Disclosure prompt legal cases 
rather than just averting them, given the large number of incidents that currently remain 
undisclosed (Studdert, Mello, Gawande, Brennan, & Wang, 2007; but see Wakefield, Jorm, & 
Ryan, 2007). Nevertheless, governments and policy makers have no option but to reconcile the 
public’s right to know with the dangers and costs incurred by hospitals’ growing clinical-technical 
capability. 
 
Aside from its focus on adverse events, the tenor Open Disclosure – honesty between clinicians 
and patients - is not novel. Thirty years ago in the West open discussions about people’s end of life 
were rare (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). Now, they are the norm (Seale, 2000) in part thanks to medical 
training focusing on communicative strategies that enable clinicians to break bad news (Buckman, 
1992). In a sense, Open Disclosure pushes this practice of sharing medical-clinical knowledge 
with consumers of health care to the limit: discussions with patients/family and team staff about 
adverse events are now no longer ad hoc, individualized and without consequences for how 
clinical processes unfold, but planned, collaborative and lead to carefully evaluated work process 
changes. Open Disclosure shifts these discussions from the conventional practice of informing 
patients and family members about the occurrence of a ‘known risk’ or ‘a complication’, towards 
involving health care consumers in discussing and (to a degree) resolving unexpected outcomes, 
particularly if these include clinical errors and incidents.  
 
Open Disclosure originated in the late 1980s at the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Centre in 
Lexington, Kentucky. Following a string of legal costs and pay-outs totaling more than US$1.5 
million (see Kraman, Cranfill, Hamm, & Woodard, 2002 ), “administrators [there] decided to 
adopt a more pro-active policy in medical cases that had the potential to result in litigation” 
(Woods, 2007: 81). Results of the VA Open Disclosure trial appeared to confirm that honesty and 
organizational risk management are not mutually exclusive (Kraman & Hamm, 1999). The 
approach has since been refined into detailed policy guidelines across different jurisdictions, 
including Canada, the U.K. and Australia (e.g. Health Quality Council of Alberta, 2006; National 
                                                     
1 It remains unclear from the COPIC materials, however, whether it is the admission of liability and 
settlement or the grief management, or both, that lead to the positive results reported to flow forth from 
Open Disclosure. 
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Patient Safety Agency, 2005). The Australian Open Disclosure Standard is typical, balancing 
prudent risk managerial with moral and restorative justice (Australian Council for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2003).Thus, policy makers in a number of countries have begun to 
mandate that health organizations become involved in revealing and apologizing for clinical-
medical shortcomings.  
 
The present article will consider how frontline staff are positioned to engage with this requirement 
for honesty. Following a review of the literature, the article2 presents an analysis of interviews 
done with clinicians involved with ‘doing’ Open Disclosure with patients and family members. 
These analyses show that Open Disclosure constitutes a complex set of potentially contradictory 
demands, including: encouraging clinicians to adopt communication skills (such as ‘reflexive 
listening’); the ethos of not blaming colleagues or the organization; as well as, a personal 
responsibility to risk manage adverse events for the organization. Our conclusion suggests that the 
openness Open Disclosure mandates into being suspends clinicians between the institutional 
apology as merely ‘cynical civility’ (Vines, 2005), the inclination to engage with and advocate for 
consumers’ anger and distress, and the organizational imperative to ward off or control complaints 
and litigation.  
 
Open Disclosure: Research and Policy  
 
The central challenge of Open Disclosure is the requirement to disclose information about adverse 
events to people who are physically injured and psychologically affected by those adverse events. 
There is both a difficulty of accessing actual instances of Open Disclosure and a dearth of 
experience among clinicians enacting Open Disclosure according to the recently produced 
guidelines. Therefore much research reports on how clinicians would or should respond if finding 
themselves in the situation of having to share with patients and their families information about 
adverse events, and how patients (families) may respond in return (Chan, Gallagher, Reznick, & 
Levinson, 2005; Liebman & Hyman, 2004; Mazor, Reed, Yood, Fischer, Baril, & Gurwitz, 2006). 
Gallagher and colleagues’ work is often cited as it reveals disjunctions between what patients 
expect following incidents and what the doctors involved would be prepared to provide 
(Gallagher, Garbutt, Waterman, Flum, Larson, Waterman et al., 2006; Gallagher & Lucas, 2005). 
Among other things, patients’ in-principle views about when to deploy Open Disclosure are found 
to be broader than those of doctors. For these patients an apology is desirable where for doctors 
apologizing remains a source of (legal) concern; patients expect full disclosure of what happened 
while doctors would “choose their words carefully”, and where patients valued truth and 
compassion, the doctors valued truth, objectivity and professionalism.  
 
There are however some reports from individuals, such as Woods (2007), who base their findings 
and advice on personal experience, or on interviews with people who have experienced incidents 
and their disclosure (Berlinger, 2005). Having been sued as a surgeon, Woods recounts how he 
was shocked into becoming more attentive to how he communicates with patients. Woods’ stance 
is of interest here, not just because he articulates a strongly moral-philosophical view, but also 
because his book Healing words: The power of apology in medicine, published by the prominent 
US Joint Commission3, is now in its 2nd edition and has already been translated into several 
languages. Woods sees Open Disclosure as in the first instance providing a moral framework for 
                                                     
2 This paper is the first in a series that reports on the national evaluation of Open Disclosure practices in 
Australia. The research is funded by the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care and 
managed by Queensland Health. Ethics approval was gained from 32 Human Resource Ethics Committees 
around Australia. Details of these approvals is available upon request. 
3 The Joint Commission is a governmental organization that accredits health services in the USA and 
provides clinical practice improvement consultancies and resources.  
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healing a damaged interpersonal relationship. Accordingly, it is crucial for him that the disclosure 
and the apology are genuine and not beholden to a risk management logic. 
 
If risk management (that is, claims avoidance) is the primary focus, the end goal, in essence, is to 
manipulate the provider-patient relationship to the organization’s advantage, not because the patient 
is intrinsically important as individual. As I have noted time and again, risk management benefits 
cannot be pursued as the reason for apology and disclosure. Rather, risk management benefits 
naturally ensue as a by-product of maintaining the relationship. (Woods, 2007: 37) 
 
Berlinger’s account brings together the experiences of clinicians involved in incidents and of 
consumers affected by incidents (Berlinger, 2005). Her book seeks to balance acknowledging 
clinicians’ pain and distress following the realization of having contributed to a patient’s harm, 
and patients’ right to disclosure and restorative justice. She concludes: 
 
Physicians may think of themselves as less powerful than injured patients and their families if they 
have been taught to view such patients and families as angry adversaries and potential litigants. But 
in the physician-patient relationship, the physician is always the more powerful actor, whether or 
not she is comfortable with that role. The injured patient, moreover, has been rendered more, not 
less, vulnerable as a result of his injury. Already vulnerable as the result of illness or other 
impairment, he has been harmed by those he entrusted to help him. Keeping these uncomfortable 
truths in mind may help physicians to respond to injured patients and their families with humility 
and compassion rather than fear and suspicion. (Berlinger, 2005: 102) 
 
For their part, Open Disclosure policy and guidelines inform staff they should disclose within the 
existing constraints of error management. This is evident in how this documentation privileges the 
expression of regret (‘we are sorry this happened’) over the more legally risky ‘full apology’ (‘we 
are sorry we made an error’). Except for guidelines issued in Alberta (Health Quality Council of 
Alberta, 2006), jurisdictions require staff to apologize in ways that avoid admitting fault and 
incurring legal liability. For example, exemplary statements offered in Queensland Health 
documentation include “I am very sorry for all the distress that you have had as a result of this 
incident” and “Everyone in this organization is very sorry that this terrible event has happened to 
you” (Queensland Health, 2006a). Other Open Disclosure Guidelines provide discursive examples 
of apologies that avoid both legal liability and mutual blame. Thus, “Your husband … was given 
an injection of penicillin shortly before his death. There were notes in his medical records that he 
was allergic to penicillin, but the person who gave the injection did not see the notes. We are sorry 
about this incident” is acceptable, while “The nurse knew your husband … was allergic to 
penicillin, because it is written all over the notes, but she gave him the injection by mistake that 
caused him to have an anaphylactic reaction, from which he could not be resuscitated. We are very 
sorry about this incident” is not (NSW Health, 2007: 11)4.  
 
                                                     
4 The second unacceptable example differs from the first in that it encompasses causal specificity 
(‘because’), personalization (‘the nurse’), attribution of mental process (‘[the nurse] knew’), and a judgment 
(‘by mistake’). 
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A desire for prudent risk management would also appear to underpin much of Open Disclosure 
guidelines’ detailed advice about how to pre-plan and structure incident disclosure, to prevent 
diverging versions of what happened circulating and causing confusion. Thus, the documentation 
insists on staff following a sequence of ‘moves’ that follow on from the opening apology: asking 
the patient about their experience, answering their questions honestly, informing them about what 
the organization will do (investigate), and conducting the post-investigation feedback meeting. It 
is evident however from the emphasis given to it that a crucial component in this sequence is 
creating space for the patient’s (and family members’) response. In one set of training materials, 
for example, the following wording is provided to ensure this happens: “There must be many 
questions that you would like to ask us. We have as much time as we need so please ask us what 
you need to know” (Queensland Health, 2006a). This shows that Open Disclosure guidelines, 
besides constraining the disclosing clinician(s) to particular kinds of language and disclosure 
moves, also can prescribe handing a modicum of control over the disclosure meeting to the patient 
(and family) to ensure they can articulate their distress and anger: “Being listened to is an 
important stage of healing and moving on” and “Being able to tell your story and express your 
concerns to a considerate and attentive listener is therapeutic” (Queensland Health, 2006a).  
 
These considerations show that adverse event disclosure opens up a complex interactive domain. 
To be sure, Open Disclosure is inscribed into a carefully designed set of dialogic stages and 
procedures, but at least one of its components is defined in terms of a shift of control from 
clinician (organization) to patient (and family). In order to illuminate how clinicians experience 
and enact the disclosure interaction, let us turn to our analysis of 120 interviews with staff across 
Australia who have participated in Open Disclosure. As our analysis will show, Open Disclosure 
is discussed in terms of confronting clinicians with having to resolve the tension between 
controlling risk and the volatility of in situ interaction. 
 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
We conducted one hundred and twenty interviews with clinicians who have done Open 
Disclosure. These interviews were collected as part of a national evaluation of Open Disclosure 
funded by the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care. The interviews were 
transcribed and discourse analysis (Iedema, 2007) used to …. and results were collated in two 
reports to provide guidance for Australian policy makers on further recommendations for the 
implementation of Open Disclosure.. For the purposes of the present paper, the interview data is 
re-analysed to draw out information about how interviewees talk about Open Disclosure as 
interactive and affective practice. The data is presented under three headings: pre-planning of the 
Open Disclosure meeting; saying ‘sorry’ - navigating between liability and apology, and turning 
on the power of reflexive listening. 
 
Pre-planning of the Open Disclosure meeting 
 
General advice emphasizes the importance of the Open Disclosure pre-planning meeting which is 
to take place before staff sit down with the family and the patient to formally disclose the adverse 
event (Liebman & Hyman, 2004; Queensland Health, 2006b). The purpose of the pre-planning 
meeting includes: establishing the facts of the adverse event as much as possible, thinking through 
who was involved in the incident and whether that person or persons should be involved in the 
disclosure, gathering information about the patient and the family (through the patient liaison 
officer and other sources), and rehearsing what to say during the open disclosure conference. As 
the first quote below bears out, an important component of pre-planning is preparing for the 
emotional dynamics of the patient and family members: 
 
Data collection, analysis and evaluation of the National Open Disclosure Standard Pilot: Final Report for Queensland Health as the 
Project Manager for the Australian Commission for Safety & Quality in Health Care 
22 June 2007 191 
Extract 1 (Patient Liaison Officer [NSW27]) 
“If there’s an actual loss of life, you can bet your bottom dollar, there’s going to be a myriad of 
emotions that all come from, you know, wherever those individuals were in, in that person’s life, 
you know? Um. So you’re dealing with a bit of bereavement, uh, in all possibility in those 
circumstances, so it doesn’t hurt to have a little bit of knowledge about how people grieve, that sort 
of thing. But there’s usually, there’s usually clues. I mean, if you’re going into a situation cold 
turkey, it would always do you a lot of good if you can talk to some of the staff that have been 
dealing with that family, because they wouldn’t have been left out on their own. They would have 
had some of the staff dealing with them, they may have had a social worker brought in, or… So you 
tap into those people that have had interaction, and try and pick up some information from them. If 
not, it it does boil down to a bit of your old body language and, and try to put yourself in their 
position I think, and try and understand how they might feel.”  
 
Besides trying to envisage patients’ and family members’ emotions, the pre-planning meeting also 
needs to assess the attitude of the clinicians whose actions may have contributed to the adverse 
event, and who may have been asked (by the consumer) to attend: 
 
Extract 2 (Anaesthetist SA [pp]) 
I talked to the anaesthetist and said that having done the Open Disclosure that I felt that certain 
things were important and perhaps we could …, he was in agreement that perhaps we could 
interview that particular way so I did guide it in the sense that I put forward the initial point to 
saying sorry without taking blame. And then I sort of led him to say to allow the patient to express 
how she felt. So, we did discuss how it would probably be best to go and if there were incidences 
where he was starting to butt into what the patient was trying to say I would sort of go and sort of 
say Perhaps we get to that later. Because the problem is sometimes when someone’s being 
involved themselves they want to explain all the time.”  
 
Pre-planning for Open Disclosure, then, is a crucial strategy that prepares disclosers for the 
intensity of grief, distress and anger experienced by consumers, and for the degree of intransigence 
harboured by colleagues who have trouble ‘understanding how they [the patient/family] might 
feel’. As the following interviewee explains, many of these tactics are now incorporated into daily 
practice to pre-empt problems: 
 
Extract 3 (RN [Vic 141])  
“I mean, years ago our consultants would say, ‘Well, make an appointment and if it suits me’, you 
know, that’s passé now, you know, for example, the day starts with the night person handing over 
to the morning team, right, and that includes physiotherapist, liaison nurse, me, you know, a whole 
lot of people and we start our morning by looking at x-rays with just a quick overview of the 
patients and then we have a detailed bedside-to-bedside which can take hours, but at that x-ray 
meeting, that’s when I break away and we discuss any incidents that have occurred and, ‘What are 
the family aware of?’, ‘Do we need to talk to the family?’ and then we’ll say, ‘Well, look, I’m 
free’, the doctor will say, ‘Look, what about two o’clock, can you arrange for the family to come in 
at 2 or 3 or before 5 or whatever’, and so that’s a common daily activity.” 
 
These interview responses show that a lot of groundwork takes place before the Open Disclosure 
session happens, and that everyday practice may be changing in recognition of the importance of  
the practice of disclosure. This groundwork is oriented not purely towards establishing the ‘facts’ 
of the incident. It is also about appraising or ‘qualculating’ (Thrift, 2004b) affective responses and 
intensities on the part of those involved, and possible ways of dealing with them. This involves 
those leading the disclosure in a complex kind of ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 1983): 
preparing oneself for consumers’ and colleagues’ affects, and devising strategies and discursive 
maneuvers that may help change their course.  
 
‘Saying sorry’ 
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When the Open Disclosure session happens, the affective dynamics presaged in the pre-planning 
phase are enacted in real time. In some cases, this translates into a pragmatic use of the apology: 
 
Extract 4 (Patient Liaison Officer [NSW 27-31]) 
 “Um, you, you sort of go in and and, you know, obviously you’re thanking people for being there 
blah blah blah, explaining why you’re there, and and, and then at that time, it’s appropriate for the 
first, sort of apology, I think. You know, to say, look, you know, I’m really so sorry that we’re here 
under these circumstances or, or whatever, you know. It, it’s hard to have a proper script in those 
situations because you have to evaluate the people that you’re dealing with. You have to really 
make a snap judgment to determine how best to determine the information that you want to give 
them.”  
 
This interviewee intimates the task is manageable, even though patients ‘can sense’ whether those 
doing the disclosing are ‘pulling wool over their eyes’:  
 
Extract 5 (Midwife nurse [SA 70]) 
“For the most part…I think most patients, most people are fairly sensible people and they know if 
you’re pulling the wool over their eyes.  They just want you to be honest and if something’s 
happened they want you to be able to say, ‘Look, this has happened. Perhaps it shouldn’t have, or 
for whatever reason, this is what’s happened.’” 
 
The next interviewee is more explicit about the tensions that result from having to disclose adverse 
events, manage legal risk, and be genuine. For this interviewee, Open Disclosure raises a serious 
ethical dilemma: 
 
Extract 6 (Director of Clinical Governance [NSW 8]) 
 “I know, it’s a very hard judgment, but um, this family have grieved, they’ve understood what’s 
happened, and now we’re going to go back to them and say, ‘Well, I’m sorry but actually this is 
what happened’, and so it’s a tremendously difficult dilemma, ethical dilemma for some of these 
issues as to what we do.  I mean we tend to err on the side of disclosure but …” 
 
This dilemma is exacerbated by having to face up to the anger and distress of victims of adverse 
events, and having little choice but to ‘share their pain’: 
 
Extract 7 (Director Health Service [Qld 142])  
 “…when you’re actually there, and in the hot seat, and … and … and explaining, um even though I 
haven’t been directly involved in the incident, but it … it’s still a very emotional, draining, stressful 
situation that you … you actually go through, and, you really have got no idea. When you walk into 
that meeting, all it’s left up to is … is your good communication skills, and um … and you know, 
and how reasonable is the family that you’re dealing with? And again, you could be very 
reasonable people in normal times, but you know, they’re … most people are going through life-
altering um change, and it’s a crisis, they’re in crisis, and um you don’t really know how the people 
are going to react, so … so that’s what sharing the pain is about.” 
 
By sharing the pain, we surmise, this last interviewee means being genuinely receptive to what 
patients and family members are experiencing. But how can those doing the disclosing and the 
apologizing ‘share the pain’ and not lose sight of the boundaries beyond which one is exposing 
oneself to legal liability and threat to organizational reputation? This brings us to the third 
component of our analysis: the space that disclosure creates for patients and family members to 
take the floor, affectively speaking, and for staff to practise the skill of ‘reflexive listening’. 
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Reflexive listening 
 
As its simulation training emphasizes, Open Disclosure involves the deployment of reflexive 
listening (Queensland Health, 2006a). Reflexive listening is a technique described in Gerald 
Eagan’s The skilled helper (Eagan, 2006), a book that for decades has helped inculcate psycho-
therapeutic skills in therapists, counselors and clinical psychologists. In the context of Open 
Disclosure in Australia, reflexive listening is taught by involving trainees and actors in simulating 
emotional confrontations.  
 
Extract 8 (Doctor [SA 34]) 
Interviewee: “And I would go and say that before I did the course I would go in there and say 
Sorry. I would say I did. I would do that and I would take the responsibility and I’ve just been 
lucky enough that there hasn’t been that serious. But I did to you, that is not right and I can see that 
now. And then I want to explain, I need to tell you what’s happened because I feel terrible. And 
what the process teaches you is that stop thinking about yourself for one minute. It is not all about 
me. Step back and say ‘what about you?’.” 
Interviewer: So, you moved … from a provider focus to patient focus? 
Interviewee: “Absolutely.”  
 
The doctor quoted in extract 8 describes their mind-altering experience of simulating the 
disclosure of an adverse event scenario with an actor. While this is the strongest statement found 
in the interview data, many other interviewees confirmed that the main impact the training had on 
them was ‘to learn to be silent’ in the face of anger and distress. The person quoted in extract 9 
describes how this technique enabled her to deal with one particular patient’s anger: 
 
Extract 6 (Nursing Manager [Qld 77-8]) 
“Um, one of the things they were very angry and it took quite a while for them to just, you know 
get rid of their anger, um, I guess one of the things that I had learned which I probably wouldn’t 
have done before the training, um, I didn’t try and interrupt them or stop them from talking. I didn’t 
try and deflect the blame because they were wanting to blame somebody, they were wanting to 
know the name of the nurse that was suppose to be looking after him. You know who’d turned their 
back or, or whatever, um, so you know, for 25 minutes, they ranted and shouted and were very um- 
scathing of, of the service. Um, I guess at the end of that, when they finally came, they were just 
getting tired from being so angry, um, I basically said look, I, I really just apologised and said, 
you’re right. …” 
 
Remaining silent creates interactive room for the patient and family members to vent their 
emotions. As they use the silence to articulate these emotions, they are reassured that their 
emotions are legitimate, they are enabled to let their emotions run their own course, and they gain 
the opportunity to re-experience and thereby disentangle themselves from those emotions (Eagan, 
2006). Paramount to this process is that reflexive listening on the part of the listener counter-acts 
the dialogic intensity that speakers’ emotions entrain.  
 
But on occasions silence alone will not do. In extract 7, the interviewee recounts how they saw no 
option but to accept responsibility for what happened under pressure of victims’ anger.  
 
Extract 7 (Director Health Service [Qld 123-4])  
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“Yeah. And um so he said look, you know, I mean this is not fair, somebody hurt my baby, and 
you’re not going to tell us who it is? You know, we are going to go to Freedom of Information and 
find out, we can easily find out. So I said look, [name father], I mean the one thing …? I said look, 
if you really want to blame somebody, I’m very happy for that to happen, you can blame me. I’m 
the consultant here, looking after the show, I am responsible if something happens, and that’s why 
we are in this room, having this discussion. And that’s why I’ve been honest with you to say it has 
happened, and we are sorry that it happened. We promise you that we will look into all the things, 
and as soon as we find out all the lessons we are going to learn from it, we will come back to you 
and [name mother]. But yes, if you want to blame somebody, you can blame me. And the first time 
I list this, because we knew the child through the  [?] so look, oh no, well it’s not fair, you were not 
involved. I said but yes, I am involved.”  
 
In this instance, the clinician bends under pressure of the victim’s anger and accepts responsibility. 
This, they say, produced ‘a breath of fresh air’:  
 
Extract 8 (Director Health Service [Qld 124])  
“And you know, ah it was one of the most dramatic experiences I ever had. As soon as I offered 
that [statement about taking responsibility for the adverse event] to them, it’s almost like there was 
a breath of fresh air coming into this room, you know, and you really - you could see him 
physically change, you know? … His tone changed, his body language changed, and he was like 
saying you know, things like so where … where do we go from here? You know? So that to me, 
was a very eye-opening experience, very.” 
 
Another clinicians describes their experience of how ‘venting’ can lead to reconciliation: 
 
Extract X (Medical Superintendent [Qld 164])  
 “Nonetheless, the opportunity to ventilate for the family, the mum when she went out, [name 
daughter] was still angry. She was not happy at all, but the mother who had left the room at one 
stage in the proceedings and, um, I think the mother went out for a fag, so I left her out there for a 
while then said to [name daughter], when I thought she could have finished her fag, ‘[name 
patient], go get your mum’, and she came back and the thing sort of rolled on from there. And on 
the way out [name daughter] said, [name mother] said, after ventilating quite a lot of emotion, 
‘Mostly I’m really very nice. I’m not always like this.’  
 
These interviewees’ comments show that Open Disclosure is considerably more than revealing 
adverse events to patients and uttering a controlled apology. These interview responses suggest 
that Open Disclosure is in the first instance an affective practice. Clinicians doing the disclosing 
need to intuit patients’, family members’ and colleagues’ reactions to adverse events; they need to 
be able to ‘read’ who among the staff are going to be defensive and intransigent, and the disclosers 
themselves need to be able to ‘sit on their hands’ as well as intervene strategically into how these 
emotional dynamics play themselves out. Indeed, in managing the affective dynamics among the 
different stakeholders, disclosers are charged with creating what Thrift calls an ‘on-demand 
environment’ (Thrift, 2004a).   
 
A New Structure of Attention? 
 
As noted in our overview with which we began our article, Open Disclosure is a complex domain 
of health reform. Its policy brings together numerous discourses, including clinical medicine, 
health services reform, legal justice, restorative ethics, risk management, patient safety, incident 
investigation, clinical quality improvement, and insurance and indemnity pay-out minimization. 
There are strong tensions among these discourses, and these are left for the frontline employee to 
resolve while in conference with the victims of incidents. In the knowledge that these meetings can 
be volatile interactive spaces, Open Disclosure policy and training advise staff to limit their 
apologies to expressions of regret, and reassure victims that a satisfactory explanation will be 
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forthcoming, as well clear and realistic change management plans to prevent the incident from 
reoccurring.  
 
As the interview data demonstrated, however, the affective work that clinicians need to do to 
realize this practice is considerable. They move precariously among the limits dictated by their 
lawyers, the proscriptions inscribed into their insurance contracts, the policies put out by health 
departments and health care organizations, and patients’ and family members anger and despair. 
Open Disclosure counsels against legal advice of the last few decades by adopting the principle of 
openness, but the way this openness is enacted will determine whether it is promoted to ward off 
complaints and litigation, or whether it is indeed able to achieve restorative justice for victims. It is 
at the heart of disclosure as interactive practice that these matters are decided: are disclosers able 
to deploy their reflexive listening training without mobilizing it for the purpose of silencing 
victims? Woods, who we cited earlier, has strong views on the matter: 
 
Authentic listening is not a technique. It is centered in compassion and in a concern for the other 
person that goes beyond our self-centered needs. Listening authentically is centered in the principle 
of psychological reciprocity: To influence others, we must first be open to their influence. (Woods, 
2007: 119) 
 
Woods is skeptical about attempts to up-skill frontline clinicians in ‘error communication’ that 
centres on enunciating ‘appropriate apologies’ (e.g. Liebman & Hyman, 2004).  
 
… policies that try to choreograph what providers can and cannot say, as malpractice insurers seem 
interested in doing … [amount to] an attempt to micromanage the provider-patient relationship – to 
control communication – and I believe this can paradoxically drive a wedge between two people at 
a time when it is most critical for honest, respectful, transparent communication and where apology 
is the norm. As long as organizations continue to treat apology and disclosure as a risk management 
strategy, instead of an authentic attempt to help providers maintain trust and enhance the provider-
patient relationship, they will continue on their path to ineffective results. They will never 
maximize risk management benefits because their intent is wrong. They’re trying to do the right 
thing for the wrong reason.” (Woods, 2007: 37) 
 
Nevertheless, towards the end of his book, Woods sets out discursive examples of what he regards 
as realizing authentic communication. In situations where clinicians are facing angry 
patients/families, he recommends that they use language such as that reproduced below (italics in 
original): 
 
I see that you are angry. I would like to take a few minutes to reflect on my performance and how it 
has led to the current situation. Let me think this over so I can respond thoughtfully and accurately 
to your concerns and offer an appropriate apology. (Woods, 2007: 74) 
 
Woods is equally specific about non-verbal body practices and how they play a role in conveying 
authenticity: “sit down within touching distance”; “Look at your patient”; “To be effective, your 
body language must be in synch with your words and tone of voice”. It would be easy to be critical 
of this scripted authenticity. But for Woods, we suspect, these discursive recommendations are 
intended to provide an entry point into what Thrift would call ‘a new structure of attention’, 
enabling frontline clinicians to begin to ‘hear’ patients (families) in ways they have not been able 
to do before. This reflexive element is at the centre of Woods’ book, with the authentic apology 
functioning as a reconfirmation of the fiduciary morality that underpins the doctor-patient 
relationship.  
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On a broader front, it seems undeniable that the adverse event, conventionally regarded as part and 
parcel of the ‘known risks’ of health care provision, has now shifted into a space where the 
public’s right to know requires it to be revealed, investigated, turned into learning, and prevented 
in future. Contributing to this shift in a major way, Open Disclosure is a policy reform initiative 
that intervenes in the communicative contours of clinicians’ obligations to patients and in the 
interpersonal complexion of their relationships with those who experience adverse events. Open 
Disclosure tries to spell out what experiences staff are to produce for patients/families following 
an incident, drawing on and designing affect to restore the service’s credibility, control, and 
confidence. Revealing the inevitable tensions that are at its heart, Open Disclosure is intended to 
generate an interactive space whose affectivity and intensity are at once deliberately engendered 
and  yet carefully managed by the partial apology and limited disclosure (eg the junior doctor’s 
name is not given).  
 
Framed thus, Open Disclosure is no longer co-extensive with conventional clinical-professional 
training, where communication ensures that sufficient amounts and appropriate types of 
information are exchanged to ensure smooth unfolding of the clinician-patient relationship and 
achieve optimal outcomes for both the service (provider) and the patient. Communication, in the 
conventional mode, centres on performing emotional labour to achieve pre-circumscribed 
outcomes: ‘a satisfactory explanation’, ‘release of victims’ anger and venting of their grievances’, 
‘reassurance that the organization will take steps to prevent reoccurrence’, ‘communication 
follow-up to demonstrate changes made to the service’. Here, of course, the term emotional labour 
can harbour a utilitarian accusation: emotion is communicatively produced to achieve a pre-
determined outcome or to satisfy the expectations of others (Taylor, 1998); it is not (meant to be) 
experienced through the immediacy of human co-presence. 
 
But it is here that the interview statements presented above are most revealing. As the interviewees 
confirmed, their planning of Open Disclosure sessions could never guarantee that the disclosure 
would go as envisaged. They were clear that they were not able to direct the meetings, come in 
with pre-scripted lines, or impose their views of what was just, correct and right. Examples 
demonstrated that the affective intensity of the meetings may override any control the clinicians 
might want to retain over the interaction. The only tactic left for them was ‘to sit on their hands 
and listen’. In effect, in disclosing incidents they found themselves engaging with patients’ and 
family members’ feelings, ‘sharing the pain’, and creating an acceptable affective outcome for 




The literature reveals tensions at the heart of Open Disclosure among clinical, legal, indemnity, 
moral and organizational discourses. The analyses presented above reveal a further tension 
between the abstract intents of these various discourses and the volatile nature of the in situ 
interactions that Open Disclosure policy implementation can call forth. Will more litigation be the 
result, or will the interpersonal intensity of disclosure predispose consumers towards reconciling 
themselves with the limits of their health care system? Consumers may accept the emotional 
tokens of sorrow extended to them by staff as valid, or they may reject staff’s emotional labour in 
expectation of a genuine, more tangible apology. Open Disclosure policy privileges the ‘partial 
apology’ (cf. Vines, 2005) and thereby risks being granted ‘cheap grace’ (Berlinger, 2003). 
However, the intensity of communication that clinicians are having to face, described in some of 
the interview statements above, makes it difficult to fully reduce this initiative to a ‘cynical 
civility’ (Vines, 2005).  
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Over and above the emotional labour that has conventionally characterized clinical work with 
patients, clinicians are encouraged and enabled by this health reform to pay reflexive attention to 
how they engage with others’ concerns, feelings, and expectations, without immediately 
questioning or rejecting their relevance. With this rise in emphasis on communicative ability and 
reflexive listening, the criteria for clinical success and failure may indeed have begun to shift from 
technical skill criteria towards communicative acumen: is the clinician able to provide ‘patient-
centred care’, appropriately break bad news, and, now, conduct honest and open discussions with 
each other and with patients and families about complications and incidents, as well as handle the 
emotional fall-out from those encounters?  
 
Open Disclosure confronts staff with the consequences of incidents for patients/families, and 
thereby potentially perturbs existing identities and prevailing communication practices. As argued, 
Open Disclosure may engender a new structure of attention on the part of clinical professionals, 
and this may well mark the beginning of a new level of acceptance and insight into the limits of 
health care on the part of the public. Something like – need more time data to tell yes!. It is true 
that the Open Disclosure literature contains considerable procedural advice and attention to the 
constraints of risk management (Cantor, Barach, Derse, Maklan, Wlody, & Fox, 2005; Fein, 
Hilborne, Kagawa-Singer, Spiritus, Keenan, Seymann et al., 2005; Liebman & Hyman, 2004). Yet 
in offering this guidance, this literature is nevertheless united on what is at issue here: “physicians 
and other health care professionals [have to] develop an awareness of the communication skills 
most likely to be useful during disclosure conversations” (Liebman & Hyman, 2004: 24). For our 
subjects Open Disclosure interactions engendered real emotions and risk; this new affective space 
could not be predictably controlled and there was tension between procedural requirements and the 
ethical obligations introduced by reflexive listening. Our analysis therefore uggests new 
communication awareness extends from knowing facts and formal constraints to being heedful to 
the dynamics of affect-charged social interaction. 5 
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APPENDIX L: TEAM PERSONNEL - BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENTS 
 
Professor Rick Iedema – Coordinator of the Project 
 
BA (Liverpool, U.K.), MA &  PhD (Syd) 
Professor of Organizational Communication 
Associate Dean (Research), Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Technology Sydney 
Prof Rick Iedema’s contribution to the study of clinical communication in hospitals is 
internationally recognized across the areas of organization studies, health care quality 
and safety and health services research and discourse analysis. In partnership with 
colleagues, he has attracted over $8 million in peer-reviewed funding over the last 8 
years. His research success includes Principal Chief Investigator roles on three 3-year 
ARC Discovery grants that attracted above-average funding, and co-Chief Investigator 
roles on three ARC-SPIRT/Linkage funded projects, two NHMRC projects, a National 
Breast Cancer Foundation project, and a Clinical Excellence Commission project. He 
acts as ‘Expert of High International Standing’ for the Australian Research Council and 
reviews grants for the Danish Research Council for the Humanities and for the 
Singaporean National Research Foundation. He has published over 100 peer-reviewed 
articles, book chapters, full-length conference papers and book reviews in international, 
high-ranking journals across different disciplinary domains, including Organization 
Studies, Social Science and Medicine, British Medical Journal, Health Services 
Management Research, Communication and Medicine, Discourse and Society, Text 
and Visual Communication. Rick’s work has attracted several invitations to present 
international keynotes and contribute articles to state-of-the-art publications such as 
encyclopaedias, handbooks and journal special issues. His research targets how 
doctors, nurses, allied health staff and managers communicate about the organization 
of their hospital work, and inquires into whether and how clinicians’ communications 
realize the intent of 21st century hospital reform initiatives. Rick has taken overall 
carriage of the Open Disclosure Evaluation project; he has interviewed stakeholders, 
and had oversight of data analysis, report production and publication of results.  
 
Associate Professor Elizabeth Manias 
 
BPharm, M Pharm, RN, MNStudies, PhD 
Associate Professor, School of Nursing, University of Melbourne 
A/Prof Elizabeth Manias is a registered nurse and pharmacist who has made a 
sustained contribution in medication safety, interpersonal and organisational 
communication, and consumer participation. Her work has examined the complex 
communication processes about how clinical care is carried out by examining different 
perspectives and the complexities of the dynamic environment in which communication 
takes place. She has extensive experience and expertise in undertaking hospital 
ethnographic research and evaluation studies in hospitals and universities. To date, she 
has received over $1.4M of competitive research funding from diverse sources, 
including ARC and NHMRC. She has also obtained competitive funding from 
government sources including the Victorian Department of Human Services, the 
Nurses’ Board of Victoria and the previous Australian Council for Safety and Quality in 
Health Care to support her work. She is the author or co-author of 7 textbooks, 7 book 
chapters, 65 peer-reviewed research journal articles, 8 multimedia medication 
programs, and numerous other publications. Her work has attracted invitations to 
present at national and international conferences, to provide consultancies with key 
international organisations (e.g. the Medicines Council of the United Kingdom), and to 
contribute papers to high quality publications including journal special issues, chapters 
in books and position statements. A/Prof Manias’s work upholds the importance of 
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translating findings into practice, and in disseminating knowledge generated in creative 
and diverse ways. For instance, she developed a medication management education 
module for nurses who wish to be endorsed as nurse practitioners in the state of Victoria. 
She was the leader of the team that negotiated the successful tender from the 
Department of Human Services to develop this module. The team subsequently 
produced comprehensive guidelines for quality teaching and learning about medications, 
which were to be implemented by all Victorian Universities. She is also a co-author of the 
highly successful textbook, Fundamentals of Pharmacology, which is in its 5th edition. 
This is the prescribed medication education textbook used in most Australian and New 
Zealand University Schools of Nursing. It is also used in Asia, South America and the 
United Kingdom. The textbook won two prestigious awards in The Australian Awards for 
Excellence in Educational Publishing in 2004. These Awards are the premier event for 
acknowledging excellence and creative innovation in textbook publishing. In 2005, she 
was awarded the prestigious Mona Menzies Award by the Nurses Board of Victoria, in 
view of her exemplary contribution to health care. Her understanding of current health 
care trends and emerging needs is shaped through active membership on key 
committees. On a state government level she is a member on two health committees: 
the Victorian Medicines Advisory Committee and the Victorian Medication Safety 
Committee, which provide advice on medicine-related issues. On a national level she is 
a member of the Royal College of Nursing Australia Quality Use of Medicines Network, 
which develops position statements on nurses’ roles in medication management, and 
makes recommendations to commonwealth bodies on patient safety in medication use. 
Her role has been to supervise Allison Williams, interview stakeholders, and contribute 
to data analysis. 
 
Professor Desley Hegney 
 
RN, Cert. Occ. Health Nursing (Sydney), DipNursEd (ACAE), BA (Hons) (UNE), 
PhD (Southern Cross), FRCNA, FCN (NSW), FAIM 
Director, Research Practice Development Centre, The University of Queensland 
and Blue Care, Professor of Rural and Remote Nursing [Sister E Kenny Chair] – 
University of Southern Queensland, University of Queensland, Toowoomba 
Health Service District, Director, Centre for Rural and Remote Area Health, 
Director, Australian Centre for Rural and Remote Evidence Based Practice 
Professor Desley Hegney's major research interest has been in the area of primary 
health care nursing – particularly rural nursing and practice nursing. She was the 
inaugural president of the Association for Australian Rural Nurses Inc., and the 
foundation Editor of the Australian Journal of Rural Health (1992-2003). Her research 
into the role and function of the rural nurse in Australia described for the first time the 
generalist advanced practice role of rural nurses in Australia. Her work has since been 
replicated in Canada. Desley is a foundation member of the executive of the ICN Rural 
and Remote Area Nursing Network, formed in Canada in 2004. Her contribution to the 
profession includes membership of: The Queensland Nursing Council's Steering 
Committee for the Scope of Nursing Practice (including the Decision Making 
Framework); the Queensland Health Ministerial Advisory Board on Rural Health; the 
Queensland Health Ministerial Taskforce for the Recruitment and Retention of Nurses; 
and Deputy-Chair of the National Rural Health Alliance. Desley is currently on the 
Editorial Boards of The Journal of Rural and Remote Health (online); the Rural Nursing 
Journal (published online in the USA) and the Australian Journal of Advanced Nursing. 
Desley is an experienced researcher, attracting funding totally $2.5 million in the last 
five years and has published extensively from these research projects. Desley has 
given approximately 45 invited and keynote addresses in the last five years and is also 
an experienced teacher. Desely developed the Graduate Certificate and Masters of 
Advanced Nursing Practice (Rural and Remote) at the University of Southern 
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Queensland. This was the first rural and remote nursing nurse practitioner program to 
be accredited in Australia. Her role has been to supervise data collection at the 
Brisbane site and contribute to data analysis. 
 
Dr Anthony Tuckett 
 
Senior Lecturer, University of Queensland, PhD 
Anthony Tuckett was the 2001 Centaur Doctoral Fellow and a 2005 Honorary Fellow at 
the School of Nursing, University of Queensland. Anthony has published widely on the 
topic of truth-telling in health care. 
 
Donella Piper  
 
Barrister/Solicitor High Court of NSW, PhD Candidature (Public Participation in 
Health Care Decision-Making)  
Donella Piper is currently a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Clinical Governance 
located within the Faculty of Medicine at the University of New South Wales.  The topic 
of her thesis is “The Role of Legislation in Facilitating Community Participation in 
Healthcare Governance : NSW Health a Case-study.” She is a Legal Practitioner of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales (Practising Certificate Class A) and Barrister and 
Solicitor of the High Court of Australia.  She has practised primarily in commercial law 
matters, including providing corporate governance advice to entities and conducting 
legal compliance audits.  Donella was a Director New England Area Health Service 
(NEAHS) from July 2002 - July 2004.   During the term of her appointment she was 
Chair of the NEAHS Clinical Ethics Committee and a member of the NEAHS Medical 
and Dental Appointments Committee.  Donella has lectured in law at UNE School of 
law (1996-2004) and Flinders University of South Australia (1996-97) in a variety of 
subject including legal ethics and professional conduct, equity and trusts, contract law, 
introduction to business law, property law, corporations law, constitutional law and 




BPsych Hons (UNSW), MEd (by Research, UNSW) 
Su-yin is a post-graduate researcher with a background in psychology and training in 
psychological research methods, with experience designing and conducting an 
Australia-wide study with gifted primary school students, using both quantitative and 
qualitative survey data for her Masters research in Education. Su-yin is currently 
undertaking research for her PhD with the Centre for Clinical Governance Research as 
part of a wider ARC Discovery Grant: 'Anchoring preventive health care to positive 
learning', using ethnographic methods to study how clinicians act and interact with 
each other, in learning from and preventing adverse events, near misses, critical 




BHI, MHI (Health Informatics) 
Researcher, Australian Council for Health Care Standards 
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Ms Nadine Mallock is a Research Officer at the Centre.  She has a background in 
Health Informatics and is currently completing an economics degree.  Ms Mallock has 
extensive experience in administering and analysing questionnaires, searching 
databases and the Internet, managing projects, writing reports and liaising with health 
care key stakeholders.  She is/or has been working on a wide range of projects 
including the evaluation of Point of Clinical Care Systems, knowledge management, 
the development of a health sector impact evaluation tool, diversity management and 
defining the public health workforce.  In 2002, Ms Mallock was part of the Clinical 
Practice Improvement Training Program evaluation team. Her role has been to 
organise and coordinate aspects of the Open Disclosure study. 
 
Dr Allison Williams 
 
B.App.Sc.(Nsg.), Monash University Grad. Dip. Adv.Nsg.(Clin. Nurse Ed.), 
LaTrobe University, Master of Nursing, LaTrobe University, PhD, The University 
of Melbourne  
Research Fellow, School of Nursing, The University of Melbourne  
Allison Williams is a Research Fellow at the School of Nursing, The University of 
Melbourne, Australia. Allison has a strong interest in enhancing standards of 
professional practice and health care delivery. Her research interests relate to disease 
management and symptom control in people with chronic disease states. She is 
interested in issues concerning informed consent and open disclosure in relation to 
medicine self-management and has a successful grant as Principal Researcher in the 
ARC Linkage Australian Postdoctoral Research Fellowship (Industry) investigating 




Dr Ros Sorensen 
 
BSocWrk, PhD (UNSW) 
Senior Lecturer, School of Nursing, University of Technology Sydney 
Ros Sorensen is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Nursing, Midwifery & Health and 
researcher in the Centre for Health Services Management. She teaches in a range of 
subjects related to health service organisation and management. Her research 
interests and activities lie in health policy development and implementation, health 
service governance and accountability, managing clinical processes in clinical 
workplaces and health service organisations, and understanding the personal and 
professional dynamics in managing change. She has authored over twenty publications 
in the field of health service organisation and change management and delivered over 




Dr Sue Brownhill 
 
Research Fellow, Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences, University of 
Technology Sydney 
PhD 
Sue Brownhill has extensive experience in social scientific research methods. Sue’s role 
on the project has been to deduce themes from the interview data, using grounded 
theory. 
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Dr Bruce Perrott 
 
BCom, MBA, PhD (UNSW) 
Senior Lecturer, School of Marketing, Faculty of Business, University of 
Technology Sydney 
Bruce Perrott's interests lie in the area of strategic management. He is concerned with 
how business and marketing strategies are formulated, formalised and managed 
through the implementation process. His current focus relates to the impact on 
electronic marketspace developments on business and marketing strategy and 
marketing/business strategy in health care. Bruce teaches in the areas of Marketing 
strategy; Marketing management; New product management; Electronic business 
projects; and Marketing strategy for electronic business. His research areas include 
Electronic marketing; transformation; management education for electronic business; 




A/Prof Hermine Scheeres 
 
MA (Syd), DipEd (Syd Teach Coll), GradDipTESOL (SCAE), PhD (UQ) 
Associate Professor, School of Adult Education, University of Technology 
Sydney 
Hermine Scheeres has worked in higher education; technical and further education and 
secondary education in Australia, England, Mexico and Argentina. Her current 
positions include: Co-ordinator of the BA Organisational Learning and the Grad Dip 
Literacy and Numeracy. She is a member of UTS Academic Board, Deputy Chair of the 
Board of the Faculty of Education, a member of the UTS Equity Reference Committee 
and Co-editor of the Journal Literacy and Numeracy Studies: an international journal in 
the education and training of adults. Hermine has developed curriculum and 
professional development courses and materials for organisations and institutions 
including: NSW State Rail; Kelloggs Australia; TAFE (equivalent) teachers in Mexico; 
English Language teachers in Argentina; Adult Literacy teachers across Australia; and 
the NSW Board of Secondary School Education (HSC). She has also worked as a 
consultant, adviser and trainer for government departments and industry. Her role has 
been to interview stakeholders. 
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